

ST. LOUIS-GLOBE-DEMOCRAT (MO)
31 October 1983

'Realistic' strategy against Soviets urged

Globe-Democrat-Los Angeles Times
News Service

FULTON, Mo. — The United States should develop "a realistic counterstrategy" to combat Soviet disruption in the Middle East and Central America, CIA Director William J. Casey has urged.

"The priority of less-developed countries in our overall foreign policy needs to be raised and sustained," Casey said in delivering a lecture Saturday at Westminster College, the same platform from which Winston Churchill warned in 1946 that an "Iron Curtain" had descended on Eastern Europe.

"We have too often neglected our friends and neutrals in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia until they became a problem or were threatened by developments hostile to our interests," Casey said in accepting an honorary doctor of laws degree from the college.

IN ADDITION to paying greater heed to Third World countries, Casey said, the United States should train its allies "in counterinsurgency tactics and upgrade their communications, mobility, police and intelligence capabilities."

He called for relaxing U.S.

foreign military sales laws so "our friends" can be provided self-defense arms more quickly.

Casey said the United States should "demand firmly but tactfully and privately that our friends observe certain standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights." American principles and domestic political support require such an approach, he said.

Talking directly to Third World countries about land reform and anti-corruption steps is required to block foreign exploitation of such problems, Casey said.

"WE NEED to show how the Soviets have exploited such vulnerabilities elsewhere to make clear that we aren't preaching out of cultural arrogance," he said.

Casey said the United States should devise a means of mobilizing private business, which he described as America's greatest asset in the Third World.

"Investment is the key to economic success or at least survival in the Third World. And we, our NATO allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy to promote private investment" there, he said. "The Soviets are helpless to compete with private capital in these countries."



William J. Casey: Spoke at Westminster College.

Casey said the Soviet Union recognizes that power rests with the military in most Third World countries and has thus sought either to win over the officers' corps in those countries or to help replace them with military men more likely to do the Soviets' bidding.

"Having for a decade denounced 'the merchants of death' (the United States), the Soviets have become the world's leading supplier of arms," Casey said. In recent years, their arms shipments to the Third World have been four times greater than their economic assistance, he said.

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What U.S. didn't know is a concern

By Doyle McManus
Los Angeles Times Service

WASHINGTON — The discovery of huge arms caches and Soviet-bloc advisers on Grenada, coupled with unexpectedly strong resistance by Cuban and Grenadian fighters, has given Reagan administration officials a sobering lesson in the limits of U.S. intelligence operations.

The disclosures about the extent of operations on Grenada by Communist-bloc personnel have provided the administration with additional justifications for its intervention.

But it has also raised questions about the adequacy of U.S. intelligence efforts on a strategically located island that has long been identified as a potential security problem for this country — especially because large numbers of Americans lived on Grenada.

CIA explanation

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in a closed session Friday, asked CIA Director William J. Casey to explain the CIA's performance before the invasion. A committee source said Casey acknowledged that intelligence had been deficient. He also told the senators that "meaningful intelligence was extremely difficult to come by" according to Sen. David Durenberger (R., Minn.).

Administration officials said that commanders of the U.S. invasion force had estimated that they would face about 600 Cubans and 1,200 Grenadian troops; they found themselves fighting as many as 1,100 Cubans, with heavier weapons and better training than had been expected.

"From my standpoint, I didn't have enough intelligence," Adm. Wesley McDonald said. "Resistance was much greater than expected due to Cuban military involvement."

"We didn't anticipate Cuban fighting units," Gen. John W. Vessey Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said earlier.

As one result, McDonald, commander-in-chief of U.S. Atlantic naval forces, increased the original U.S. fighting force of 1,900 to about 3,000 troops by Thursday and 6,000 on Friday.

No useful intelligence

Administration officials said the problem was not a failure of intelligence but, instead, a situation in which the United States had few opportunities to gather useful intelligence.

The United States had no permanent representatives in Grenada, and the leftist regime permitted few visits by U.S. diplomats, officials said.

The CIA had no spy network on the island and as a result, they said, the United States had general information on political and military developments in Grenada, but little specific tactical information.

Under questioning about a possible intelligence "failure," White House spokesman Larry Speakes said Thursday, "When you don't have any intelligence resources there at all, something can't fail that isn't there."

The United States did have satellite photographs of the 10,000-foot airstrip the Cubans were building on the island, but U.S. intelligence officials apparently failed to detect the buildup of Cuban troops or the number of weapons they were bringing ashore.

Casey reportedly acknowledged that the military planners' information had been deficient, but noted that "intelligence is not an exact science."

Durenberger said much of the information the United States was using apparently came from Eastern Caribbean countries that joined the invasion.

McDonald also defended the intelligence effort.

"From my standpoint, I didn't have enough intelligence, but I don't think there was a failure there," he told a Pentagon news conference. "I think you have to look at the total perspective of what we were trying to gather. To concentrate intelligence for an assault on an island such as Grenada is something we are not geared to do under normal circumstances."

"We were looking at Grenada in the broad aspect of what was going on, but on the details for a planned incursion into the country — to evacuate American citizens by force — was something that we did not have as much intelligence as I, as fleet commander, would like to have," he said. "I think we just didn't have the time to concentrate on it."

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WASHINGTON TIMES
31 October 1983

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Casey calls for 'realistic' strategy

FULTON, Mo. — The United States has failed to properly confront the challenge of the Soviet Union in Third World countries and needs to develop "a realistic counter-strategy" for the newest ideological battleground, CIA Director William Casey said.

"It is past time for the American government — executive branch and Congress — to take the Soviet challenge in the Third World seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it," Casey said in a speech over the weekend at Westminster College.

Casey's message also reinforced the Reagan administration's rationale for keeping troops in Lebanon and Grenada: that they are essential to hold back Soviet influence and allow citizens to freely choose their own governments.

From Times News Services and Staff Reports

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US NEWS & WORLD REPORT
31 October 1983

STAT

Washington Whispers.

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One of Robert McFarlane's first tasks as Reagan's new national-security aide, insiders say, will be to convince Defense Secretary Weinberger and CIA Director Casey that he is not a "captive" of the State Department and will fairly present to the President their hard-line views on foreign and defense issues.

★ ★ ★

U.S. intelligence analysts are baffled by Soviet President Yuri Andropov's long absence—more than six weeks—from public view. One theory is that Andropov has been sidelined by serious illness.

Feelings of Hurt and Betrayal

Kirkpatrick suspects she was done in by her friends

When U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, who had been accompanying the Kissinger Commission in Central America, flew to Washington for a speaking engagement two weeks ago, she had no indication that a major staff change was about to take place. National Security Adviser William Clark said nothing about it when they met at the White House, and it was only because she had a bad bronchial infection that she canceled her return to Latin America. She did not hear about her trusted colleague's nomination as Interior Secretary until an aide called the following day.

Thus began a process that, at least in the eyes of the proud and prickly U.N. Ambassador, TIME has learned, laid bare the backbiting and power struggles within the White House. Kirkpatrick was not upset primarily by her failure to be tapped for the National Security Council (NSC) post. But she now views what happened to her as a shabby betrayal by people she considered friends within the Administration. Whether or not the slights she perceives were in fact intended, her experience provides a glimpse of the personal rivalries that have long undermined Ronald Reagan's policymaking apparatus and of the human toll such struggles exact.

When Clark finally called her to tell of his move, Kirkpatrick urged him to reconsider. She feared there would be no one left in the Administration with clout enough to pull together American policy around the globe. Secretary of State George Shultz, she felt, was too absorbed in international economic policy, East-West issues and crisis management in the Middle East to develop strategy elsewhere. Until now, she and her hard-line allies, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey, had been able to fill the gap, but only because Clark listened to them—and Reagan listened to him.

Although he later let it be known that he had sought the Interior job, Clark told Kirkpatrick that he was simply doing what the President asked. He assured her that there would be no ill effects on policy if she were to succeed him at the NSC. It was an idea seconded by Casey, when he called the same evening.

Kirkpatrick had not at that point harbored any real hope of taking over at the NSC. A few months before, noticing that Clark seemed overburdened, she had offered to give up her U.N. post and come to Washington as his deputy. He had turned the suggestion aside, adding that she might become National Security Ad-

viser if he ever quit. Just before she left for Central America, Clark confided that he was tired of the disagreements with Shultz. The NSC job was taxing his health, and he wanted her to succeed him. But she filed these conversations away as idle speculations.

Senior White House aides say that Clark in reality never thought Kirkpatrick was the most suitable replacement. All along, Clark's deputy Robert McFarlane was considered by most of Reagan's advisers, and even by Reagan, as the obvious choice. But as in other foreign policy personnel disputes during the past three years, Reagan allowed the uncertainty to linger and leak. What should have been a clean change of command became another running story—similar to the one that accompanied the departure of Secretary of State Alexander Haig—of struggles between Administration pragmatists and ideologues. The recriminations from the dispute are still reverberating. "Those who fought McFarlane," says one consummate White House infighter, "did not help themselves."

As the President delayed announcing his choice, the maneuvering among his aides quickened. Kirkpatrick was too ill to attend a White House foreign policy meeting, and Clark phoned her afterward to reveal that a new succession plan had been discussed. Chief of Staff James Baker and Presidential Assistant Michael Deaver seized the opportunity to propose a radical plan that would have made them the undisputed joint czars of the White House staff: Baker would take the NSC job and Deaver would become chief of staff. Clark immediately opposed the move, arguing that the President's motives would be suspect since Baker was his top political adviser and had no foreign policy experience. Weinberger and Casey strongly agreed. Moreover, Reagan's more conservative supporters considered Baker the leader of the pragmatists, and hence evil incarnate.

The strongest opposition to Kirkpatrick came from Shultz. He implied to a few associates that he would resign if she got the NSC post, and that word was

passed to the White House. But the question in the minds of the White House staff soon became not whether Kirkpatrick would get the job, but how to assuage her disappointment about her loss to McFarlane and the decline of her influence now that Clark was gone.

Kirkpatrick had expressed her frustrations with the U.N. and the need to commute to New York City from her home near Washington. But in seeking to let her down gently about not getting the NSC job, White House aides gave her the impression that they wanted to oust her from the U.N. post. When Clark called to say that McFarlane would be appointed, he told Kirkpatrick that she had three alternatives: becoming the Deputy National Security Adviser, taking over the Agency for International Development, or coming into the White House as a Presidential Counsellor, a title now held only by Edwin Meese. She quickly rejected these options, feeling that without a base of power she would be easily bypassed by Shultz and McFarlane.

Meese was also uncomfortable with the idea of bringing Kirkpatrick in as a Counsellor, feeling that the new post would dilute his own power and title. So too were McFarlane and Shultz. But others tried to persuade her to take a job in Washington. Casey called and asked if he could come by for a drink. Pulling herself from her sickbed, Kirkpatrick drove to a pharmacy for a cold remedy and then received the CIA director at her Bethesda, Md., home. He urged her to take the Counsellor's job. Weinberger talked to her on the phone for an hour the next morning trying to persuade her to become McFarlane's deputy. She told them both no. As a close friend later put it, "What would she do at national security briefings? Chime in and correct McFarlane?"

Kirkpatrick was invited to meet with the President on Monday before his announcement of McFarlane's appointment. Clark, apparently wishing to keep the encounter secret, suggested that she use the diplomatic entrance, where the press was

CONTINUED

not allowed. She refused, saying that she would enter the White House publicly as she always had. In contrast to the chilly dealings she had been having with most of his staff, the hourlong meeting with Reagan was friendly. He offered her the Counsellor's title or another Washington job, and again she refused. But he seemed genuinely eager to have her stay on at the U.N. if she wanted. She promised him that she would wait until the end of the year to reassess her position.

What most upset Kirkpatrick, upon her return to her official residence in the Waldorf Towers in New York, was the implication of White House aides that she would be leaving the U.N. Although many no doubt thought they were accommodating her own expressed wishes, the feisty Kirkpatrick viewed their urgings that she "move" to Washington as an attempt to remove her from her job. "Why 'move' to Washington?" a friend quotes her as saying. "Don't they know I live there?"

She was particularly upset by a story in the *Washington Times* by Reporter Jeremiah O'Leary, a former aide to Clark, that said Baker might take over her U.N. post. (If the story was indeed intentionally planted, it seemed aimed at undermining both Baker and Kirkpatrick, since such a scenario would require that she be fired and be moved from the White House.) Baker termed the story "baloney" and Clark called to deny it, but Kirkpatrick now fears that she is being humiliated through the press like others who have been unceremoniously dumped from power. Her speculations about the motives of those spreading such stories have become quite byzantine: perhaps they want to maneuver Jim Baker out of the White House, or to signal a shift to a more moderate foreign policy prior to an election year. There was no evidence that there was in fact any serious desire in the White House to ease her out of her job; by week's end senior aides had concluded that her determination to stay at the U.N. was best for all concerned.



Feeling harassed and still popping cold pills, Kirkpatrick last week lamented that her sense of propriety had been violated—not only by her detractors but also by those she once thought were friends. She feels that she has been too "trusting," and confides to intimates that she now knows how Alexander Haig, once her archenemy, must have felt when he was forced out. To her mind, the only person above suspicion is the President, whom she considers a decent man, largely unaware of his staff's manipulative ways. Yet when an aide last week told her that the President's press conference was on television, she turned away, as if not wanting to be reminded of the pain he had unwittingly caused. She said she never watches television, and asked the aide to tell her if anything important came up.

—By Walter Isaacson.

Reported by Laurence I. Barrett and Gregory H. Wierzynski/Washington

World Briefs

Counter-strategy urged

WASHINGTON — The United States has failed to properly confront the challenge of the Soviet Union in third-world countries and now must develop "a realistic counter-strategy" for that ideological battleground, Central Intelligence Agency director William Casey said Saturday.

"It is past time for the American government — executive branch and Congress — to take the Soviet challenge in the third world seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it," Casey said.

Casey said the United States must raise the priority of developing nations in its foreign policy, advise them "firmly but tactfully" about the need for standards of human rights and government honesty and mobilize what he called "our greatest asset in the third world — private business."

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ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
30 October 1983

CIA Head Urges Strategy To Fight Soviet Influence In Third World

By Girard C. Steichen
Of the Post-Dispatch Staff

FULTON, Mo. — The United States must develop a realistic counter-strategy to stop growing Soviet influence in the Third World and at the same time help developing nations establish stable economies and democracies.

That was the message that the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William J. Casey, delivered Saturday in an address at Westminster College here.

"It is past time for the American government — executive branch and Congress — to take the Soviet challenge in the Third World seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it," Casey said in his lecture.

Casey was invited to the college to deliver the 40th John Findley Green Foundation Lecture, made famous by Winston Churchill's 1946 "Iron Curtain" lecture.

Casey called Soviet involvement in Third World countries creeping imperialism. He said the Soviet Union or its proxies were promoting violence and revolution in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica.

Casey also cited another example: "The early reports from Grenada indicate that in addition to Cubans and Soviets, there are Bulgarians, East Germans, North Koreans and other Communist bloc nations there. Working from the Soviet embassy, they were working to establish a permanent military base in the eastern Caribbean."

Referring to Churchill's warning of Soviet expansion in 1946, Casey said:

"How much more alarmed would Churchill be if he looked around the world today and saw how the Soviets have grown in strength and how far they have extended their power and influence beyond the Iron Curtain he so aptly labeled."

He said the Middle East and Central America are areas most heavily targeted by the Soviet Union.

"Soviet power is already solidly established in Cuba and Nicaragua," Casey said.

The Soviet Union also has attempted to consolidate its influence in Afghanistan, Africa and Asia, threatening the West's vital oil interests while eroding American security closer to home, he said.

To counter growing Soviet influence in the Third World, Casey said, the United States must raise and sustain the importance of developing nations in foreign policy planning.

The United States must advise developing nations firmly but tactfully about the need for standards of human rights and government honesty, Casey said.

"We have to be willing to talk straight to those we would help about issues they must address to block foreign exploitation of their problems — issues such as land reform, corruption and the like."

He urged changes in laws governing foreign military sales to permit the United States to provide arms to allies more quickly while continuing to give economic assistance.

"American influence in Central America will be damaged if the West is unable to sensitively and constructively assist the people of Central America and Mexico in defending themselves as well as solving their social and economic

problems on their own terms," Casey said.

He said the United States could play a vital role in helping Third World nations develop better communications, mobility and more effective police and intelligence capabilities.

Private businesses also can play an important role, he said.

"Investment is the key to economic success or at least survival in the Third World and we, our NATO allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy to promote investment in the Third World," Casey said.

He said that, although the Soviet Union is the largest exporter of arms in the world, it cannot deliver sustained economic support.

"The Soviet Union is crippled. It is crippled in having only a military

dimension. The Soviets are helpless to compete with private capital in these countries," Casey said.

He said only an integrated, multidimensional foreign policy will succeed in dealing with Third World nations and stop Soviet expansion there.

"Without a sustained, constant policy over a number of years, we cannot counter the relentless pressure of the USSR in the Third World. The less developed nations of the world will be the principal U.S.-Soviet battleground for many years to come," Casey said.

About 30 protesters from Columbia, Mo., picketed the lecture on a sidewalk near Champ Auditorium. They carried placards denouncing U.S. involvement in Grenada, Nicaragua and other Central American nations.



William Casey
CIA director

Casey: U.S. must stop Soviet ambitions

By Ed Antle
 Missourian staff writer

The third world will continue to be the "principal U.S.-Soviet battleground for many years to come," CIA director William Casey said Saturday, and the United States needs to recognize the pressure that the Soviet Union is exerting there and needs to decide how to stop it.

Casey sounded like Winston Churchill — freely quoting from Churchill's 1946 "Iron Curtain" lecture — as he gave the 40th John Findley Green Lecture at Westminster College Saturday afternoon.

Speaking in Champ Auditorium, Casey said Churchill would be "much more alarmed if he looked around the world today and saw how far the Soviets ... have extended their power and influence beyond the Iron Curtain he so aptly labeled."

During the 1970's, Casey said, the Soviets began their offensive "on a new front — the Third World,"



William Casey

Hillary Levin

where they have effectively used proxy nations to advance their inter-

ests.

"Yet the Soviet Union is crippled," he said.

Because the Soviets have "only a military dimension," Casey said, they must rely solely on the subversion of governments to gain influence in Third World countries.

"But in the long run, it is economic, financial, scientific, technical and cultural relationships which attract, deliver benefits, and maintain close relationships with less developed countries," Casey said. "The Soviet Union can not compete in these areas."

The United States must capitalize on the fact that the Soviet Union can not compete with investments made by private businesses, "our greatest asset in the Third World," the director said.

Casey also looked to Churchill to justify recent actions of the United States.

If Churchill were alive today, Casey said, he would be relieved to know that the United States was countering the attempts of the Soviet Union to influence Grenada and Lebanon.

Some do not agree.

Marc Wutschke, a member of the Committee Against Intervention, a Columbia group which demonstrated in Fulton Saturday against U.S. activities in Central America, said earlier this week that the invasion of Grenada may be President Reagan's way of testing the waters to see if he can invade Nicaragua.

Other protesters included at least four professors from Westminster. Before the lecture, the faculty had voted to request Casey's invitation to the Green Lecture be withdrawn because they say Casey has operated on the margins of the law numerous times as a private businessman. Three-fourths of the Westminster faculty did not attend the lecture, said John Langton, political science professor.

WILMINGTON SUNDAY NEWS JOURNAL (DE)
30 October 1983

Casey urges concern for Third World

By RONALD J. OSTROW

Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON — CIA Director William J. Casey urged the United States Saturday to develop "a realistic counterstrategy" to combat Soviet disruption in the Middle East and Central America, which he said is vulnerable because it relies too heavily on military aid.

"The priority of less-developed countries in our overall foreign policy needs to be raised and sustained," Casey said in delivering a lecture at Westminster College in Fulton, Mo., the same platform where Winston Churchill warned in 1946 that an "Iron Curtain" had descended on Eastern Europe.

"We have too often neglected our friends and neutrals in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia until they became a problem or were threatened by developments hostile to our interests," Casey said in accepting an honorary doctor of laws degree from the college.

In addition to paying greater heed to Third World countries, Casey said, the United States should train its allies "in counterinsurgency tactics and upgrade their communications, mobility, police and intelligence capabilities."

He called for relaxing bars on U.S. foreign military sales laws so that "our friends" can be provided arms for self-defense more quickly.

Casey said that the United States should "demand firmly but tactfully and privately that our friends observe certain standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights." American principles and domestic political support require

such an approach, he said.

Talking directly to Third World countries about land reform and anti-corruption steps is required to block foreign exploitation of such problems, Casey said.

"We need to show how the Soviets have exploited such vulnerabilities elsewhere to make clear that we aren't preaching out of cultural arrogance," he said.

The CIA director said that the United States should devise a means of mobilizing private business, which he described as America's greatest asset in the Third World.


"Investment is the key to economic success or at least survival in the Third World and we, our NATO allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy to promote private investment" there, he said. "The Soviets are helpless to compete with private capital in these countries."

Casey said that the Soviet Union recognizes that power rests with the military in most Third World countries and has thus sought either to win over the officers' corps in those countries or to help replace them with military men more likely to do the Soviets' bidding.

Casey contended that the Soviet Union "is crippled" by having only a military dimension in its relations with the Third World. While military support can establish a relationship between a superpower and a small country, Casey said, economic, scientific, technical and cultural exchanges maintain relationships.

Because the Soviets cannot compete in those areas, according to Casey, they "rely on subversion and disruption of stable political and economic relationships to weaken Western relationships. . . ."

'Hottest' Cold Warrior assails Soviets



By PAUL ROBERTS
of the Tribune's staff

FULTON — Director of Central Intelligence William Casey yesterday decried Soviet attempts to exploit and overthrow shaky governments but supported his own government's use of force in the Caribbean and Central America.

Casey delivered the 40th John Findley Green Lecture to an audience of about 2,000 at Westminster College. Former Congresswoman Clare Booth Luce introduced him as the "hottest of Cold War warriors."

The college announced weeks ago that Casey would discuss the role intelligence gathering plays in national security. Instead, he focused on "creeping Soviet imperialism."

Casey said the late Winston Churchill, who delivered his "Iron Curtain" speech in 1946 at Westminster, would be alarmed today to see Soviet domination threatening "the Caribbean and Central America on the very doorstep of the United States."

Through the "Cubanization of Central America," Casey continued, "the Soviets can calculate that a greatly increased military threat on our southern flank—and the internal disruption that would result if millions of Latin Americans walked north—would distract the United States" from military commitments elsewhere in the world.

Casey attacked the Soviets for trying to "destabilize and subvert other countries by fostering internal insurgency."

He did not address, however, Central Intelligence Agency funding and training of Central American guerrillas opposed to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

Rather, he said, "We must foster the infrastruc-

ture of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allow a people...to reconcile its own differences through peaceful ways."

Casey offered no substantial comment on the U.S. invasion earlier this week of Grenada. Before the invasion, Casey said, the tiny Caribbean island was part of a list including Vietnam, Afghanistan, Africa and the Persian Gulf in which communist influence had become most prevalent.

Though the Reagan administration last week repeatedly denied any intentions of invading Nicaragua, Casey directly compared the Managua government to the former regime in Grenada.

He said the presence of Soviet, Bulgarian, North Korean and Cuban advisers in Grenada indicated the Soviet Union had intended to use that country as a base for spreading rebellion.

Grenada, Casey said, was "a microcosm of what we see in Nicaragua," where Soviet proxies are "working to fasten a totalitarian grip."

The United States has "too often neglected our friends and neutrals" in developing countries, Casey added. "These countries now buy 40 percent of our exports; that alone is reason enough to pay greater attention to their problems...."

"Without a sustained, constant policy applied over a number of years, we cannot counter the relentless pressure of the USSR in the Third World."

His speech, delivered in a raspy monotone, lasted about 40 minutes. Westminster awarded Casey an honorary doctoral degree.

Protesters, about 30 of them carrying signs urging an end to U.S. covert involvement in Central America, were gone when the audience emerged from Champ Auditorium after the speech.

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Available*



A. F. Beltstock of the
department, far left,
watches over
demonstrators
outside Champ
Auditorium on the
Marquette College
campus yesterday.
The group of about
50 was protesting
Central Intelligence
Agency actions
abroad. Inside the
auditorium, the
agency's director,
William Casey, was
presented an honorary
doctorate degree.

AP Wirephoto

FULTON KINGDOM DAILY SUN-GAZETTE
30 October 1983

35 march to protest CIA director's visit

By JOEL BLEIFUSS
Staff writer

About 35 people demonstrated against CIA Director William Casey's visit Saturday. The protest was peaceful, which suited Bill Reifsteck of the Fulton Police Department, and Westminster Director of Development Jack Marshall just fine.

As the demonstrators marched a circle between the sidewalk markers that defined the area of protest adjacent to Champ Auditorium, where Casey was to speak, Reifsteck poured out words of assurance to Marshall.

"We've got a bull horn and if they get on the grass we will give them adequate time to get off. There will be no problems. We're not going to harass them in any way," Reifsteck said.

"We hope it's going to be a very peaceful demonstration. They have a right to demonstrate as well as anyone has a right to give a speech," he added. Some of the demonstrators' children did make it on to the grass, however, but were allowed to stay.

The pickets circled and chanted. "Hey, Hey Uncle Sam, We remember Vietnam." "Hey Hey, Ho Ho, Ronald Reagan has got to go." and "US troops out of Grenada." Accompanying the voices were signs that read "Honorary Degrees only for Honorary People." "We know who invited Casey here, but who invited the CIA there?" "USSR out of Afghanistan. US out of Grenada." and "Revolution wasn't a dirty word when we had ours."

At one point, a spectator, a Westminster student dressed in clean battle fatigues, could no longer contain himself. "That's right! Give it to the Cubans. Smart. Real good."

Sharon Stinson, visiting her son Scott at Westminster's Parents' Day, noted, "I think the man has a right to come and speak and they have a right to protest. I don't necessarily agree with their protests though."

John Fuquay's father, who declined to give his name, said, "What I think you wouldn't print. Your editor wouldn't let you."

"I think it brings attention to our school. It's good for it," said Jim Hill. "I like it that people have the guts to speak out."

John Scribner added, "I think it is good to have controversial people."

Coming back from the gym, Don Bartell and Randy Clark were also pleased to see the demonstrators. "I think it is great," said Barthell. "They should be protesting. I don't think he should even be speaking," said Clark.

The Casey demonstrators said were motivated by different concerns.

Jay Magner said, "I'd like to see the Caseys and Reagans stop intervening militarily in other nations of the world. I would have hoped they would have learned that lesson in Vietnam. I learned as a Vietnam veteran that we can't go around and change the political destiny of the world."

Kathy Bakich, a law student at the University of Missouri, speculated on the Reagan administration's reasons for military involvement in Grenada, Central America and Lebanon. "It's a ploy or tactic to divert public attention away from the economic and domestic policies that are affecting peoples' ability to live and work. It is also a diversion from the changes in national policy Reagan has made in areas like the environment that are permanently damaging our society."

Carolyn Britell brought her children to the demonstration. "I'd like to see them

brought up in a country where if their government says they are a democracy, they act like one. I'm trying to teach my children not to be hypocritical. The U.S. says we're for freedom, but we don't want other countrys to freely determine their own fates," she said.

Protest organizer Steve McIntire said, "I hope Mr. Casey can someday realize that when thousands of people die in Central America it is not a conflict to be fought out between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The question for the people of Central America is not which superpower to ally with, but where their next meal will come from."

"I want to make sure you know there are no Westminster students in the demonstration," one local student told reporters.

The demonstrators were, however, joined by four Westminster faculty members. "There's my political science professor," said one student, who noticed Peter Leo.

English department's David Collins said, "It's been a long time since I felt it was necessary to join a demonstration, not since the end of the Vietnam War was over. But I felt it was worthwhile to make a statement today not just about William Casey's appearance on campus, but also about the growing commitment of U.S. troops in the Middle East and Central America and now in the Caribbean."

After stepping off the line, Professor Hank Ottinger said, "I'm going home."

"We've got important things to do this afternoon," added Terry Mitze of Westminster's English department, who also left early.

Westminster Chaplain Bill Young, also decided to miss the speech. "For the faculty, it has never been a free speech issue. The question is do we honor a man like Casey with the college's highest honor?"

CONTINUED



About 35 demonstrators, playing to a large Parents' Day audience, protested the visit of CIA director William J.

Casey to Westminster College Saturday. (Photo By Joel Bleifuss)

Third world strategy urged by CIA head

FULTON, Mo. (AP) — The United States has failed to properly confront the challenge of the Soviet Union in third world countries and needs to develop "a realistic counter-strategy" for the newest ideological battleground, Central Intelligence Agency director William Casey said Saturday.

"It is past time for the American government — executive branch and Congress — to take the Soviet challenge in the third world seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it," Casey said in remarks prepared for a speech at Westminster College.

Casey said the United States must raise the priority of developing nations in its foreign policy, advise them "firmly but tactfully" about the need for standards of human rights and government honesty and mobilize what he called "our greatest asset in the third world — private business."

The CIA director addressed the same issue first raised at the small college by Winston Churchill, who delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech there in the same lecture series in 1946.

Casey's message also reinforced in general terms the Reagan administration's defense for keeping troops deployed in Lebanon and Grenada, that they are essential to hold back Soviet influence and allow citizens to freely choose their own governments.

"How much more alarmed would Churchill be if he looked around the world today and saw how the Soviets have grown in strength and how far they have extended their power and influence beyond the Iron Curtain he so aptly labeled," said Casey, pointing to communist power deployed from Vietnam to Africa to Central America.

He said that beginning in the mid-1970s, the Soviets launched a new strategy aimed at developing countries. "And their strategy has worked."

Much of that strategy, Casey said, involves use of surrogate forces from Cuba, East Germany, Libya and Vietnam in roles from combat soldier and terrorist to teacher and administrator. And the Soviets have become the world's leading supplier of arms, he said.

"Yet the Soviet Union is crippled," Casey told the college audience. "It is crippled in having only a military dimension. It has not been able to deliver economic, political or cultural benefits at home or abroad."

Casey said the United States must begin to pay greater attention to the problems of third world nations, which buy 40 percent of U.S. exports, "before our attention is commanded by coups, insurgencies or instability."

"We have to be willing to talk straight to those we would help about issues they must address to block foreign exploitation of their problems — issues such as land reform, corruption and the like."

And, he said, the United States needs to compete with the Soviets in furnishing arms and counterinsurgency training to developing countries, including loosening foreign military sales laws to permit more rapid shipments overseas and keeping stockpiles of basic weapons on hand.

"The less-developed nations of the world will be the principle U.S.-Soviet battleground for many years to come," Casey said.

CIA director points to threat in Third World

By The Associated Press

Fulton, Mo.—CIA Director William J. Casey urged the United States Saturday to develop "a realistic counterstrategy" to combat Soviet disruption in the Middle East and Central America.

Mr. Casey said the Soviets were vulnerable because they rely too heavily on military aid.

"It is past time for the American government—executive branch and Congress—to take the Soviet challenge in the Third World seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it," Mr. Casey said in remarks prepared for a speech at Westminster College.

Mr. Casey said the United States must raise the priority of developing nations in its foreign policy, advise them "firmly but tactfully" about the need for stan-

dards of human rights and government honesty and mobilize what he called "our greatest asset in the Third World—private business."

The CIA director addressed the same issue first raised at the small college by Winston Churchill, who delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech there in the same lecture series in 1946.

Mr. Casey's message also reinforced in general terms the Reagan administration's defense for keeping troops deployed in Lebanon and Grenada: they are essential to hold back Soviet influence and allow citizens to freely choose their own governments.

"How much more alarmed would Churchill be if he looked around the world today and saw how the Soviets have grown in strength and how far they

have extended their power and influence beyond the Iron Curtain he so aptly labeled," said Mr. Casey, pointing to communist power deployed from Vietnam to Africa to Central America.

Beginning in the mid-1970s, he said, the Soviets launched a new strategy aimed at developing countries. "And their strategy has worked."

Much of that strategy involves use of surrogate forces from Cuba, East Germany, Libya and Vietnam in roles from combat soldier and terrorist to teacher and administrator, he said. And the Soviets have become the world's

leading supplier of arms, he said.

"Yet the Soviet Union is crippled," Mr. Casey told the college audience. "It is crippled in having only a military dimension. It has not been able to deliver economic, political or cultural benefits at home or abroad."

Mr. Casey said the United States must begin to pay greater attention to the problems of Third World nations, which buy 40 percent of U.S. exports, "before our attention is commanded by coups, insurgencies or instability."

"We have to be willing to talk straight to those we would help about issues they must address to block foreign exploitation of their problems—issues such as land reform, corruption and the like."

And he said the United States needs to compete with the Soviets in furnishing arms and counterinsurgency training to developing countries, including loosening foreign military sales laws to permit more rapid shipments overseas and keeping stockpiles of basic weapons on hand.

"The less developed nations of the world will be the principal U.S.-Soviet battleground for many years to come," Mr. Casey said.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
30 October 1983

STAT

Casey Calls for Policy to Counter Soviet Disruption

By RONALD J. OSTROW, *Times Staff Writer*

WASHINGTON—CIA Director William J. Casey urged the United States on Saturday to develop "a realistic counterstrategy" to combat Soviet disruption in the Middle East and Central America, a region that he termed vulnerable because it relies too heavily on military aid.

"The priority of less-developed countries in our overall foreign policy needs to be raised and sustained," Casey said in delivering a lecture at Westminster College in Fulton, Mo., the same platform where Winston Churchill warned in 1946 that an "Iron Curtain" had descended on Eastern Europe. A text of Casey's speech was made available here.

"We have too often neglected our friends and neutrals in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia until they became a problem or were threatened by developments hostile to our interests," Casey said in accepting an honorary doctor of laws degree from the college.

In addition to paying greater heed to Third World countries, Casey said, the United States should train its allies "in counterinsurgency tactics and upgrade their communications, mobility, police and intelligence capabilities."

Private Business: Greatest U.S. Asset

He called for relaxing restrictions in U.S. foreign military sales laws so that "our friends" can be provided arms for self-defense more quickly.

Casey said the United States should "demand firmly but tactfully and privately that our friends observe certain standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights." American principles and domestic political support require such an approach, he said.

The CIA director said the United States should devise a means of mobilizing private business, which he described as America's greatest asset in the Third World.

"Investment is the key to economic success, or at least survival, in the Third World; and we, our NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy to promote private invest-

ment" there, he said. "The Soviets are helpless to compete with private capital in these countries."

Casey said the Soviet Union recognizes that power rests with the military in most Third World countries and has thus sought either to win over the officers' corps in those countries or to help replace them with military men more likely to do the Soviets' bidding.

"Having for a decade denounced 'the merchants of death,' the Soviets have become 'the world's leading supplier of arms,'" Casey said. In recent years, their arms shipments to the Third World have been four times greater than their economic assistance, he said.

Casey contended that the Soviet Union "is crippled" by having only a military dimension in its relations with the Third World. While military support can establish a relationship between a superpower and a small country, Casey said, economic, scientific, technical and cultural exchanges produce benefits and maintain relationships.

Because the Soviets cannot compete in those areas, according to Casey, they "rely on subversion and disruption of stable political and economic relationships to weaken Western relationships and create a condition of chaos in which their surrogates and internal allies can seize power."

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FULTON KINGDOM DAILY SUN-GAZETTE
30 October 1983

File

Casey says U.S. might essential to Third World

By ROBIN BENEDICK
Staff writer

United States forces in Grenada and Lebanon are essential to check Soviet influence in Third World countries, and will allow those nations to freely choose their own governments, Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Casey said Saturday.

Speaking at Westminster College in Fulton, Casey said he would not reveal any of the details behind the recent invasion of the island of Grenada by U.S. forces. However, he said, "Grenada is a vivid illustration of how the Soviets practice creeping imperialism by proxy. Earlier reports showed Cubans on the island. The Soviets, North Koreans, Libyans, East Germans and Bulgarians, all working out of the Soviet Embassy, were establishing a military base in the eastern Caribbean."

Casey used the 40th John Findley Green Lecture series at the college to address the same issue first raised by Winston Churchill, who delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech there in 1946.

"The U.S. needs a realistic counter-strategy. . . Without a sustained, constant policy applied over a number of years, we cannot counter the relentless pressure of the USSR in the Third World.

"It is past time for the American government — executive branch and Congress — to take the Soviet challenge in the Third World seriously, and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it. These less-developed countries of the

world will be the principal U.S.-Soviet battleground for many years to come," the CIA director said.

Reiterating the Reagan administration's defense posture, Casey pointed to new communist threats have developed in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Africa, the Caribbean and

Central America. The United States, therefore, can no longer neglect developing countries, and must also advise them "firmly but tactfully" about the need for standards of human rights.

"We must find a way to mobilize and use our 'greatest asset in the Third World — private business," he said.

Since the mid-1970s, the Soviets have launched a new strategy aimed at developing countries, Casey said. "And their strategy has worked."

Using forces from Cuba, East Germany, Libya and Vietnam in roles from soldier and terrorist to teacher and administrator, the Soviets have become the world's leading supplier of arms, Casey said.

"Yet, the Soviet Union is crippled. It is crippled in having only a military dimension. It has not been able to deliver economic, political or cultural benefits at home or abroad," he said.

Moreover, Russia can not compete in economic, financial, scientific, technical and cultural exchanges, which attract and maintain close relationships with Third World countries, Casey charged.

"We need to be ready to help our friends defend themselves. We can train them in counterinsurgency tactics and upgrade their communications, mobility, police and intelligence capabilities," he said.

By loosening foreign military sales laws to permit more rapid shipments overseas, and keeping large supplies of basic weapons on hand, the United States could better compete with the Soviets, Casey contended.

"We have to be willing to talk straight to those we would help about issues they need to address to block foreign exploitation of their problems — issues such as land reform, corruption and the like," he

said.

Casey, like previous John Findley Green lecturers, alluded often to Churchill and the problems he faced alerting the world to the Soviet expansionism. "How much more alarmed would Churchill be if he

looked around the world today and saw how the Soviets have grown in strength, and how far they have extended their power and influence beyond the Iron Curtain he so aptly labeled," Casey said.

The United States must pay more attention to the problems of Third World nations, which buy 40 percent of U.S. exports, "before our attention is commanded by coups, insurgencies or instability. The priority of less-developed countries in our overall foreign policy needs to be raised and sustained," Casey said.

"The chief threat posed by the Soviet Union, therefore, is not necessarily in the vastness of its military forces — though vast they are — but in the relentlessness of their assault on our values and on our freedom," Casey concluded.

Clare Boothe Luce, former Ambassador to Italy and the 37th Green lecturer, introduced Casey before he received an honorary doctor of laws from the college.

"As my personal friend, Bill has an uncanny ability to make money easily in a variety of ways — as a publisher, author, lawyer, businessman and speculator," Luce said.

Casey became CIA Director in January 1981, and was the first director to be appointed a cabinet officer by the president.

The John Findley Green Foundation was established in 1936, and provides for annual lectures designed to promote understanding of economic and social problems of international concern.

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MIAMI HERALD

30 October 1983

file only

U.S. needs better strategy to fight Soviet inroads in Third World, Casey says

By RONALD J. OSTROW
Los Angeles Times Service

WASHINGTON — CIA Director William J. Casey urged the United States Saturday to develop "a realistic counterstrategy" to combat Soviet disruption in the Middle East and Central America, which he said is vulnerable because it relies too heavily on military aid.



Casey

"The priority of less-developed countries in our over-all foreign policy needs to be raised and sustained," Casey said in delivering a lecture at Westminster College in Fulton, Mo., the same platform where Winston Churchill warned in 1946 that an "Iron Curtain" had descended on Eastern Europe.

"We have too often neglected our friends and neutrals in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia until they became a problem or were threatened by developments hostile to our interests," Casey said in accepting an honorary doctor of laws degree from the college.

In addition to paying greater heed to Third World countries, Casey said, the United States should train its allies "in counterinsurgency tactics and upgrade their communications, mobility, police and intelligence capabilities."

He called for relaxing bars in U.S. foreign military sales laws so

that "our friends" can be provided arms for self-defense more quickly.

Casey said the United States should "demand firmly but tactfully and privately that our friends observe certain standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights." American principles and domestic political support require such an approach, he said.

Talking directly to Third World countries about land reform and anti-corruption steps is required to block foreign exploitation of such problems, Casey said.

"We need to show how the Soviets have exploited such vulnerabilities elsewhere to make clear that we aren't preaching out of cultural arrogance," he said.

The CIA director said the United States should devise a means of mobilizing private business, which he described as America's greatest asset in the Third World.

"Investment is the key to economic success or at least survival in the Third World and we, our NATO allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy to promote private investment" there, he said. "The Soviets are helpless to compete with private capital in these countries."

Casey said the Soviet Union recognizes that power rests with the military in most Third World countries and has thus sought either to win over the officers' corps in those countries or to help replace them with military men more likely to do the Soviets' bidding.

"Having for a decade denounced 'the merchants of death,' the Soviets have become the world's leading supplier of arms," Casey said.

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WASHINGTON POST
30 October 1983

CIA Chief Would Counter Soviet Third World Strategy Offered

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

CIA Director William J. Casey said yesterday that the United States must counter the Soviet Union in the Third World with a strategy that emphasizes "basic human rights" and the virtues of democracy, including press freedom.

"It is past time for the American government—executive branch and Congress—to take the Soviet challenge in the Third World seriously and develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it," Casey said.

Casey made his remarks at Westminster College in Fulton, Mo., where British prime minister Winston Churchill held forth 37 years ago with his famous speech about the "Iron Curtain" that the Russians were drawing down in Eastern Europe.

Invited—over faculty dissent—to deliver the 40th John Findley Green Foundation lecture, Casey gave a remarkable speech that in many ways sounded like a text from the Carter administration.

To deal with all the threats the Soviets pose, from nuclear missiles to "creeping imperialism," Casey declared, "We must maintain a strategic posture that convinces the Soviets that the risk of any attack on the United States or its allies far outweighs any possible benefits. But more than that is necessary."

Warning that "a Cubanization of Central America would quickly create new refugees by the millions," the CIA director said that the United States needs "a realistic counterstrategy" there as elsewhere, one that would "represent a sensible American approach to the Third World whether or not the U.S.S.R. is involved."

Essential ingredients of that strategy, Casey argued, are:

- Greater attention to "our friends and neutrals" around the world before U.S. attention is commanded by coups, insurgencies or instability.
- Demands, "tactfully and privately" delivered, "that our friends observe certain standards of behavior with regard to 'basic human rights' and issues such as 'land reform, corruption and the like.'"
- Readiness "to help our friends defend themselves," including counterinsurgency training and changes in U.S. laws to permit quicker provision of arms for self-defense.
- Mobilization of "our greatest asset in the Third World, private business."

But the final weapon, Casey submitted, is one "we can deploy around the world.... we must foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose its own way...."

Casey said Grenada "provides a vivid illustration of how the Soviets practice 'creeping imperialism' by proxy. Early reports indicate that, in addition to the Cubans on the island, Soviets, North Koreans, Libyans, East Germans and Bulgarians, mostly working out of the Soviet embassy, [were] working together to establish a military base in the eastern Caribbean."

In a meeting Oct. 4, the Westminster Faculty Council, some of its members asserting that Casey's past business dealings raised questions about his honesty, passed a resolution calling on the college to withdraw the invitation. However, the board of trustees voted to stand by the invitation.

Special correspondent Scott Gordon contributed to this article.

FULTON, MO.

CASEY SAYS THIRD WORLD TO BE BATTLEGROUND FOR U.S. FOR YEARS TO COME

CIA Director William Casey said the Third World will continue to be the principle U.S. battleground for many years to come and the United States needs to decide how to stop pressure there from the Soviet Union.

In the 1970s, the Soviets began their offensive "on a new front - the Third World," Casey told the more than 1,000 gathered Saturday at Westminster College, where about 30 students and professors gathered to protest CIA's involvement in Nicaragua.

The Soviets have effectively used proxies or nations acting unofficially on their behalf, citing the actions of East Germans in Africa, Cubans in Latin America and Vietnamese in Asia as examples, he said.

"Yet the Soviet Union is crippled," Casey added.

Because the Soviets have "a military dimension" they must rely solely on subversion and disruption of government to gain influence in Third World countries, he said.

"But in the long run, it is economic, financial, scientific, technical and cultural relationships which attract, deliver benefits and maintain close relationships with less developed countries," he added. "The Soviet Union cannot compete in these areas."

Casey also said Winston Churchill, if he were alive, would be relieved to know that the United States was countering attempts by the Soviet Union to influence Grenada and Lebanon.

The CIA director looked to Churchill several times during his lecture.

"From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent..." Casey quoted from Churchill's 1946 "Iron Curtain" speech. "The Communist Parties which were small... have been raised to preminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control."

Churchill would be "much more alarmed if he looked around the world today and saw how far the Soviets... have extended their power and influence beyond the Iron Curtain he so aptly labled," the CIA director said.

The threat of nuclear holocaust is the object of most of our fears and the reason for much of our strategy against the Soviet Union, said Casey, who has been CIA director since 1981.

Casey said the U.S. has made the mistake of only becoming involved in the Middle East, Latin American and Asia when hostile interests become a threat. Because of 40 percent of our exports go to these areas, they should receive more attention in our foreign policies, he said.

He said laws governing foreign military sales need to be relaxed, and the U.S. should make military training more available to these countries.

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The U.S. must capitalize on the fact that the Soviet Union cannot compete with the U.S. in investing in private business, "our greatest asset in the Third World," Casey said.

Before Casey's speech, protestors, mostly students from the University of Missouri but also four professors from Westminster College, sang "No drafts; No war; U.S out of El Salvador; William Casey out of Nicaragua." The protestors, members of the Committee Against Intervention, said they were not protesting Casey's speech but CIA's activity in Nicaragua.

"If Reagan can get away with the invasion (of Grenada) on the specious claims he has made, then that might embolden him to invade Nicaragua -- something he wants to do," said Marc Wutschke, a member of the group.

The faculty of Westminster early this month had presented a resolution to the college's board of trustees to withdraw the invitation to Casey to speak.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 October 1983

FILE APPEARED
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Senators Suggest Administration Exaggerated Its Cuba Assessment

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 — Democratic and Republican members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said today that the Reagan Administration had exaggerated Cuba's role in Grenada.

Based on intelligence information they have received, including a briefing Friday by two senior Administration officials, the Senators said that evidence of Cuban activity in Grenada does not support claims that Cuba was on the verge of occupying the island or turning it into a base for the export of terrorism and revolution.

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York and vice chairman of the intelligence committee, said: "We simply do not know enough yet to draw any firm conclusions about Cuba's role or intentions. Nothing has been discovered so far that would show with any certainty that Cuba was planning to take over Grenada."

'Serious Analysis' Needed

He added, "The Government owes itself and the public some serious analysis of the evidence that has been found rather than offering instant conclusions on TV."

A Republican Senator, who asked that his name not be used, said, "The Administration has rushed to judgment about the Cuban presence in Grenada. Yes, there were more Cubans and more Soviet and Cuban weapons than we thought, but we need to know a lot more before I'd be willing to accept the assessment that Grenada was about to become a Cuban proxy."

The Reagan Administration initially

said it had ordered the invasion of the small Caribbean island Tuesday to protect the lives of United States citizens on the island and to restore democratic institutions in the wake of a bloody coup earlier this month. Administration officials have increasingly cited the Cuban presence in Grenada as the reason for the invasion; Mr. Reagan said Thursday that the United States move prevented a planned "Cuban occupation of the island."

On Friday, Adm. Wesley L. McDonald, commander in chief of United States forces in the Atlantic region, said that Cuban military documents found in Grenada showed that Cuba was planning to send 341 additional officers and 4,000 reservists to Grenada in the near future, bringing the total number of Cuban troops on the island to more than 5,000.

Admiral McDonald said that there were more than 1,100 Cubans in Grenada when the invasion began Tuesday. He said more than 600 had been captured, and the rest are presumed to have fled to the hills, where resistance to the American invaders is continuing.

The Administration has also said that several warehouses full of modern Soviet and Cuban weapons were discovered in Grenada, including sufficient ammunition to supply thousands of troops for a month of fighting.

Reporters who were permitted by the Defense Department to visit Grenada on Friday toured several of the warehouses and found that they contained large stocks of Soviet-made arms and ammunition, including AK-47 rifles as well as large quantities of antiquated weapons.

Senator Moynihan and other members of the committee questioned the Administration's statement about the arms cache. "On Friday we heard that Grenada was a Soviet and Cuban arsenal," Senator Moynihan said. "Today I pick up the newspaper and read that many of the weapons kept in storage were made 100 years ago and are valuable historical pieces, including 19th-century carbines."

A second Republican Senator on the intelligence committee, who also asked not to be identified, said that after hearing Friday from William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam, most members of the panel believed that more information was needed before conclusions could be reached about Cuba's role in Grenada.

This reaction, several senators said, reflected a general air of anxiety in Congress about the invasion of Grenada and the Administration claims about Cuban activities.

"I guess, given the stakes, that it's not surprising that the White House and Pentagon would make the most they could out of the Cubans, but in fairness we've got to say the case isn't that black and white," the Republican Senator said.

Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, said: "The general attitude on the committee was wait-and-see. There isn't sufficient information

yet to make an informed judgment, and what is available keeps changing. Every time someone from the Administration speaks there seems to be a new total for the number of Cuban troops in Grenada."

Formal Examination Planned

Democrat and Republican committee members said that the panel plans to conduct a formal examination of what the United States knew about the Cuban presence in Grenada before and after the invasion.

One Republican Senator said: "I can understand that there wasn't time to provide the kind of intelligence information you'd like to have before launching an invasion, but if it turns out that Cuba was in fact planning to turn the island into a base, that Castro was moving massive amounts of arms and large numbers of troops to Grenada, then I'd like to know why our intelligence agencies couldn't detect that until we landed 6,000 troops on the island."

Senior military officers have complained that a lack of intelligence information about Cuban forces in Grenada left invading troops unprepared for the intense resistance they say they encountered from Cuban soldiers.

Several committee members said Mr. Casey said the Central Intelligence Agency did as good a job as it could, given the limited time it had to help prepare for the invasion. Administration officials have said that serious planning for the invasion began late last week.

The Senators said Mr. Casey also told the committee that there was no truth to widely circulating rumors that the St. George's University School of Medicine in Grenada, where hundreds of United States citizens were enrolled, was used by the C.I.A. to provide fictitious, or cover, occupations for United States intelligence agents in Grenada.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 October 1983*File Only - 20*ARTICLE REPEATED
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Casey Sees a Soviet Challenge

WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 (AP) — William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, said today that the United States had failed to properly confront the challenge of the Soviet Union in developing countries and now must adopt "a realistic counterstrategy."

"It is past time for the American Government — executive branch and Congress — to take the Soviet challenge in the third world seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it," Mr. Casey said in a speech prepared for delivery at Westminster College in Fulton, Mo. A text of the speech was released by his Washington office.

Mr. Casey said the United States must raise the priority of developing nations in its foreign policy, advise them "firmly but tactfully" about the need for standards of human rights and honesty in government and mobilize what he called "our greatest asset in the third world — private business."

It was at Westminster College in Fulton that Winston Churchill delivered his now famous speech in which he coined the phrase "Iron Curtain" in reference to the Communist bloc coun-

tries of Eastern Europe, and Mr. Casey referred to that speech today.

The Director said that since Mr. Churchill's day, new Communist threats have sprouted around the world, from Vietnam to Africa to Central America.

Mr. Casey said that beginning in the mid 1970's, the Soviet Union undertook a strategy aimed at developing countries. "And their strategy has worked," Mr. Casey said.

"How much more alarmed would Churchill be if he looked around the world today and saw how the Soviets have grown in strength and how far they have extended their power and influence beyond the Iron Curtain he so aptly labeled," Mr. Casey said.

Cuba forces catch U.S. by surprise

CIA lapse hinted as Grenada resistance surpasses estimates

By Terry Atlas

Chicago Tribune

WASHINGTON—U.S. military planners working on the invasion of Grenada were told by the Central Intelligence Agency to expect about 600 Cubans on the island, mostly construction workers building a major airstrip on the southern tip of the island.

Instead, U.S. marines and Army Rangers going ashore Tuesday encountered at least twice as many Cubans, who put up much stiffer resistance than intelligence anticipated. "They were heavily armed and militarily trained," said a White House spokesman on Friday.

The CIA's estimation of the Cuban military build-up on the island has led to sharp questions in Congress and elsewhere about the accuracy of intelligence preceding the invasion. "Our military intelligence wasn't as good as we had hoped," said the House minority leader, Rep. Robert Michel (R., Ill.).

In his nationwide broadcast Thursday night, President Reagan himself said that military planners "had little information about conditions on the island." He said he and others were surprised to find what constituted a "a complete base with weapons and communications equipment which makes it clear a Cuban occupation of the island had been planned."

THE APPARENT lack of detailed information came as a surprise, because Reagan repeatedly has pointed to the Eastern Caribbean island and its former Marxist prime minister, Maurice Bishop, as an example of the spread of Soviet and Cuban influence and subversion in the region.

In March, Reagan showed satellite photographs documenting construction of a 10,000-foot runway, which he said could handle Soviet military aircraft, and construction of military facilities.

In the days preceding the invasion, the CIA and other intelligence agencies apparently had to scramble to assemble what sketchy information they had about conditions after the overthrow and murder of Bishop by radical Marxists in the Grenada military during the preceding weeks. It is unclear whether the number of Cubans increased in the days between the coup on Oct. 14 and the U.S. invasion Tuesday.

A gap in information is all the more surprising because U.S. military personnel hit the island with maps locating the homes of each American. There were reports on Capitol Hill that CIA agents were among the passengers on the first plane evacuating Americans from the island.

A WHITE HOUSE spokesman, breaking the usual policy of silence on intelligence matters, said Friday that "there was no [American] intelligence operation on the ground in Grenada."

But the spokesman, Larry Speakes, denied that there was a breakdown in intelligence-gathering, as happened four years ago before the Iranian revolution. He said that conclusion would be "erroneous" and rejected the idea that faulty intelligence might have prolonged the mission and cost American lives.

"We had twice as many Cubans there as we thought were there," he said. "But it wasn't a force of Cubans we weren't prepared to deal with militarily."

Adm. Wesley McDonald, overall commander of the invasion forces—which also included about 300 soldiers from six other Caribbean nations—said Friday, "I didn't have enough intelligence, but I don't think there was a failure there. I just think we didn't have the time to concentrate on it." McDonald is also commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Atlantic.

"WE WERE looking at Grenada in the broad aspects of knowing what was going on," he said during a Pentagon news briefing. But for the invasion to evacuate American citizens, he said, "we did not have as much intelligence as I would like to have [had]."

CIA director William Casey met behind closed doors Friday with members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to brief them on activities in Grenada and Beirut. Asked about the failure to estimate accurately the Cuban presence on the island, he reportedly said that "intelligence is not an exact science."

Afterward, several senators who attended the meeting said they were satisfied with the CIA's performance. The agency reportedly had prepared a covert operation to overthrow the pro-Cuban Bishop government in 1981 but dropped it because of congressional opposition. Bishop, a pro-Castro Marxist, was murdered Oct. 19 by the more militant Marxists who had deposed him.

ADMINISTRATION officials said that although Reagan was short of definite information on Monday, the day before the invasion, he did receive intelligence reports that the radical new Grenadian government might hold American medical students on the island hostage. Reagan has justified the invasion on grounds that he was trying to avert a repetition of the Iranian hostage situation of 1979-81.

"We did have one or two intelligence reports, that the Cubans on the island were starting to kick the idea around," said one official.

Speakes said Friday that officials were surprised that the American forces found not only 49 Soviets and their dependents on the island, but also Bulgarians, East Germans and North Koreans. "The presence of these came as a surprise to us and a shock to the governor-general" of Grenada, he said.

FULTON, MO.

CIA DIRECTOR: U.S. MUST CONFRONT SOVIETS IN THIRD WORLD

The United States has failed to properly confront the challenge of the Soviet Union in Third World countries and needs to develop "a realistic counter-strategy" for the newest ideological battleground, CIA Director William Casey said Saturday.

"It is past time for the American government - executive branch and Congress - to take the Soviet challenge in the Third World seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it," Casey said in a speech at Westminster College.

Casey said the United States must raise the priority of developing nations in its foreign policy and advise them "firmly but tactfully" about the need for standards of human rights and government honesty.

Casey's message also reinforced the Reagan administration's rationale for keeping troops in Lebanon and Grenada: that they are essential to hold back Soviet influence and allow citizens to freely choose their own governments.

Grenada "provides a vivid illustration of how the Soviets practice creeping imperialism by proxy," Casey said. "Early reports indicate that in addition to the Cubans on the island, Soviets, North Koreans, Libyans, East Germans and Bulgarians, mostly working out of the Soviet embassy, work together to establish a military base in the eastern Caribbean."

Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Soviets launched a new strategy aimed at developing countries, "and their strategy has worked."

Much of that strategy, Casey said, involves use of surrogate forces from Cuba, East Germany, Libya and Vietnam in roles from combat soldier and terrorist to teacher and administrator. And the Soviets have become the world's leading supplier of arms, he said.

"Yet the Soviet Union is crippled," Casey told the college audience. "It is crippled in having only a military dimension. It has not been able to deliver economic, political or cultural benefits at home or abroad."

FULTON, MO.
GRENADA - CASEY

Grenada provides a good example of the Soviet Union's attempt to promote violence in Third World countries, CIA Director William J. Casey said tonight.

Casey said intelligence reports indicate the Soviet Union or its "proxies" were promoting violence and revolution in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica.

In an speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Casey called on the United States to react to the Soviet threat.

"It is past time for the American government -- the executive branch and Congress -- to take the Soviet challenge seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it," he said.

Addressing the same issue as Winston Churchill in his famous "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton in 1946, Casey said, "How much more alarmed would Churchill be if he looked around the world today and saw how the Soviets have grown in strength and how far they have extended their power and influence beyond the Iron Curtain he so aptly labeled?"

Casey said the Soviets began in the mid-1970s a new strategy for developing nations, "and their strategy has worked." The new tactics involved use of forces from other nations with close ties to Moscow.

"The early reports from Grenada," he said, "indicate that in addition to Cubans and Soviets, there are Bulgarians, East Germans, North Koreans and other Communist-bloc nations there. Working from the Soviet Embassy, they were working to establish a permanent military base in the eastern Caribbean."

Casey said the United States must "raise and sustain" the importance of developing nations in foreign policy planning.

Washington must advise those nations "firmly but tactfully" about the need for standards of human rights and governmental honesty, he said.

He also urged changes in foreign military sales laws to permit the United States to provide arms to allies more quickly.

Casey said that although the Soviet Union was now the largest exporter of arms in the world, it could not deliver sustained economic support.

"The Soviet Union is crippled," Casey said. "It is crippled in having only a military dimension."

Intelligence flaws cited in invasion

By FRANK GREVE
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — U.S. forces seriously underestimated Cuban strength on Grenada, based their assaults on tourist maps and, at least in some cases, didn't know which side the Grenadian army was on, American officials and returning troops now acknowledge.

Further, Cubans on the island reportedly were tipped off to the invasion 24 hours in advance, greatly adding to the danger faced by U.S. troops.

The problems, say members of Congress and the invaders themselves, included a lack of intelligence about the size, arms, commitment and location of enemy forces.

Those shortcomings may have led U.S. invasion leaders to drop paratroopers into anti-aircraft fire, to have slowed operations on the ground, and to have made administration leaders overly optimistic that U.S. troops could be removed

within a week.

Asked Friday why U.S. troops expected 500 Cuban construction workers on Grenada but encountered instead an estimated 1,100 well-armed Cuban combatants, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger acknowledged the intelligence weakness.

"I suppose because it [the armed buildup of Cuban forces] was carried on clandestinely," said Weinberger. "We don't have any representation on the island. We did not have any way of really determining this."

In addition, U.S. intelligence sources told the Associated Press that Cuba had been tipped off to the U.S. attack 24 hours before it began.

The intelligence sources, speaking on condition they not be identified, told the AP that the tip was an "unintentional" leak from one of the six Caribbean nations that joined the United States in the venture. They refused to say which of the six — Antigua, St. Lucia, Dominica, St. Vincent, Jamaica and Barbados — was to blame.

Castro sent colonel

Cuban President Fidel Castro did not send reinforcements to Grenada, the sources said, but he did dispatch an Army colonel to direct the island's defense.

This went undetected by U.S. forces, and the reason, according to three congressmen, may have been this: The Central Intelligence Agency had no spies on Grenada until Monday. According to two other

sources close to Caribbean intelligence operations, the lone U.S. spy on Grenada was captured and disappeared sometime between Oct. 14 and Oct. 21.

Another story offered privately by administration officials is that the United States had an informant among the medical students at St. George's College of Medicine. But the medical students were confined to the school's two campuses after Oct. 14. The beefing-up of Grenada's defenses came after that date, Pentagon officials say.

Whatever the reason for ill-preparedness, these were among the hazardous and comic results:

- A Marine platoon leader approached his commander, saying he had a man in his unit who could help "with the native language," according to a Washington Post report. Grenadians speak English.

- Another platoon leader, at midday Tuesday, approached Miami Herald correspondent Don Bohning to ask, "Can you tell us what's going on? Is the Grenadian army with us or against us?"

- Some invasion units patrolled with only tourist maps of the rugged, complex Grenadan terrain for guidance, according to ABC News.

- Army Ranger paratroopers apparently dropped into hostile and unexpected anti-aircraft fire Tuesday at Point Salines airport.

- Initially, top Defense Department

officials described the Cuban forces on Grenada as "construction workers" who would be treated as neutrals. On Friday, after they had offered strong resistance, Adm. Wesley McDonald, commander of the Grenada operation, described them as "well-trained, professional soldiers" who had been "impersonating construction workers."

24-hour estimate

And there were serious consequences. In initial briefings Tuesday, Pentagon officials, apparently relying on dated intelligence, sug-

gested Grenadian troops were modestly armed and that the military operation might be concluded in 24 hours.

Terrence Daly, 21, of Alexandria, Va., one of the 6,000 troops involved in the assault, called his mother Tuesday night from Fort Bragg, N.C.

"They're shipping me to Grenada," said Daly, unaware of the tough combat ahead. "They've given me a flak jacket, a rifle and 100 rounds of ammunition."

But servicemen returning from the front said recounted the stiff resistance encountered. 1st Lt. Michael Andre Menu, 34, of Portland, Maine, recalled, "We were fighting against very highly armed people, with armored personnel carriers that were jammed full of ammunition," said Menu, now recovering at the naval hospital at Charleston, S.C., from a shrapnel wound to his arm. "Yes, sir, they were waiting for us."

Other injuries, and perhaps deaths, may have resulted from the parachute drop into enemy fire; the Defense Department has not released details of how casualties happened. The normal procedure when dropping parachutists is to silence hostile fire first, a course readily available in Grenada had gunships from the nearby carrier USS Independence been employed.

Not enough intelligence

McDonald admitted here Friday, "I didn't have enough intelligence." But, he continued, "I don't think there was a failure there. You have to look at the total perspective. An assault on an island such as Grenada is not something we are geared to do. We did not have as much intelligence as I, as force commander, would like to have."

McDonald and White House spokesman Larry Speakes on Friday became the first administration officials to admit that the United States might face protracted resistance from Cuban and Grenadian troops in the island's hills and jungles.

How they did so well, and the United States so poorly, is a question for William J. Casey, director of the CIA. He will discuss the adequacy of intelligence in Grenada with some skeptical senators next week, at the invitation of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D., N.Y.), vice chairman of the intelligence committee.

WASHINGTON

CASEY WARNS CENTRAL AMERICA 'CUBANIZATION'

Soviet-backed 'creeping imperialism' threatens Central America and a 'Cubanization' of the area would send millions more refugees toward the United States, CIA Director William Casey said Saturday.

In a lecture at Westminster College at Fulton, Mo., where Winston Churchill coined the phrase 'Iron Curtain' 47 years ago to describe the Soviet bloc, Casey said Churchill would be 'alarmed' to see how Soviet power has been extended.

'He would see Soviet power ... in Vietnam, along China's southern border and astride the sea lanes which bring Japan's oil from the Persian Gulf, in Afghanistan, 500 miles closer to ... the Strait of Hormuz through which comes the oil essential to Western Europe, on the Horn of Africa overlooking the passageway of Suez ... in southern Africa, rich in minerals, which the industrial nations require, and in the Caribbean and Central America, on the very doorstep of the United States,' Casey said.

'Soviet power is already solidly established in Cuba and Nicaragua,' Casey said. 'This threatens the Panama Canal and the sea lanes of the Caribbean. Insurgencies and revolutionary violence are unleashed to topple governments in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.'

The major Soviet threat in Central America, he said, 'is something we might call creeping imperialism. The Kremlin uses a variety of techniques to exploit economic, racial and religious divisions around the world, to destabilize and subvert other countries by fostering internal insurgency.'

'A Cubanization of Central America would quickly create new refugees by the millions,' he said. 'The Soviets can calculate that a greatly increased military threat on our southern flank and the internal disruption that would result if millions of Latin Americans walked north would distract the United States from dealing with what could be more lethal threats elsewhere in the world.'

Casey said Washington should counter Soviet subversion by promoting U.S. investment in the Third World and expanding abilities to provide weapons and military training to friendly Third World nations.

He also noted the United States 'must be prepared to demand firmly but tactfully and privately that our friends observe certain standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights.'

Casey delivered the 40th John Findley Green Foundation Lecture and was awarded an honorary Doctor of Laws degree. The Green Foundation lecture series began in 1936 and has brought a number of world leaders, including Presidents Ford and Truman, to Westminster.

In 1946, Churchill gave his famous 'Iron Curtain' speech at the Missouri college, which Casey quoted liberally.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 October 1983

Invasion in Grenada: Flawed

-Intelligence Debated

U.S. Now Puts the Strength Of Cubans on Isle at 1,100

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 — The Reagan Administration further increased its estimates of the number of Cubans in Grenada today amid growing debate about why intelligence agencies failed to measure Cuban strength more accurately before Tuesday's invasion.

Administration officials said the latest figures showed more than 1,100 Cubans were in Grenada, 10 percent more than reported by the Government on Thursday and almost twice as many as estimated before American and Caribbean assault forces invaded.

At the same time, some military sources said privately that reports from Grenada today indicated that 610 Cubans were being held prisoner and 800 to 1,000 were still at large.

Adm. Wesley L. McDonald, Commander in Chief of American forces in the Atlantic region, said at a Defense Department news conference that 638 Cubans, including a colonel, are being held prisoner at Point Salines and Pearls airports in Grenada. He said 17 Grenadians are also being held captive.

Admiral McDonald said the Defense Department did not know the whereabouts of the remaining 500 or more Cubans, but assumes they have fled into the hills where invading forces continue to encounter pockets of armed resistance.

Cuban Documents Cited

"I think they're going back into the hills," Admiral McDonald said. "They're fighting a delaying action or they're taking us on to defend the military areas that they have been assigned to. As those places are being overrun — I would say with a restraint of force — they are disappearing into the mountains."

Admiral McDonald and other Administration officials said the figure of 1,100 Cubans was based partly on documents found at a Cuban military installation in Grenada overrun earlier this week. The estimate is also drawn from comments by Cuban prisoners, the officials said.

Confusion on the ground in Grenada makes it impossible to provide a precise count of Cubans, the officials said.

President Reagan and his top aides have increasingly emphasized the Cuban presence in Grenada as a justification for the invasion.

Mr. Reagan said Thursday that the invasion had prevented a planned "Cuban occupation of the island."

Admiral McDonald said today that documents captured by American forces indicated that Cuba planned to send 341 additional officers and 4,000 reservists to Grenada soon. He said that the Cubans appeared to be planning to take over control of the island and install their own government.

The documents cited by Admiral McDonald and other secret Cuban military papers that Administration officials said have been found in Grenada have not been made public.

Gap Called a Handicap

Before the invasion began, however, intelligence reports about the Cuban presence on the island indicated little danger that such an occupation was imminent, according to intelligence officials and public statements by Administration aides.

Some military officers have said privately that the gap in intelligence seriously handicapped planning for the invasion and left the troops that landed unprepared for the intense resistance they faced from heavily armed Cuban combat forces.

"One of the fundamentals of warfare is knowing the strength of your enemy and in this case we were badly surprised," a senior military officer said.

Admiral McDonald, noting that

"resistance was much greater than expected due to the extensive Cuban military involvement on the island," said, "I didn't have enough intelligence but I don't think there was a failure there."

The collection of intelligence information in places such as Grenada does not normally involve the kind of detailed, tactical reporting needed to plan an invasion, the admiral said, adding: "I don't think the system failed, I just think we didn't have the time to concentrate on it."

Intelligence Coverage Increased

Admiral McDonald said that intelligence coverage of Grenada was not stepped up until several days before the invasion. "When we were invited by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to intervene it became obvious we had to solicit as much intelligence as we could," he said.

He added, "We were not micro-managing Grenada intelligence until about that time frame."

The Administration has said that the United States first received a request to intervene early last Saturday.

In an appearance today before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, said that intelligence coverage of Grenada, including overflights by American spy planes, was increased over last weekend, according to several senators on the panel. The senators said that Mr. Casey had told the committee that the C.I.A. had few agents on the island before the invasion.

Admiral McDonald, like other Administration officials, said that estimates before the invasion placed the number of Cubans in Grenada at 500 to 600, with at least half serving as construction workers. It was not apparent until after the invasion began, he said, that many of those were trained combat troops. Nor was the United States aware that the actual number of Cubans in Grenada totaled more than 1,100, he said.

Aware of a Buildup

The United States was aware of some Cuban buildup in recent weeks, Admiral McDonald said.

On Oct. 6, he said, a Cuban troop transport ship "offloaded arms in St. George's Harbor."

On Oct. 24, the day before the invasion began, he said, a Cuban transport aircraft arrived in Grenada with a delegation of military personnel. He said that President Fidel Castro of Cuba "later announced that the delegation was led by Col. Totola Comas for the purpose of taking charge" of the Cubans on the island.

"Colonel Totola was sent to organize and supervise defense of the island," the admiral continued. "All Cuban personnel were ordered to improve their combat disposition."

Although Administration officials have expressed surprise at the extent of the Cuban military presence in Grenada in the days since the invasion began, there was intelligence information available months ago that officials cited at the time as evidence of a large Cuban involvement.

On March 9, for example, Nestor D. Sanchez, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs, told a group of educators, "In Grenada, Cuban influence has reached such a high level that it can be considered a Cuban protégé."

Mr. Sanchez said, "Cuba has, for example, constructed a military camp in Grenada." After describing the facilities at the camp in detail, Mr. Sanchez said, "The camp is built to house a battalion-size unit and is being built by the Cubans." An American battalion normally has 800 troops.

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WASHINGTON POST
29 October 1983

Reports Magnify Soviet Presence

CIA's Reports Magnify Soviet-Cuban Presence

By Bob Woodward and Patrick E. Tyler
Washington Post Staff Writers

Intelligence reports coming from Grenada after the U.S. invasion show a stronger and larger Soviet-Cuban military and diplomatic presence than expected, but they may fall short of supporting President Reagan's assertion that the Caribbean island was "being readied as a major military bastion to export terror," according to administration and congressional sources.

After the Senate Intelligence Committee was briefed yesterday by CIA Director William J. Casey, a Republican member of the committee said that the large, combat-ready Cuban construction force and extensive anti-aircraft batteries camouflaged around the Point Salines airport show the Soviets and Cubans had established a permanent base of operations.

But the senator added that the administration's case that the island was being readied to export revolution and terror in the eastern Caribbean was "inferential and circumstantial" at this point.

Pentagon officials said yesterday they believed there are about 1,100 Cubans on the island, 600 of whom have been captured by U.S. forces who landed on Grenada Tuesday morning.

The CIA has sent five interrogators to Grenada to begin screening the captured Cubans, a senior official said.

The official said the discovery of the well-established Cuban presence provided U.S. intelligence analysts with a unique opportunity to study closely the military manage-

ment and organization of a small state under Soviet and Cuban influence.

The Cuban construction crews turned out to have been equipped for combat much like U.S. Navy Seabees (construction battalions), according to the official. In their barracks on the southern end of Grenada, the official said, American forces found special hooks by the Cubans' bunks from which to hang their AK47 assault rifles.

in Grenada

The Cubans were said to have high technology Soviet and Cuban communications gear and weaponry. One senior official said a Cuban general was believed to have been on the island recently in a command or advisory capacity.

The Pentagon has highlighted the presence on the island of a Cuban colonel as an indication of the importance placed on the military base.

Several sources, including a Pentagon official and a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said yesterday that the Cuban colonel, Pedro Tortolo Comas, was sent to Grenada the day before the invasion "to lead the resistance." By the time Tortolo arrived, the impending invasion was being widely reported in the Caribbean. Political leaders there were debating whether to endorse the invasion plan by some eastern Caribbean countries.

A Reagan administration official said the volume of weapons found in Grenada by invading U.S. forces far exceeded the defensive needs of the island and the only logical conclusion was that the island was being prepared as a staging area by the Soviets and Cubans.

"The raw military photos alone and the raw numbers, including millions of rounds of ammunition, make the case," this official said.

Contrary to earlier reports, a Senate intelligence staff source said a Cuban ship named the "Vietnam Heroica" did not resupply the Cuban troops during the weekend before the invasion. The supply ship had been in a Grenada harbor since Oct. 17 or Oct. 18, this source said, before the death of Grenada's former prime minister, Maurice Bishop. Pentagon officials said yesterday that a troop transport offloaded arms in St. George's on Oct. 6.

U.S. forces have found 49 Soviet bloc diplomats and dependents in

Grenada. In addition, U.S. officials said they were surprised to be told that 24 North Koreans, 10 East Germans and four Bulgarians were taking refuge in the Soviet mission in Grenada.

This is considered large for a country that size and is certain to include intelligence officers, said a senior administration official, who added that the 20 North Koreans almost equal the number of North Koreans in Nicaragua supporting the Soviet-Cuban presence there.

At the closest U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown, Barbados, there have been as many as 40 to 50 American diplomats with a total staff of 155 personnel, according to Sally A. Shelton, a former ambassador to Barbados. The embassy represents U.S. interests in Barbados and a number of other Caribbean countries.

During yesterday's Senate Intelligence Committee briefing, according to one Republican senator who attended, Casey compared Grenada

and Nicaragua, noting that the mix of Soviet bloc diplomats and advisers seems roughly the same in each of the two countries.

Though Casey apparently did not mention it to the Senate committee yesterday, a senior administration official said the CIA has indications that a Soviet-backed assassination team was involved in killing former prime minister Bishop last week, six days before the U.S. invasion.

It was reported from the region last week that Bishop and a number of his aides were killed after a crowd of supporters freed him from house arrest Oct. 19. He reportedly was executed after being seized outside Fort Rupert on the island by Grenadan troops then under the command of Gen. Hudson Austin.

The administration official declined to reveal the basis for information about a Soviet assassination team. The official cited this information as an "important intelligence byproduct" being gathered in the wake of the invasion.

WASHINGTON

CIA CHIEF CALLS FOR THIRD WORLD COUNTER-STRATEGY AGAINST SOVIETS
BY JIM DRINKARD

The United States has failed to properly confront the challenge of the Soviet Union in third-world countries and now must develop "a realistic counter-strategy" for that ideological battleground, Central Intelligence Agency director William Casey said Saturday.

"It is past time for the American government _ executive branch and Congress _ to take the Soviet challenge in the third world seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it," Casey said in a speech released by his Washington office.

Casey said the United States must raise the priority of developing nations in its foreign policy, advise them "firmly but tactfully" about the need for standards of human rights and government honesty and mobilize what he called "our greatest asset in the third world _ private business."

He used the speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Mo., to address the same issue first raised at the small college by Winston Churchill, who delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech there in the same lecture series in 1946.

The CIA director said that since Churchill's day, new communist threats have sprouted around the globe, from Vietnam to Africa to Central America.

He said that beginning in the mid 1970s, the Soviets launched a strategy aimed at developing countries. "And their strategy has worked."

"How much more alarmed would Churchill be if he looked around the world today and saw how the Soviets have grown in strength and how far they have extended their power and influence beyond the Iron Curtain he so aptly labeled," said Casey.

Casey's message also reinforced in general terms the Reagan administration's defense for keeping troops deployed in Lebanon and Grenada: that they are essential to hold back Soviet influence and allow citizens to freely choose their own governments.

Much of the present Soviet strategy, Casey said, involves use of surrogate forces from Cuba, East Germany, Libya and Vietnam in roles from combat soldier and terrorist to teacher and administrator. And the Soviets have become the world's leading supplier of arms, he said.

"Yet the Soviet Union is crippled," Casey told the college audience. "It is crippled in having only a military dimension. It has not been able to deliver economic, political or cultural benefits at home or abroad."

Casey said the United States must begin to pay greater attention to the problems of third world nations, which buy 40 percent of U.S. exports, "before

CONTINUED

WASHINGTON

U.S. COMMANDER FINDS NO EVIDENCE OF MISSILES ON GRENADA

The commander of U.S. forces in Grenada on Friday said no missiles had been found on the island and he was "not aware" of missile storage bunkers being built, despite a published report that intelligence photographs of the installation prompted the U.S. invasion.

Adm. Wesley McDonald, commander in chief of the Atlantic fleet, said U.S. troops had found no evidence of missiles on the leftist-ruled island and added: "I'm not aware of missile bunkers being installed there."

Sources also quoted CIA Director William J. Casey as telling the Senate Intelligence Committee that there was no evidence of missile sites being built on Grenada.

The Knight-Ridder news service reported Friday that intelligence photographs provided evidence that missile storage bunkers may have been under construction in Grenada, prompting the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to urge an immediate invasion.

The photos showed four concrete shelters 200 feet long and 40 feet wide, with walls 12-to-18 inches thick, under construction about 800 feet from the new airport runway at Point Salines, Knight-Ridder said. The story was carried in Knight-Ridder newspapers.

The photographs were taken by a spy on Grenada who relayed them to sources off the island using a scanning device and a radio transmitter, according to Knight-Ridder, which said the information was compiled from Pentagon, congressional and independent sources.



By Ray Morgan

CIA director Casey to lecture at college

CIA Director William J. Casey will discuss world affairs in the 40th John Findley Green Foundation Lecture at 3 p.m. Saturday in Champ Auditorium at Westminster College in Fulton.

Mr. Casey is the first CIA director to be designated by a president, Ronald Reagan, as a full Cabinet officer. He will discuss the current state of intelligence as it applies to the security of the United States.

Clare Boothe Luce, a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and a former member of Congress, is expected to attend the lecture. She helped to arrange the visit by the CIA director and was the 37th lecturer in the Green series.

During World War II, Mr. Casey served on the staff of William J. Donovan, the founder of the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of the CIA. Mr. Casey received the Bronze Star for his work in coordinating French resistance forces in support of the invasion of Normandy and the liberation of France.

Later he became chief of American secret intelligence operations in Europe. He served as associate general counsel at the European headquarters of the Marshall Plan, the foreign-aid support plan for European nations after World War II.

Mr. Casey also has been chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1971 to 1973, undersecretary of state for economic affairs and president and chairman of the Export-Import Bank.

The lecture is a part of the 1983 Westminster parents weekend. Because of space limitations, tickets will be distributed only to Westminster students, faculty, officials and parents.

C.I.A.'s Role to Be Discussed

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 — William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, agreed today to meet with senators Friday to discuss questions about whether there was a Central Intelligence Agency presence on Grenada prior to Tuesday's invasion.

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, vice chairman of the intelligence committee, said he issued an invitation to Mr. Casey to meet with senators because a C.I.A. role on Grenada "has been widely reported and discussed on the Senate floor" in private conversations.

The New York Democrat added that he was precluded by Senate rules from discussing the substance of the reports. He said all senators had been invited to the briefing with Mr. Casey, which would be held in the secure intelligence

committee room on the fourth floor of the Capitol.

Senator Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado, asked if he had heard about reports of C.I.A. involvement on the island, replied, "Nothing I can talk about."

Another Democratic senator said he had received information that C.I.A. agents were among the passengers on a planeload of 70 American medical students flown out of Grenada Wednesday.

His information came indirectly from the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the Defense Department, he said.

Some Capitol Hill aides said they hoped that, with Cubans and Russians on the island, the United States had a significant intelligence operation there.

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WASHINGTON
BY ROBERT PARRY

Cuba was tipped off to U.S. plans to invade Grenada at least 24 hours before the attack began, possibly explaining why the 1,100-man Cuban force seemed so well prepared for the assault, U.S. intelligence sources said Friday night.

Sources, who spoke on condition they not be identified, said the warning came from an "unintentional" leak from one of the Caribbean nations which joined the United States in the invasion Tuesday.

The sources refused to disclose which of the six countries leaked the information.

Although learning of the invasion plans, Cuba's President Fidel Castro did not send reinforcements to the island, but did dispatch an army colonel to direct the island defense, the sources said.

U.S. Marines and Army paratroopers who landed on Grenada in the pre-dawn hours Tuesday were surprised by the stiffer-than-expected defense mounted by the Cubans and the Grenadian army. The possibility of a leak could help explain why the defenders were able to prevent U.S. forces from obtaining their main objectives on the first day.

Meanwhile, the Navy admiral who commanded the invasion force and a White House spokesman disputed suggestions that U.S. intelligence had failed by underestimating the number of Cubans on the island by about half.

"You can't know everything," said deputy press secretary Larry Speakes, who added that there was no U.S. intelligence operation in Grenada. "You do your best."

Adm. Wesley McDonald, commander in chief of the Atlantic fleet, said, "I didn't have enough intelligence, but there wasn't an intelligence failure. ... I don't think the system failed. We just didn't have the time to focus on it."

Initial estimates put the number of Cubans on Grenada at 600, a figure that was raised to "upwards of 1,000" once the U.S.-led invasion of the island got under way early Tuesday. McDonald said the estimate was 1,100 Cubans, with more than 300 still fighting.

President Reagan said he launched the invasion at the request of six eastern Caribbean nations concerned about a bloody leftist coup on Grenada and the possibility that violence would spread to them.

U.S. intelligence hastily compiled what it could about Cuban and Grenadian military strength last week as final plans were put together for the invasion, Reagan administration sources said, but the CIA estimate proved off the mark when U.S. forces landed on the island.

U.S. officials, speaking publicly and privately, have expressed surprise at the number of Cubans on the island and the determined fight mounted by Cuban and Grenadian defenders.

28 October 1983

STAT

GRENADA/COUP

RATHER: Good evening. This is the CBS Evening News, Dan Rather reporting. The United States now has 6,000 troops on Grenada, triple the number that took part in the Tuesday morning invasion. And apparently many in that American military force will be there longer than was originally indicated. Army Rangers of the assault force prepared to return home today; no word on when the Marines will proceed on to Beirut, where they were headed when the invasion plans got the go-ahead. More of the 82nd Airborne Army division came in today. The number of U.S. military dead from Grenada reached 11 today officially, with 67 wounded and seven missing. Eight of the dead arrived at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware yesterday; word of that just disclosed late today. Pentagon correspondent David Martin reports now on the Defense Department's version of what is happening on Grenada.

MARTIN: President Reagan called it mopping up, and many of these pictures released today by the Defense Department made it look almost easy. Marines moving through northern parts of the island were greeted as conquering heroes. But the overall commander of the operation reported that some fighting is still going on. ADM. WESLEY MCDONALD (Operational Commander): Heavy fighting occurred on the evening of 27 October, at the Calivigny military barracks area. Air strikes and artillery were used to help our forces secure that area. They are continuing to receive small-arms fire.

MARTIN: With 6,000 U.S. soldiers now ashore, most of the remaining fighting is taking place in the south. The Army shelled the area from emplacement around Pt. Salines airfield. Navy jets from the carrier Independence made strafing runs, and Air Force C-130 gunships unloaded their cannons on suspected hideouts. There is strong suspicion the military barracks at Point Calivigny housed a terrorist training camp. That could help explain the presence of some 30 East Germans, Bulgarians and North Koreans inside the Soviet embassy. ALAN ROMBERG (Pentagon Spokesman): It came as a surprise because we didn't know they were there. Ah, it's also of some interest that they were there and what it may say about the kind of role that they were playing.

MARTIN: That could also help explain the large cache of arms and ammunition found earlier at Pt. Salines. U.S. intelligence had spotted the warehouses which held the weapons but had not known what was inside. It is now believed the weapons were brought in by Cuban ships under cover of darkness. MCDONALD: The overwhelming evidence from our ground troops is that Cubans, not Grenadians, were in the forefront of the fighting.

CONTINUED

WASHINGTON TIMES
28 October 1983

U.S. urged to ban goods produced in Soviet Gulag

BY A WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF WRITER

Soviet imports produced by forced labor should be barred from the United States, as the law requires, the chairman of a House appropriations subcommittee said yesterday.

The law banning forced-labor goods, which has been on the books for more than 50 years, "has not been enforced with regard to the Soviet Union," said Rep. Edward R. Roybal, D-Calif., during House action on a Treasury Department

spending bill including funds for the U.S. Customs Service.

"The enforcement of that section of the law should, of course, be carried out," Roybal stated.

Roybal's remarks were intended as part of the legislative history governing congressional approval of the Customs Service funding.

The issue was raised by Rep. Eldon Rudd, R-Ariz., who is part of a bipartisan coalition of anti-communist and human rights activists in Congress seeking tougher sanctions against the Soviet Union following the Soviet downing of a Korean jetliner carrying 269 people.

The forced labor import matter has taken an ironic twist, in light of President Reagan's tough rhetoric in favor of retaliation against the Soviets.

It has been learned that Secretary of State George P. Shultz and other senior administration officials are fighting backstage to stop an intended ban against about three dozen specific Soviet imports that Commissioner of Customs William van Raab planned to invoke as soon as it had Treasury Department approval.

More than \$227 million worth of Soviet metals and manufactured goods, largely produced by forced labor including political prisoners, are imported here each year, according to a State Department

report issued last February.

Opponents of the ban within the department have prevented Raab's ruling from being published in the Federal Register by sidetracking it to the Senior Interagency Group for International Economic Policy, according to administration sources.

The group, which includes all Reagan department heads with jurisdiction over world economic and intelligence matters, "is stacked in favor of big business interests that oppose trade sanctions," one source reported.

Officials at the State and Treasury departments said everyone involved in the top-level review of Raab's intended Customs Service action was under orders not to talk about it.

Dennis Murphy, director of public affairs for the Customs Service, would only say that the ruling had been referred to the Senior Interagency Group "for review" because it "has such sweeping implications."

One official said "there is no timetable for action" on the import ban, but denied that the review process was a bureaucratic way to stop the ban from being implemented.

However, another senior official said he expected the review to include an update of the intelligence data used as the basis for the State Department's earlier assessment that "forced labor, often under harsh and degrading conditions, is used to execute various Soviet developmental projects and to produce large amounts of primary and manufactured goods for both domestic and Western export markets."

During yesterday's House debate, Rudd pointed to official documentation of widespread Soviet forced-labor practices, which Sen. William L. Armstrong, R-Colo., had printed in the Congressional Record on Sept. 15.

The documentation included an extensive CIA list of Soviet industries and products "in which forced labor is used extensively." The list, compiled last May, was "based on a

variety of intelligence sources and open publications with information from former prisoners," CIA Director William J. Casey told Armstrong.

The list included wood products, electronic components, glassware, automotive parts, raw minerals and mineral products, clothing, petroleum products and chemicals, food, construction and household goods.

According to the State Department report, the Soviets use a network of some 1,100 forced-labor camps comprising about 4 million forced laborers throughout the Soviet Union. The system includes at least 10,000 political and religious prisoners, the report stated.

When Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, it included a provision banning importation of products "mined, produced or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor and/or forced labor."

The measure has been used to bar certain imports from Cuba and Mexico, but never has been invoked against the Soviet Union, according to government officials.

— George Archibald

ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400060003-8
28 October 1983

GRENADA/COUP

JENNINGS: Now the Senate has approved a bill which says the War Powers Act does pertain to the U.S. invasion of Grenada. A House Committee passed it yesterday, and it would require the withdrawal of American troops from the island by January 23rd at the latest, the end of a 90-day period. As Brit Hume reports, today's vote does not mean most of the Congress has turned against the president.

HUME: CIA Director Casey came here today to brief the Senate Intelligence Committee on Grenada. Afterward, one member who is normally a leading critic of Reagan foreign policy said what he heard was good enough for him. SEN. JOSEPH BIDEN (D-Del.): Now I've seen facts sufficient to put me a position of saying, I think the president was right.

Days of Crisis for President: Golf, a Tragedy and Secrets

By FRANCIS X. CLINES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 25 — At midday Saturday, as President Reagan was in the midst of a round of golf at the Augusta National Golf Course in Georgia, he had under active consideration a secret request from Caribbean nations to join in the invasion of Grenada.

The President, already a legend in the Administration for keeping his own counsel, had begun the most secretive and momentous week of his incumbency with a golf club in his hands.

One of his golfing partners, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, was receiving the latest details of Grenada plans going on back in Washington, and discussing them with the President on the golf course, according to White House officials.

At the same time, the President's National Security Adviser, Richard C. McFarlane, was monitoring the situation nearby as the President stroked away.

On Sunday morning, the Grenada issue was further laid out in Administration study papers as Mr. Reagan made a sudden return home and appeared standing in the rain outside the White House, grief-stricken and mourning the marines who had died in the shocking Beirut explosion a few hours earlier.

The national security meetings that followed were ostensibly devoted entirely to the Lebanon crisis, but today it became clear that they also advanced the Grenada invasion decision still further.

At 8 o'clock Monday night, as Administration officials were publicly denying reports of an imminent invasion of Grenada, the President's senior advisers personally rounded up Congressional leaders, asking them not to use their phones, not even to break dinner dates with their wives, and to drive in White House limousines to an urgent meeting with the President.

Mr. Reagan was waiting in his residence upstairs at the White House and they sat with him in the yellow

Oval Office, a working enclave, while he briefed them on the military action to be launched by the following dawn.

The secret of the invasion was kept; official spokesmen were at that time using such replies as "preposterous," and "untrue" to rebuff news inquiries, characterizations ordered, according to one informed source, by the President's National Security Council.

President Reagan finally told the nation at 9:07 this morning, emerging into the White House briefing room and looking pink-cheeked amidst the most grueling days of his Administration.

Speakes Is Abashed

He had averaged about five hours sleep Friday and Saturday nights as Caribbean and Middle East bulletins were mulled over, according to White House workers. He finally yielded to some nap time Sunday, as basic decisions were made on the Beirut explosion and the Grenada invasion.

"He looked the same as ever to me," one White House worker said, summarizing the President's personal demeanor through all this, a demeanor that had him gravely denouncing the Grenada regime at one hour ("a brutal group of leftist thugs") and talking about the weather the next with a visiting official from Bangladesh ("You left the dry season in your country to come here to the rain").

The President had kept the Grenada operation covert to "most everybody" in the White House, according to Larry Speakes, the President's spokesman. "It was a very narrow planning operation," he said, appearing abashed at having misled news reporters — unknowingly, he insisted. "A man who stands here is only as strong as the guidance he is given," he said when asked whether the Administration had lied.

The measure of the announcement this day at the White House can be taken by the fact that one of the few questions on the Beirut explosion, an enormous topic the preceding day, was not asked until an afternoon briefing at 1:47. Mr. Speakes said he had nothing really new to report.

"The latest death toll?" a reporter asked. Mr. Speakes looked back at an aide, "What was it?" he said. "Two hundred-seven."

In watching the President's demeanor through the two days of events, some politicians said they were struck by the fact that he did not immediately address the nation by television on either or both subjects. Privately they questioned whether he is trying to avoid the instant personal identification with crisis events that marked the Administration of his predecessor, President Jimmy Carter.

Graphic Pictures of Reagan

At the Congressional leadership gathering on Grenada in the White House Monday night, Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. reportedly brought up the subject of a Lebanon address, and this evening the White House finally announced that the President would speak about both subjects Thursday night in a nationwide broadcast.

In the meantime, the White House offered the public some graphic tableaux, snapped by the White House photographer during the weekend, depicting the President at the center of various conferences. He is seen in bathrobe and slippers being briefed by Mr. Shultz and Mr. McFarlane, then out on the Augusta fairway, pausing at the wheel of his golf cart as he receives another dispatch. Mr. Shultz is getting the latest word in another, holding the special security phone with a golf glove on.

Perhaps the most fascinating of the many questions left unanswered by the Administration as the day of the invasion announcement unfolded floated up at a "background" briefing given at the White House by an anonymous diplomat and an anonymous general. "Where's Bill Casey right now?" they were asked, referring to the director of Central Intelligence. They said they did not know.

ESSAY

Boost Phase Intercept?

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, Oct. 22 — During Mr. Reagan's autumn press conference (we're down to one a season now), the answer that revealed a snail's-pace flow of paper into the Oval Office had to do with a recommendation for missile defense in outer space.

"Nothing has actually been presented to me as yet," the President said. "I'm fascinated with reading all about it, but I haven't seen it..."

Two weeks ago, a senior inter-agency group consisting of the national security adviser, the Secretary of Defense and a couple of other guys sent a report to the President that obviously never made it to his Camp David briefcase.

"X-ray lasers, chemical, excimer and free electron lasers, particle beams and kinetic energy hit-to-kill devices," the report concluded, "all have high potential for boost-phase intercepts."

I can just hear Mike Deaver saying to Dick Darman, "We're not going to bother the President's head with that kind of stuff." In this case, however, they may have underestimated their boss's level of interest.

At the 1980 Republican convention, candidate Reagan approved an item in the platform that Senator Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming had been lobbying for: an "active defense," with outer-space lasers in mind. On March 23, 1983, the President — pretty much on his own — inserted a couple of paragraphs in a speech daring to suggest a departure from the generation-old theory of nuclear defense known as "mutual assured destruction."

In his speech, which was promptly dubbed "Star Wars" and ridiculed by the arms control establishment, the President called for a study of weapons that would destroy missiles when they were launched — in the "boost phase" — rather than rely on the threat of a retaliatory attack. Said Mr. Reagan: "Better to

save lives than to avenge them."

For the last six months, his Administration has been straining to come up with a "bridging document" to plan the construction of space-to-boost-phase weapons. The C.I.A. has estimated that the Soviet Union will have a laser-beam satellite in place within four years. Such weapons do not violate existing treaties (though that would scarcely trouble Moscow) because they are not "weapons of mass destruction" — just the opposite, they destroy such weapons.

The internal debate has been between those who want to begin systems integration soon, so as to have an operational test within a decade, and those who want to wait until sometime in the next millennium when lasers can be developed that would be able to blast missiles that are 75 times "harder" than any we have in our arsenal today.

The let's-get-started crowd emphasizes chemical lasers, for which we have the technology now; but the "R & D forever" crowd wants lasers with shorter wavelength beams that could really zap 'em someday, if Someday comes before Doomsday. Within the Administration, most of the former opponents of an active defense are in the "R & D forever" set, demanding delay

until lasers are available with a zap-page accuracy of 399 out of 400 shots.

In the report, which seems to be stuck in the White House interoffice mail and which the President could read by picking up the current issue of Aviation Week, the tilt is toward starving present technology in favor of feeding future technology. What little support is given chemical laser development came at the urging of William Clark and his resident National Security Council expert, Col. Gilbert Rye.

Now that Mr. Clark is being put out to pasture, Robert McFarlane, his replacement at the N.S.C., is likely to put this project under his protégé, Ron Lehman, who is said by hawks to be an "R & D forever" man. That is one illustration of the profound change in strategic mind-set brought about by the President's selection of the apparatchik option at the N.S.C. (Cap Weinberger and Bill Casey, now at the far periphery of power, are putting out the story that the damage to the hard-line cause could have been worse — that they saved the Republic from James Baker as national security adviser. You can buy their face-saver if you like.)

Here is a case where the President's common sense is sound, where establishment thinking has become muscle-bound and outdated, and where Mr. Reagan is willing to respond to a press conference charge that he is starting a defensive arms race with a disarming "Would that be all bad?" Yet he is unable to get his proposal off the ground and out of the bureaucratic gravitational field; his aides yes him to death with plans so long range as to throw open a new window of vulnerability in the 1990's.

"Taking a chop off your plate today because you think you'll have a steak tomorrow," says Malcolm Wallop, "is a way to stay hungry." Mr. Reagan's "active defense" has few other active defenders.

WASHINGTON POST
22 October 1983*File Only - JG*

Reagan Advisers Block Staff Ploy

By Lou Cannon

Washington Post Staff Writer

A group of longtime Reagan advisers last week thwarted a power play by White House chief of staff James A. Baker III and deputy chief of staff Michael K. Deaver to make Baker President Reagan's national security affairs adviser and to move Deaver into Baker's job, administration officials said yesterday.

These officials said Reagan tentatively had agreed to the plan, but discarded the idea at the urging of his outgoing national security affairs adviser, William P. Clark, who was backed by White House counselor Edwin Meese III, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and CIA Director William J. Casey.

The disclosure of what one official called "the Baker-Deaver option" provided a glimpse into the tangled power politics of the Reagan White House, where bitter policy disputes and personal feuding have been commonplace.

Clark, Meese and Weinberger have been trusted Reagan associates since his first term as governor of California, beginning in 1966. Casey was Reagan's campaign manager in 1980.

When Clark arrived at the White House early in 1982, he and Deaver were friends and allies.

But their relationship deteriorated in recent months, and Reagan took note of this "friction" when he granted Clark's request to be named secretary of the interior. None of these officials would comment publicly about the maneuvering, except for Weinberger, who

said he "played no role" in the president's decision. But several officials confirmed the discussion of the plan.

They said that Baker, who has been chief of staff throughout the administration, long has talked of acquiring experience in a foreign policy post and that Deaver, the aide closest to the Reagan family, would like the chief of staff's post.

However, those opposed to the idea cited Baker's lack of experience in foreign affairs, coincidentally using the argument that Baker's allies had made against Clark. They also questioned whether Deaver had the background in substantive issues for the chief of staff's post, where even Baker's adversaries acknowl-

edge his competence. One official said the Baker-Deaver option arose quickly as "a target of opportunity" after Clark decided that the pressures of the national security adviser's job had become too severe and asked Reagan to name him as the replacement for outgoing Interior Secretary James G. Watt.

The obvious choice to replace Clark was the man who Reagan eventually selected, Robert C. McFarlane, who had served as deputy national security affairs adviser before becoming the U.S. special envoy to the Middle East.

When Clark resigned last Thursday, administration officials said that McFarlane would be named national security adviser. But they backed off this prediction on Friday, saying that conservatives were mounting a campaign to make U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

the national security adviser. The Kirkpatrick boomlet, strongly supported by Casey, did not make headway because she was not acceptable to Secretary of State George P. Shultz, officials said. It was at this time, on Friday, Oct. 14, that Deaver and Baker came up with their idea.

One official said Shultz had "signed off on the Baker option," which he said was offered in the form of Baker as an alternative to Kirkpatrick. But it was not known

if Shultz, who has complained about White House dominance in foreign policy decision making, was enthusiastic about the idea.

Reporters had been advised on Friday that the McFarlane appointment was likely to occur over the weekend, but the maneuvering had the effect of delaying the decision. Reagan reportedly consulted with all his senior advisers and went with what one of them called "the safe choice" of McFarlane.

"Baker would have driven the conservatives up the wall, and Kirkpatrick would have provoked a crisis with both the White House staff and the secretary of state," said one official. "Bud [McFarlane] is less abrasive than Jeane and more acceptable than Baker."

Reagan met privately with Kirkpatrick before announcing McFarlane's appointment last Monday and persuaded her to stay on at the United Nations at least through the end of the General Assembly session in December.

Kirkpatrick's name was prompt-

Infighting at the White House

By Benjamin Taylor
 Globe Staff

WASHINGTON — A report in the Washington Times that James A. Baker 3d, the White House chief of staff, is being considered by President Ronald Reagan as a replacement for Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, the chief US delegate to the United Nations, was adamantly denied yesterday by the White House.

The denials were so adamant that they served to highlight once again the rather sharp ideological schism and bureaucratic infighting that has marked the Reagan White House over the last three years.

Larry Speakes, the White House spokesman, said the story "appears to be wishful thinking on the part of those who would like to see Jim Baker elsewhere."

Baker was not returning telephone press calls yesterday, but one of his aides called the article "a bunch of baloney that was leaked to the Washington Times by someone who is obviously not one of Jim Baker's best friends in this Administration."

The Washington Times is a conservative newspaper founded in 1982 by Rev. Sun Myung Moon of the Unification Church after the Washington Star folded a year earlier.

The newspaper is not widely read by the movers and shakers in Washington. But it does carry a number of conservative columnists, and to some extent, it has become an outlet for right-wing senti-

ment and rumors about where conservatives think or hope the Reagan Administration is headed.

The 52-year-old Baker is the leader of the so-called pragmatist group of White House aides who have constantly been battling more traditional conservative Reaganites during the last three years.

The Baker-Bush connection

Conservatives outside the Administration have long held a distrust for Baker because of his ties to Vice President George Bush. Both Bush and Baker are from Houston, and Baker ran Bush's campaign for the GOP presidential nomination in 1980.

Early in the Administration, most of the publicized bureaucratic squabbles at the White House focused on the internecine battles between Baker and Edwin Meese 3d, counselor to the President.

Earlier this year, there were several reports that Baker and his followers were at odds with William P. Clark, then the national security adviser.

Clark had access to Reagan any time he wanted, a fact which was said to upset the deputy chief of staff, Michael Deaver, a Baker ally who controls who gets in to see the President.

The infighting also reportedly stemmed from concern among the pragmatists about Clark's rather ideologically rigid approach to foreign policy and the need for dramatic increases in military spending.

Clark's sudden and surprising move from the security adviser's job to be Interior Secretary kicked off yet another round of squabbling between the pragmatists (the popular term in the Reagan White House these days for describing a moderate) and the conservatives, some of whom wanted Kirkpatrick and not Robert C. McFarlane to replace Clark in the sensitive foreign policy job.

Meese's apparent decline

With Clark's departure, the conservatives were particularly upset that, outside of Meese, whose clout seems to be on the decline anyway, there would not be anyone in the highest levels of the White House to represent their point of view.

There was much speculation inside and outside the White House yesterday about who leaked the story to the Times. Jeremiah O'Leary, the author, attributed his information to "well-informed Administration sources."

Some observers suspected Clark, who, even though he pushed for McFarlane as a successor, was reportedly unhappy with the suggestions that the Baker group had finally forced him out of the White House.

Others suggested that William Casey, the director of Central Intelligence, may have been the source. Casey, who ran Reagan's 1980 campaign, and Baker, who helped to prepare Reagan for his debate with Jimmy Carter, have given diametrically opposite stories to the FBI on how the Carter briefing book for that debate fell into the hands of the Reagan campaign. Baker has pointed the finger at Casey. Casey has said he never knew anything about it.

In any event, only a handful of Reagan's original top White House aides remain. These include Baker, Meese, Deaver, and Richard G. Darman and Craig Fuller, presidential assistants. And with the exception of Meese, the conservatives in the top White House jobs — Richard V. Allen, Clark, Martin Anderson, Lyn Nofziger — have left.

Perhaps that is why one top Reagan aide said, "Outside the White House we may have problems, but inside the White House, the working situation has never been more harmonious."

KISSINGER COMMISSION

Central American animosities grow

By Daniel Southerland

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

In the midst of a new debate here over Central America, critics and defenders of Reagan administration policy alike agree on at least one matter: Hostility among nations in the region is growing, thus increasing the chances of a wider war.

The critics claim that the administration has contributed to this "polarization" by funding the so-called secret war conducted against Nicaragua's Sandinista-led regime. Administration officials respond that the Sandinistas themselves are responsible for provoking the hostility of their neighbors and increasing the risks of widening the war.

Administration officials also argue that pressure from the US-supported opponents of the Sandinistas has caused the Sandinistas to consider moves aimed at securing peace in the region.

This argument over a polarization of forces is one of the issues at the heart of the current debate in the United States Congress over American funding for rebel forces in Nicaragua. The House of Representatives voted 227-194 Thursday to halt such aid. At the end of July, the House voted 228-195 to end further aid to the rebel forces. The Senate did not act then and must act on this week's authorizing bill in order to change policy.

As House debate began on Thursday, Intelligence Committee chairman Edward P. Boland, a Democrat from Massachusetts, said that with rebel attacks on oil depots and on the Managua airport, the conflict inside Nicaragua had intensified since the vote in July.

One of the administration's problems is that the rationale for the secret aid to the rebels has shifted along with the intensification of the conflict. Administration officials at first claimed that the aid was designed to build a program to interdict the flow of weapons from Nicaragua to El Salvador. When it became apparent that the rebels did not have

this in mind, some administration officials argued that the aim was to put pressure on the Sandinistas. Among rebel leaders themselves, some said the aim was the overthrow of the Sandinista regime. But administration officials continued to insist that this was not their aim.

Requesting anonymity, one administration official said earlier this week that parallel to the debate in the

Congress, there is a debate within the administration itself as to how far the US ought to go in putting pressure on the Sandinistas. William J. Casey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was reported to favor ever-increasing pressure, apparently in the hope that the Sandinista regime could be overthrown. But the administration official insisted that this was not the policy the administration had adopted.

Meanwhile, the Kissinger Commission on Central America was reported to have returned from its trip to the region struck by the degree of polarization that has taken place. In meetings with the commission, leaders in both Honduras and Costa Rica were said to have advocated tough action toward Nicaragua.

"Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala are building toward a war with Nicaragua," an administration official said. "But this is not our fault; . . . 99 percent of the reason for this polarization is Nicaraguan intransigence. The Nicaraguans started all this before we put any pressure on them."

In a letter to House leaders delivered prior to Thursday's congressional debate, Secretary of State George P. Shultz argued that to cut off CIA support to the anti-Sandinista rebels would "undermine the cause of peace and democracy" and "virtually destroy" chances for a negotiated settlement in Central America.

But House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (D) of Massachusetts argued that Mr. Shultz was requesting support for a policy of arming rebels seeking the overthrow of a legitimate government.

If the House vote goes as expected —


against covert aid — a long and difficult legislative process lies ahead. The Senate can be expected to vote next week in favor of the secret aid. Then a House-Senate conference committee would take up the matter. Finally, the Democrats, in an effort to block the aid, could still hold up the entire appropriation bill for all intelligence programs.

At his press conference on Wednesday, President Reagan defended such aid as legitimate:

"I do believe in the right of a country, when it believes that its interests are best served, to practice covert activity," said Reagan. But the President added that it would be impossible to let the American people know what was happening in Nicaragua "without letting the wrong people know — those that are in opposition to what you're doing."

The Sandinistas, however, claim to know fairly well what is going on. They charge that the administration has declared a war on Nicaragua that involves the United States ever more directly.

A source close to the Nicaraguan government said, meanwhile, that Nicaragua Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto Brockman was planning to present a new Nicaraguan peace plan Thursday to US Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne A. Motley. The source said the plan would be in the form of draft treaties and would cover in detail specific American concerns, including verification procedures to control the flow of arms and the withdrawal of foreign advisers from the region.



Shultz argues for aid to Nicaraguan rebels

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

Flight 007: What We Know Now

Why don't we all allow ourselves a second look at the American response to the downing of the Korean airliner? As happens, a pattern of events has belatedly come into focus in the news, but it has not yet come into focus in the general political consciousness. It could make a difference.

The pattern fell into place in a New York Times story of Oct. 6 that went straight to the central question of what did they know and when did they know it. American intelligence officials, the Times said, had reviewed all available evidence and found no indication that Soviet air defense personnel knew the plane they were firing at was a commercial airliner. This judgment was said to have gone to the White House two weeks after the attack.

The pieces of this story had been published earlier but—for me and many others—the assembly of the pieces permitted a clear view of a critical difference previously fuzzed: the difference between shooting down a plane knowing it was an airliner and shooting it down suspecting it was a military reconnaissance aircraft. It is not the whole difference between guilt and exoneration, but it is the partial difference between an act reflecting unforgivable cynicism and explicable hard ball.

In other words, American intelligence fairly early came to a view consistent with the Soviets' claim that they had taken the Korean plane for a military RC135, one of which had been off their coast a few hours earlier. But American policy and opinion

have not caught up with this view.

One trouble was that the Soviets added the charge, still not in the slightest substantiated, that the Korean plane was doing espionage duty. Many Americans in and out of the government have found it easier to shoot that particular fish in a barrel than to cope squarely with the Soviets' assertion of mistaken identity.

So at least until Oct. 6—during the whole month-plus when American policy and public opinion were most deeply engaged—the dominant view was that the Soviets shot down the airliner deliberately and wittingly. From that perception flowed any number of epithets and condemnations, which in turn contributed to the Soviets' further responses and, with those responses, colored the atmosphere in which the missile talks were unfolding.

It seems to me that had the dominant view been that the Soviets committed "only" a heartless paranoid act by shooting down an airliner they thought was a spy plane, our words and hearts would not have so hardened, and the resultant political damage would have been less.

Many will recall that after Israel shot down a plane it acknowledged it knew to be a Libyan airliner, with 113 lives lost, the United States took it in stride as just one of those unfortunate things.

Imagine if President Reagan, after getting the straight word—let's hear it for Bill Casey, by the way—in mid-September, had gone on television:

"We have sifted the intelligence and concluded that, contrary to our earlier suspicions, the Soviets might have thought they were shooting at one of our intelligence planes. We think the Soviets were negligent in not identifying the plane correctly, unjustified in shooting it down without knowing what it was, and tendentious in accusing us of using the Korean plane for spying. But . . .

Reagan did go forward with the arms talks, of course. But he did so to the accompaniment of angry, abusive cross-cutting comments, which continue:

The administration could have used the Oct. 6 Times report to reposition the United States in public diplomacy for the next substantive steps in private diplomacy. Instead, the State Department chose to stay in the familiar defensive debate mode. The United States does not and may never know "for sure" whether the Soviets thought KAL 007 was a civilian plane, the spokesman said; anyway, they should have known.

When William Pfaff wrote a good column (Oct. 13) in the International Herald Tribune criticizing the administration for not facing up to the implications of the Times report, a U.S. Information Agency official said (Oct. 19) the column "must delight Soviet propagandists" and repeated the assertion that the shooting was an act of "unprovoked aggression."

Is there not one person in the United States government who can publicly talk straight about this affair?

Personal mention

Trustees of Westminster College in Fulton, Mo., say CIA Director William Casey can speak at the school as scheduled even though a majority of the faculty is opposed to his appearance. A college spokesman said faculty criticism of Casey primarily is the result of allegations of financial misdealings by the CIA director. Casey is scheduled to deliver the John Findley Green Foundation Lecture Oct. 29.



Casey

WASHINGTON POST
20 October 1983

'Vindication' Rewards a Six-Year Struggle

By Caryle Murphy
Washington Post Staff Writer

For Elias P. Demetracopoulos there are no tasks. Only missions. Whether it is hounding the former Greek military junta, spoiling Washington's relations with the Greek colonels, ferreting out secrets or clearing his reputation, Demetracopoulos pursues his dragons with doggedness and excruciating thoroughness.

Very often he gets what he is after, and recently he has claimed another victory. Six years after The New York Times published an article that the Greek lobbyist says sullied his name, he has wrested from the Central Intelligence Agency a letter disassociating itself from the story and saying it has "no hard facts" in its files to support the allegations, attributed to the CIA, that were printed about him.

Demetracopoulos calls this "vindication." The New York Times, which published a story about the recent CIA statement that some readers took as a retreat from its earlier account, says, "The source of the retraction is the CIA, not The New York Times," according to Assistant Managing Editor Craig Whitney. The CIA declines to elaborate on its August statement.

It is a fitting epilogue to the career of one of Washington's more enigmatic figures. Among foreigners who have migrated to this political mecca with causes to plead, this Athens-born son of an archeological guide has negotiated a unique and controversial swath through Washington's political and social thickets.

Demetracopoulos was a well-known political journalist in Athens in the 1950s and 1960s whose reporting on occasion provoked clashes with U.S. officials in Greece. His reputation in this city took seed when he fled Greece after the 1967 military junta and began a one-man crusade on Capitol Hill against the Greek colonels.

He took to Washington like a fish to water, quickly making high-level connections in both Republican and Democratic circles by building on contacts he had made during his journalistic career.

A man of medium build whose oval head once had "so much black hair," according to its 54-year-old owner, Demetracopoulos is gregarious and enthusiastic, with a self-mocking sense of humor. There is a European accent to his manners and speech, which like his mind are obsessively precise. He neither drinks nor smokes, and one of his passions is chocolate milkshakes.

"He's a lobbyist by birth. . . . He's good at meeting people, shaking hands, getting them to know him," said a congressional aide.

But even those who know him as "Elias" say they do not know him well. He has no family and no formal organizational ties in his ethnic community. "He's kind of a mystery person. He kind of likes that role. That's my impression," said one acquaintance. "He kind of creates this air of mystery about him."

After arriving in Washington, Demetracopoulos lived at the Fairfax Hotel (now the Ritz-Carlton), then owned by Louise Gore, a prominent figure in the Republican Party in Maryland who had befriended the Greek exile. Almost immediately after arriving, he landed a job as a foreign consultant for a Wall Street brokerage firm called Brimberg & Co. A divorcee whose former wife is now dead, he often escorted well-known Washington women to social functions.

But this rather glamorous facade evaporated, according to one acquaintance, with a visit to Demetracopoulos' one-room flat in the hotel. A sofa bed, telephone, table and few chairs made up his furniture. The rest of the room was swamped with the inventory of Demetracopoulos' trade: piles and piles of files.

"When you walked in you probably saw 20,000 pieces of paper," said Elias Vlantou, a friend and activist in the Greek-American community. "It was not elegance. It was dedication. . . . I think this was his only interest in the world—information about what Greece was doing, about what the United States was doing, what Turkey was doing. That's all he cared about."

During the junta period, Demetracopoulos, who describes his political views as "centrist-liberal," provided information to newspapers back home, but says he was not paid for it.

"Demetracopoulos was every night on the phone dictating to me very exciting reports from congressional meetings and news which helped our cause of getting rid of the colonels," said Louis Danos, then editor of a small antijunta paper and now press counselor at the Embassy of Greece.

For his antijunta efforts, Demetracopoulos was stripped of his Greek citizenship from 1970 until 1974, when the colonels were ousted.

But it was not only the junta that Demetracopoulos angered.

In 1968, he went to the Democratic Party and, he says, told them that the Greek junta was funneling money to the Nixon-Agnew campaign through a Boston-based, Greek-American businessman named Thomas Pappas. Later, in 1971, he made similar allegations to a congressional subcommittee investigating Greek-American relations. Though these allegations made their way into the press and the political lore of Washington, they have never been proved.

Soon after, Demetracopoulos says he began to feel the heat. In 1971, an anonymous memo written in the State Department was given to House Speaker Carl Albert. It stated that Demetracopoulos' reporting while he was still in Greece had caused "considerable embarrassment" to Queen Fredericka and King Constantine and that he "caused friction in Greek-American relations. . . by publishing highly classified documents."

The memo went on to challenge Demetracopoulos' veracity by raising doubts about his past. Demetracopoulos learned about the memo from a congressional aide and, after he made heated protests, the State Department retracted it and sent him an apology.

Demetracopoulos says Nixon administration officials, including Attorney General John N. Mitchell, directly and indirectly threatened him with deportation because of the Pappas affair. Gore confirmed Mitchell made such threats to her about Demetracopoulos. Mitchell said that allegation was "nonsense" and "totally ridiculous."

In addition, Demetracopoulos says, the Justice Department began asking questions about him. He eventually obtained a memo

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WASHINGTON POST
20 October 1983

File Only

Capitol Punishment

The Spy the Spies Love

By Art Buchwald

Who says there aren't heroes left in America any more? Just the other day, in a surprise ceremony, the CIA awarded CIA Director William J. Casey the "Distinguished Intelligence Medal," the agency's highest award. Casey was cited for "outstanding leadership" and for restoring the credibility of the CIA and bringing "imagination to our operation."

In the past, a decoration of this magnitude was usually reserved until the director retired or resigned from the job. But apparently the people who work for Casey couldn't wait. I am not privy to how these awards are made, but I know they're not easy to get.

They must have an awards committee out at Langley that goes over every one of the citation nominations to make sure the person is deserving of the honor.

"Gentlemen, our first nominee is James Blickstein, who, in a clandestine operation, dropped behind enemy lines in Afghanistan and delivered needed radio equipment to the rebels. He then walked barefoot 500 miles across Russian-held territory back to Pakistan. Does he get a medal?"

"He's paid to do that. Why should he get an award? If we give out the 'Distinguished Intelligence Medal' to every Tom, Dick and Harry involved in a clandestine operation, it will deflate its value."

"Okay, let's forget Blickstein. The second nominee is Hiram Cope, who managed to go over the wall at the Soviet's submarine base at Murmansk and steal all the U.S.S.R.'s naval codes. He then swam to Norway in a frogman suit."

"Big deal. I'll admit it wasn't a bad operation, but is it worth a medal?"

"All in favor say aye—all against, nay. The nays have it. Scratch Cope."

"We now come to Nicaragua and Honduras. Our man down there has

managed to get around all the restrictions the congressional Committee on Intelligence laid down for covert operations, and got his people to bomb Nicaraguan soil."

"He should get a medal."

"But do we want to give him the highest one?"

"I don't think we do, because we have to make him the fall guy in case Congress starts raising a ruckus. Let's give him the CIA's Good Conduct Award. We can always give him the biggie just before we fire him."

"We're all agreed then on T.L. Now I have a CIA person that I am proud to nominate. I propose that we give the 'Distinguished Intelligence Medal' to none other than our revered director, William J. Casey."

"I have no quarrel with that. The man certainly has gone beyond the call of duty."

"You won't hear a nay from me. He's the bravest of the brave."

"The smartest of the smart."

"His outstanding leadership has made this organization what it is today."

"If it wasn't for his imagination I don't know where we'd all be today."

"I take it then there is no opposition to awarding the director our highest decoration."

"I've still got five years to go before retirement. You won't hear any objection from me."

"Good. Then I'll write up the citation and we'll get Deputy Director John McMahon to present it to him in a full-fledged formal ceremony, with the CIA Undercover Band."

"It's the least we can do for the old man."

"No one in the CIA deserves it more."

"How did you ever think of it, Wiloughby?"

"When you're in the intelligence business you HAVE to think of every-

thing."

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20 October 1983

Update

■ Trustees at Westminster College in Fulton, Mo., say faculty opposition won't stop CIA Director William Casey from speaking at the school Oct. 29.

Reported by Susan Older,
Timothy Kenny, Michael
Clark and Marta McCave

*File Only - DC1*WASHINGTON TIMES
20 October 1983**BRIEFLY / Capital****'New leads' in briefing book probe**

Rep. Donald Albosta, D-Mich., said yesterday "new leads . . . which could play a significant role" have delayed his House subcommittee's hearings into how Carter White House materials reached Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign.

In a three-paragraph statement yesterday, Albosta made no mention of any other specifics of the panel's investigation.

In a related development, federal law-enforcement sources said the FBI is nearing an end to its parallel investigation into who leaked or stole Carter materials, including portions or all of a debate briefing book.

The FBI probably will turn results of its investigation over to the Justice Department by late October or early November for a decision on whether further action is necessary, law-enforcement sources said.

From Times News Services and Staff Reports

CIA director to speak at college in Fulton despite faculty protests

CIA Director William J. Casey is scheduled to deliver the John Findley Green Foundation Lecture at Westminster College at Fulton despite opposition from a majority of the faculty and a grandson of Green's.

The college board of trustees has reaffirmed the invitation to Casey and announced plans to present him with an honorary degree. Casey will deliver the 40th annual lecture at 3 p.m. Saturday, Oct. 29, in the college's Champ Auditorium.

Faculty criticism of Casey centers on allegations of improper financial dealings, according to Bruce Hackmann, the college's director of press relations.

A spokesman for Casey in Washington said Tuesday that the Casey was aware of the issue and would present the speech in Fulton.

ALL OF THE faculty allegations against Casey were reviewed by the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee in 1981 and 1982 and found "absolutely untrue," CIA spokesman Dale Peterson said.

Other faculty criticism contends



Casey

Objections to the talk by William J. Casey center on allegations of improper financial deal- ings.

that several recent Green lecturers have been conservative rather than covering a spectrum of political positions, Hackmann said.

St. Louis lawyer John R. Green II, a grandson of the lecture founder, was present at the board of trustees meeting Oct. 10 and noted his opposition to Casey's appearance for the lecture.

Green, a 1947 graduate of Westminster, said he noted published reports of Casey's alleged financial dealings and told the trustees that he believed it "inappropriate to attach my grandfather's name to a lecture given by this man."

GREEN SAID that despite his opposition to Casey's speech, he would continue to support the college in other endeavors.

College President J. Harvey Saunders announced that a committee of faculty, alumni, trustees and students would be appointed to advise the school on future speaker

selections, Hackmann said.

Casey is to discuss the role intelligence plays in the security of the nation and the world. The college has announced that "due to space limitations," admission will be limited to Westminster students, their parents and faculty members.

Clare Boothe Luce, the 37th Green lecturer, helped arrange the Casey appearance, and she is expected to be at the college for his lecture, Hackmann said.

OTHER GREEN lecturers have included former British Prime Ministers Winston Churchill and Edward Heath, former Presidents Truman and Ford, former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger.

Casey was on the staff of William J. Donovan, founder of the Office of Strategic Services, during World War II. He helped coordinate French resistance forces in support of the Normandy invasion and liberation of France and later was chief of American secret intelligence operations in Europe.

Casey has been chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, secretary of state for economic affairs and president and chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States.

19 October 1983

FULTON, MO.

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APPEARANCE BY CIA DIRECTOR OPPOSED AT COLLEGE

Trustees of Westminster College say CIA Director William J. Casey will be allowed to speak at the school as scheduled even though a majority of the faculty is opposed to his appearance.

College spokesman Bruce Hackmann said faculty criticism of Casey primarily is the result of allegations of financial misdealings by the CIA director. Casey is scheduled to deliver the John Findley Green Foundation Lecture on Oct. 29.

St. Louis lawyer John R. Green II, a grandson of the lecture founder, also said he was opposed to Casey's appearance.

College trustees at a recent meeting reaffirmed their invitation to Casey and their decision to award him an honorary degree.

Admission to the lecture at Champ Auditorium was to be restricted by "space limitations" to Westminster students, their parents and faculty members, college officials said.

CIA spokesman Dale Peterson said allegations against Casey were investigated by a Senate committee in 1981 and 1982 and found "absolutely untrue."

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Reagan hit for bypassing Kirkpatrick

By John Maclean
 and Storer Rowley

Chicago Tribune

WASHINGTON—After President Reagan chose foreign policy professional Robert McFarlane over Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, as his new national security adviser Monday, Kirkpatrick indicated she might leave her UN job before the end of Reagan's first term.

Hardline conservatives had pressed the candidacy of Kirkpatrick, whose hawkish views often mirror their own.

Reagan's choice of McFarlane indicated he prefers a quiet, well-run foreign policy for the coming election year rather than a controversial, ideological stance. Secretary of State George Shultz, who has been on the losing end of policy battles with a more conservative White House, appeared to be the main beneficiary of the President's choice.

Conservative spokesmen were quick to react, labeling McFarlane's choice "a mistake" and "another disappointment" from a President who they believe has become too moderate for their liking.

PROMINENT conservatives, among them Richard Viguerie, publisher of Conservative Digest, also expressed dismay last week when Reagan announced that he would nominate his then-national security adviser, William Clark, to replace James Watt as Interior Department secretary. Clark, who is awaiting confirmation, was considered one of the few genuine conservatives in the White House and the President's inner circle.

"Passing over Jeane Kirkpatrick may be a mistake on a number of points," said Craig Shirley, a spokesman for the National Conservative Political Action Committee, a powerful, right-wing lobbying group. "She was qualified; she is a woman. McFarlane is a career bureaucrat who once said, 'We do not seek superiority over the Soviet Union,' which flies in the face of what Reagan said in 1980."

McFarlane said he will seek to be a "coordinator" of foreign policy rather than an "advocate." He added that he expects no battles with Cabinet officers over the fundamentals of policy.

SOME OF THOSE close to Kirkpatrick said she badly wanted the post. She met privately with Reagan before he made the announcement about McFarlane, which had been widely reported over the weekend.

In a statement, Kirkpatrick said: "The President of course has the right to appoint to any position in his administration. As always, I support the President's decisions."

"I am committed to remaining at the United Nations through the current session of the 38th General Assembly [which is scheduled to conclude in December]."

Friends said Kirkpatrick was considering her future. But they also said she was handling her feelings without rancor. "She's a tough lady," one said.

IT HAD BEEN widely speculated that Kirkpatrick, a leader of the so-called neo-conservative movement, would have stirred up disputes rather than calmed waters as national security adviser.

A White House official said senior administration officials, including Shultz, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey, had not advocated her candidacy for the post.

Asked if she had been offered a new job as consolation, Reagan would say only that she will remain at her post at the UN. He also praised her performance there as "invaluable." Reagan said she has done "as magnificent a job as anyone who has ever held that post and, probably, more so than most."

"I was looking for more than experience in filling this post," Reagan said during a White House ceremony. "I also wanted someone of strong principle, someone of keen judgment and someone who could effectively manage the affairs of the NSC [National Security Council]."

McFARLANE promised he would do his best to smooth over differences within the Reagan foreign policy team, which has plagued the administration from its first days. As a sign of continuity, he said he will appoint as his deputy John Poindexter, a retired Navy rear admiral who has been on the national security staff as military assistant since 1981.

McFarlane also indicated his choice to replace him as special envoy to the Middle East is Richard Fairbanks, who has been his deputy in Middle East diplomacy. Reagan said he would rely heavily on McFarlane's advice in this matter.

McFarlane is Reagan's third national security adviser in only three years in office. Richard Allen, the first, resigned during a controversy over accepting gifts from Japanese businessmen, and Clark is the nominee to replace Watt.

Relations between the NSC and State Department were strained under both. Asked if his views will collide with Shultz's, McFarlane replied, "Of course not." McFarlane said the media have exaggerated the foreign policy spats.

"I THINK the President, from his opening days here in the White House, has expressed his confidence in Cabinet government," McFarlane said. "And I think more than many of you allow, Cabinet government has been the name of the game in national security affairs."

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18 October 1983

McFarlane named national security adviser

By Gilbert A. Lewthwaite
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — President Reagan, ignoring conservative opposition and moving to establish policy continuity while avoiding personality conflict, appointed Robert C. McFarlane yesterday to be his national security adviser.

Mr. McFarlane, a low-profile operator, was deputy to the man he replaces, William P. Clark, who was nominated last week to be James G. Watt's successor at the Interior Department.

"Working closely with me, he will provide the leadership and spirit of teamwork we value in this administration," said Mr. Reagan, noting Mr. McFarlane's background as a decorated Marine, scholar, adviser to three presidents, congressional staffer, and counselor at the State Department.

Mr. McFarlane, 46, who most recently has been the administration's special emissary to the Middle East, stated his own commitment to the form of cabinet government preferred in the Reagan White House.

Asked whether his appointment would mean a shift of foreign policy-making back to the State Department, he said: "If the point of your question is — do I intend to seek to promote a personal point of view, or in any way to establish some confrontational status with the secretary of state? — of course not."

Relations between Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Mr. Clark, a close friend of Mr. Reagan, had become increasingly strained over Mr. Clark's independent conduct of foreign affairs.

Mr. McFarlane said that he did not anticipate any problems with Mr. Shultz, or the other main administration players in national security, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, Central Intelligence Agency director William J. Casey, or U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick.

Press reports have suggested that

Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Casey were concerned that their viewpoints might not be put as forcefully to the president by Mr. McFarlane as they were by Mr. Clark, a conservative hardliner.

Mr. McFarlane acknowledged that he might have "disagreements" with other top officials, but contended that his role would be as an "administrator," not an "advocate." His job, he said, would be "to see all the options are there," to ensure that decisions were properly implemented, and to oversee the national security community.

Asked if he would enjoy the same access as Mr. Clark to Mr. Reagan, he said: "The importance of that access is clearly understood. The continuity of that access was reaffirmed [by Mr. Reagan] today. I have no reservations about it."

Conservatives have questioned whether Mr. McFarlane will be as influential as Mr. Clark inside the White House, and favored Mrs. Kirkpatrick, an outspoken advocate of tough diplomacy, for the post.

Mr. Reagan said yesterday that Mrs. Kirkpatrick would remain at the United Nations, where she "has done as magnificent a job as anyone who has ever held that post."

"As far as I know, she is happy," said Mr. Reagan, responding to reports that the ambassador was tired

of commuting between Washington and New York and wanted a job in the capital.

[But the Associated Press reported that Mrs. Kirkpatrick was making no promises to stay beyond this year.

"I am committed to remaining at the United Nations through the 38th session of the General Assembly," Mrs. Kirkpatrick said in a statement issued by her spokesman, Joel Blocker.

[She had no words of congratulation for Mr. McFarlane, the wire service reported. Her statement said "the president has the right to appoint anyone to any position in the administration and, as always, I support the president's decision."]

Mr. McFarlane's appointment was quickly endorsed by two key Senate Republicans. Senator Charles H. Percy (R, Ill.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said Mr. McFarlane was "an able and effective adviser who has the confidence of the president."

The appointment brought prompt criticism from the labor-backed Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a constant opponent of administration policy in Central America.

It said that Mr. McFarlane's record "hardly suggests that Latin America can expect a modification of current Reagan administration policy — seeking military solutions in Central America."

The McFarlane Choice

Reagan Decision on New Security Adviser Is Viewed as a Setback for Conservatives

By STEVEN R. WEISMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 — The appointment of Robert C. McFarlane as national security adviser and the likelihood that Jeane J. Kirkpatrick will leave the United Nations were widely viewed today as a major blow to conservatives in the Reagan Administration.

News
Analysis

A key foreign policy official said that Mr. Reagan was being seen increasingly as shaping a "traditional Republican Administration," with a more pragmatic and flexible approach on such issues as arms control and relations with the Soviet Union. The hard-line conservatives have been less willing to make concessions in arms talks or to listen to the European allies on curbing trade with Moscow. The allies have generally favored the continuation of trade relations.

Other officials said they expected that Mrs. Kirkpatrick's departure — White House officials said today she was undeterred in her intention to leave the Administration at the end of the year — and Mr. McFarlane's installation at the White House would lead to a less assertive approach in Central America.

'He Is a Hard-Liner'

A senior White House official said he and others felt that Mr. McFarlane was being unfairly misjudged as "soft" by conservatives. "That attitude comes by people who don't know the man," he said, noting that early in 1981 the same critics worried that Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger was insufficiently conservative.

"Bud McFarlane is not conservative?" the official asked. "That's ridiculous. He is not an ideologue, but he is a hard-liner."

The official acknowledged, however, that Mr. McFarlane had been a leading advocate of flexibility in arms control talks as the Administration discussed

revisions in its negotiating position with Democrats in Congress this year.

Mr. McFarlane, a veteran of the Ford and Nixon Administrations, is seen in Congress and among arms control experts as a product of the process that produced arms accords at that time. Mr. Reagan, however, sought the Republican Presidential nomination in 1976 charging that the Ford and Nixon arms deals had damaged American security.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick, who is the chief United States representative at the United Nations, is a major proponent of military and economic aid to stop the spread of Communism in Central America. Her chief ally has been William P. Clark, who resigned today as national security adviser after being nominated Secretary of the Interior by Mr. Reagan.

Skepticism Overcome

Mr. Clark had to overcome the skepticism of fellow White House officials to win agreement to have Mr. Reagan speak out on Central America last spring. In addition, he angered colleagues at the White House and the State Department earlier this year by winning approval of large-scale military exercises in Central America.

Administration officials said that even if Mr. McFarlane tends to agree with Mr. Clark's approach, he would likely lack the influence to carry it through. They said he could not possibly duplicate Mr. Clark's authority, which was derived from his long association with the President.

"Clark really felt strongly about Central America," said a senior foreign policy official. "He was instrumental in drawing the lines and getting the President excited about it. If you're President, it's one thing to listen to a fair-minded low-key guy, and another to listen to someone you've known for 20 years and who's bailed you out lots of times."

Another top Administration foreign policy official agreed that the departure of Mrs. Kirkpatrick and Mr. Clark would be viewed as "a major lurch in

orientation of our foreign policy."

Mrs. Kirkpatrick, an outspoken and acerbic advocate of a hard line against the Soviet Union, was hoping to be named national security adviser in place of Mr. Clark, according to several friends. In the last several days, conservatives in the Administration, or allies of it, waged a lobbying campaign on her behalf.

In addition, both Defense Secretary and William J. Casey, director of Central Intelligence, were said to fear Mr. McFarlane's low-key approach would hamper him in the bureaucratic battles sure to face him at the White House.

Mr. Reagan was said to have settled on Mr. McFarlane only after assuring Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Casey that the new adviser would have all the access and authority of Mr. Clark. The evidence today was that he had yet to assuage conservatives who fear that the Administration is less friendly to their views.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick's attitude was reported to have been one of keen disappointment at not being chosen national security adviser, and high irritation at reports over the weekend suggesting that she might be offered an undefined advisory post after leaving the United Nations. She was said today to have not changed her mind about planning to reject such an offer.

Aide at Ease In the Middle

Robert C. McFarlane

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 — Since early 1981, Robert C. McFarlane has played differing roles as an administrator, a special diplomatic envoy, an adviser on foreign policy and military issues and a part-time lobbyist in Congress. It is in the role of lobbyist that Mr. McFarlane has seemed to have his greatest success.

Man
in the
News

His promotion today from deputy to principal national security adviser to President Reagan will please many middle-of-the-road Democrats as well as Republicans. He has a reputation as a Reagan Administration official who wants to and can work smoothly with members of both parties in an effort to restore a bipartisan policy, now somewhat tattered, on such subjects as arms control and weapons procurement.

Strong conservatives, however, seemed unenthusiastic about Mr. McFarlane's promotion.

Following Familiar Steps

Mr. McFarlane, who is known by associates by the nickname "Bud," retired from the Marine Corps as a lieutenant colonel in 1979. He is following in the tracks of two other military officers who left the Pentagon to become staff assistants at the National Security Council and ultimately became the national security adviser. Mr. McFarlane worked for both of those men — Brent Scowcroft and Alexander M. Haig Jr.

Mr. McFarlane was a military assistant to Henry A. Kissinger from 1973 to 1975, when Mr. Kissinger was national security adviser. He then worked under Mr. Scowcroft from 1976 to the end of the Ford Administration in January 1977.

After the Marine Corps returned him to active duty in Okinawa, he decided to retire. He spent the last two years of the Carter Administration as a staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Trouble-Shooter Under Haig

Mr. Haig made him counselor of the State Department in 1981, a job in which Mr. McFarlane acted as a close confidant and trouble-shooter for the Secretary of State, taking on a wide variety of tasks.

In early 1982, President Reagan appointed his longtime confidant, William P. Clark, to become the national security adviser. Even after a year as Under Secretary of State, Mr. Clark was not especially familiar with the minute details of foreign and military policy, and he brought Mr. McFarlane with him from the State Department to the White House.

There, according to most officials and members of Congress who watched the two operate, Mr. Clark concentrated on trying to preserve ideological purity in the Administration's national security policy and Mr. McFarlane handled the administration of the staff.

On July 22, Mr. McFarlane was appointed to be the President's personal representative in the Middle East, charged with trying to promote a settlement between Israel and the Arab nations and to encourage all foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon. Syria repeatedly expressed displeasure with the United States position, and Mr. McFarlane got no demonstrable results.

Backed an Expanded Role

Instead, he became the leading voice for directing a Marine force and offshore naval forces to begin direct support for the Lebanese Government of President Amin Gemayel.

In 1981, after Israel bombed Lebanon, Secretary of State Haig sent Mr. McFarlane to Israel to express Washington's desire that American-supplied weapons not be used in offensive operations. Prime Minister Menachem Begin did not bend on the issue.

If Mr. McFarlane's efforts as a diplomat have had no spectacular results, he is given a great deal of credit for saving several Reagan initiatives that were faltering in Congress.

One example is the MX missile program. Congress voted to deny production money last December and then restored the money this spring. One reason is that Mr. McFarlane's former chief, Mr. Scowcroft, appointed as chairman of a Commission on Strategic Forces, helped get the support of moderate Democrats for a package that included building the MX, developing a small single-warhead missile and putting forth a more flexible White House position in arms-control talks with Moscow.

'Has Confidence' of Congress

One of the moderates, Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, said this summer that "more than anyone else in this Administration, Bud McFarlane is the guy who has the confidence of members of Congress."

Although he was not able to work out a compromise, Democrats also praised Mr. McFarlane's efforts to find a way in which a Democratic resolution cutting off covert aid to guerrillas fighting the Nicaraguan Government could be forestalled.

Robert Carl McFarlane was born on July 12, 1937, and is a graduate of the Naval Academy. He and his wife, Jondra, have three children. His father, William Doddridge McFarlane, was a New Deal Democratic Congressman from Texas from 1932 to 1938.

Although Mr. McFarlane shuns personal publicity and usually displays a solemn face, several associates say he sometimes shows mischievous humor in private. Last year, when White House officials were selecting a new name for the MX and eventually chose "Peacemaker," Mr. McFarlane is reported to have said at one point, "I don't suppose 'The Widow Maker' would be a good idea."

CONTINUED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1983*File Only: JSC*

Reagan Appoints McFarlane Adviser On U.S. Security

By Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Reagan yesterday named Robert C. McFarlane as his national security affairs adviser and persuaded Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, whom he praised for "a magnificent job," to remain as ambassador to the United Nations.

Reagan appeared with McFarlane in the White House briefing room and announced his appointment to replace William P. Clark, named last week by the president to be secretary of the interior.

The president praised McFarlane as a person of "strong judgment" and "keen principle," and said, "He shares my view about the need for a strong America, an effective, bipartisan foreign policy based on peace through strength."

Two hours before that announcement, Reagan met privately with Kirkpatrick, who had made no secret that she would have liked the national security adviser's post. He urged her to remain at the United Nations, administration officials said.

Kirkpatrick, who reportedly was disappointed that she was not chosen to replace Clark, later issued a statement saying she will remain at the United Nations through the end of the present session of the General Assembly in December.

Other administration officials said she agreed to "mull over" the president's request that she remain at the United Nations, and one of them predicted that "Jeane will stay as long as the president wants her in the administration."

Reagan praised Kirkpatrick effusively in his seven-minute appearance in the briefing room, saying that she is performing "a great service to her country" at the United Nations and that she is "invaluable in what she is doing."

Conservatives outside the administration had pushed for Kirkpatrick's appointment on ideological grounds, and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and CIA Director William J. Casey had expressed reservations that McFarlane would not have sufficient access or influence within the White House to represent their agencies' views.

McFarlane alluded to these objections in a question-and-answer session with reporters yesterday, after a private meeting with Reagan.

"The importance of that access [to the president] is clearly understood," McFarlane said. "The continuation of that access was reaffirmed today, and I have no reservations about it."

McFarlane, 45, a former Marine lieutenant colonel now serving as Clark's deputy and U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, also emphasized that he would not play favorites in counseling the president.

"My role now is not to be an advocate but a coordinator," he said. "I intend to do that."

Reagan told senior advisers of his decision over the weekend, ignoring a lobbying campaign developing for Kirkpatrick. Others in the administration were quick to climb aboard the McFarlane bandwagon as soon as Reagan announced the decision.

Weinberger issued a statement saying he is "personally delighted" by the "splendid appointment" of McFarlane, whom he praised for "his abilities, his effectiveness and his skill in advancing the president's national-security and foreign policies." Wein-

berger also criticized "press speculation" about his own role, saying it was "far off the mark."

Kirkpatrick issued a more restrained statement, saying, "I respect the right of the president to appoint anyone he chooses" and promising to stay on through the General Assembly session.

McFarlane's appointment was supported in the White House by Clark and chief of staff James A. Baker III and also was praised by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who spoke to reporters on his plane returning from Canada.

"I think what we'll see is continuity," Shultz said. "Bud McFarlane has been part of the process for quite a while. He's excellent, very good to work with, a real professional, knows the issues, a fair-minded person."

Shultz conceded that there have been some problems "from time to time" in relations with Clark but said he was able to discuss and solve them, and he predicted that he could do the same with McFarlane.

According to aides, Shultz had a long telephone conversation with Reagan about the appointment Saturday and another this morning while in Canada. With Clark's departure to Interior, administration officials

are trying to emphasize that Shultz, who is to spend next weekend with the president in Augusta, Ga., will take the lead role in foreign policy.

Several officials, including McFarlane, emphasized that Clark, a confidant of Reagan since 1967, will remain available for consultation.

Conservatives outside the administration were disappointed. They see Clark's appointment to Interior as no gain because he replaced James G. Watt, the administration's most outspoken conservative, and McFarlane's appointment as a loss.

"For the first time since President Reagan took office, the two top foreign policy jobs, secretary of state and national security adviser, will be held by someone who is not a conservative," said Richard A. Viguerie, a New Right spokesman and fund-raiser.

"As a protege of Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. McFarlane's views are probably very compatible with those of the moderates and liberals who run the State Department," he said.

In accepting the appointment, McFarlane said he fully shares the president's national security goals.

"They have stemmed the tide," he said. "And they have set us on a course which I

believe deeply will prove Spengler wrong, that the West can, indeed, define its interests, defend them, demonstrate freedom, democracy, free enterprise as the hope of the future."

The reference was to German philosopher Oswald Spengler's pessimistic book, published after World War I and called "The Decline of the West."

McFarlane said Rear Adm. John Poindexter, No. 3 man on the national security affairs staff, will serve as his deputy. Administration officials said Richard Fairbanks, McFarlane's deputy in the Mideast, will take over as special envoy in the region, at least temporarily.

McFarlane spent the day touching base with various power centers inside and outside of the administration. In addition to his private meeting with Reagan, he spoke with Weinberger, Kirkpatrick and Casey, conferred with Clark and lunched with former secretary of state Alexander M. Haig Jr.

A graduate of the Naval Academy, McFarlane is the son of William Doddridge McFarlane, who served as a Democratic congressman from Texas from 1932 to 1938. The younger McFarlane was a military assistant to Kissinger when Kissinger was President Nixon's national security affairs adviser.

Reagan, McFarlane and other administration spokesmen took turns yesterday defending U.S. participation in the multinational peace-keeping force in Lebanon despite the increase in casualties among U.S. Marines there.

When Reagan was asked by a reporter, "Why are we in Lebanon and why are we letting our Marines be there to get killed every day," he replied in a firm voice:

"Because I think it is vitally important to the security of the United States and the western world that we do everything we can to further the peace process . . . in the Middle East."

White House spokesman Larry Speakes and State Department deputy spokesman Alan Romberg issued statements saying attacks on U.S. Marines are designed to disrupt the process of national reconciliation in Lebanon. A sixth Marine was shot and killed in Lebanon Sunday, and five others were wounded.

"The Marines are there," Speakes said. "They are there for a mission. That's where they will stay as long as the president thinks it's necessary for a peace-keeping effort in the Middle East."

Staff writers John M. Goshko and Don Oberdorfer contributed to this report.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
17 October 1983

File Only DCI

Reagan Picks McFarlane for Security Post

Appointment Not Expected to Alter U.S. Foreign Policy

By SARA FRITZ,
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—President Reagan has decided to appoint special Middle East envoy Robert C. McFarlane to succeed William P. Clark as his national security adviser, Administration officials said Sunday.

McFarlane, a 46-year-old former Marine Corps officer who served as Clark's deputy before being sent to the Middle East last July, is expected to be offered the job and accept it in the next day or two. Clark was chosen last week to replace James G. Watt, who resigned as secretary of the Interior Oct. 9.

The President informed other advisers late Saturday that he had decided to offer the national security job to McFarlane. Administration officials predicted that Reagan and McFarlane would discuss the appointment face to face no later than Wednesday.

Advised Ford, Nixon

McFarlane, a reserved, hard-working man who has served as an adviser to Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Richard M. Nixon, was chosen to replace Clark despite some misgivings expressed about him by Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and CIA Director William J. Casey. Officials said Weinberger and Casey were afraid that foreign policy would get less of the President's attention under McFarlane because he lacks the close relationship that Clark has had with Reagan.

Although Reagan assured Weinberger and Casey that the role of national security adviser would not change, Administration officials still were skeptical that McFarlane could ever achieve the status of Clark, who, as a longtime friend and confidant of Reagan, was considered the most influential adviser in the White House.

However, the McFarlane appointment is not expected to produce a significant shift in Reagan's foreign policy because Clark has always relied heavily upon advice from the Middle East envoy. In fact, officials predicted that McFarlane would enhance the credibility of Reagan's policy because he has a background in foreign affairs that Clark lacks.

Shultz Comments

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, traveling to Halifax, Nova Scotia, for talks with Canadian officials, told reporters that he had been satisfied with the National Security Council system when Clark was present and was confident that he would continue to be satisfied. "I think the process is working quite satisfactorily," Shultz told reporters, "as it was with Judge Clark there. Personally, I am sorry that he is not going to be there."

Shultz, without suggesting that he knew that McFarlane's appointment was all but certain, said Clark's successor "should be somebody who can have the confidence of those he's working with . . . or she's working with"—an obvious reference to the campaign among conservatives to persuade the Pres-

ident to name U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick to the post.

Many conservatives had mounted telephone and telegram campaigns urging the White House to appoint Kirkpatrick, who reportedly is being considered for another foreign policy job in Washington. Casey was said also to have supported her appointment.

Howard Phillips, national director of the Conservative Caucus, has said McFarlane is disliked intensely by many conservatives who charge that he has not vigorously pursued military superiority over the Soviet Union, has sought to build the MX missile only as an arms control "bargaining chip" and has failed to act on alleged Soviet violations of arms control treaties.

The national security job became vacant just as McFarlane was returning to Washington after months of negotiations that produced the current cease-fire in Lebanon. An admirer of McFarlane in the White House said he gave Reagan a "absolutely brilliant" explanation of the current problems in Lebanon during a meeting Friday. It was the first in a series of White House meetings in which the President will decide what steps to take in the Middle East.

It is not known whether Reagan plans to appoint another Middle East envoy to replace McFarlane, who reportedly wants the Administration to resume earlier efforts to revive the Middle East peace process. If Administration officials decide that there is no chance for progress in the Middle East, they could decide to leave the position vacant as a way of de-emphasizing it in the 1984 election year.

McFarlane, a former staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee who is known to aspire to running for Congress himself, is expected to be a more visible national security adviser than Clark. Unlike Clark, he has a reputation for working well with members of Congress, which will help him in legislative battles this fall over defense spending and the funding of the MX missile.

But the selection of McFarlane does not guarantee an end to turf battles that Clark waged with the State Department and other White House officials. Shultz, White House Chief of Staff James A. Baker III and others were often angered by Clark's habit of dealing

CONTINUED

directly with the President on matters of mutual interest without keeping them informed. Some officials fear that McFarlane will follow this pattern, particularly as he struggles to establish himself in the new job.

The position of White House national security adviser, which was created in the Harry S. Truman Administration, has been at the heart of internal dissension in every administration since Henry A. Kissinger raised it to a high-profile position under Nixon.

McFarlane would be the third person to hold the national security post under Reagan, who came to office in 1981, promising to eliminate friction between the White House and the State Department by downgrading the job of national security adviser.

Reagan's first national security adviser, Richard V. Allen, resigned in January, 1982, after admitting that he accepted \$1,000 and two watches from a Japanese journalist.

Allen, who was succeeded by Clark, did not even brief the President face to face on foreign-policy matters. Although Clark was the first man without a strong foreign-policy background ever to occupy the position, he succeeded in restoring it to its earlier prominence.

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ON PAGE A-1

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 October 1983

Impact of Reagan Cabinet switch

Greater involvement in foreign affairs by President is predicted

By Daniel Southerland
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Strong direction of foreign policy can be expected from President Reagan for the remainder of his first term in office, administration officials say.

The officials say that this is one of the main legacies left by the outgoing national security adviser to the President, William P. Clark: to get Reagan more deeply involved in foreign affairs.

A series of crises around the world, from Central America all the way to the Philippines, would seem to demand ever greater presidential involvement. So would election-year politics. Polls show that a mishandling of foreign affairs could damage the President's reelection chances should he choose to run again, a prospect which now seems assured.

At the same time, the departure of Judge Clark from the top national security post at the White House would appear to strengthen, at least temporarily, the hand of Secretary of State George P. Shultz. Clark had assumed a leading role in the fields of arms control and Central America and some aspects of Middle East policy. Clark's successor will have to go through a period of settling in, during which time the State Department will be expected to provide continuity on a number of issues.

Experts outside the government are predicting, meanwhile, that Clark's departure will also reinforce a trend toward pragmatism in Reagan's foreign policy, a trend which has not always been evident in the President's rhetoric. A recent example of the pragmatic trend was Reagan's handling of the Soviets' shoot-

ing down of Korean Airlines Flight 7 on Sept. 1. Reagan spoke harshly of the Soviet Union following the incident, but his actions were measured. The sanctions announced — closing Soviet airline offices in the United States and setting further limits on cultural and other exchanges, for example — were limited.

Pragmatism has also been reflected in the President's approval of a huge new grain agreement with the Soviet Union and in his determination to keep arms re-

duction talks going with the Soviets. Reagan has overruled subordinates who proposed denying the Soviets new American oil- and gas-drilling equipment. The President has made compromises with moderate Democrats and Republicans in the Congress over arms control proposals. Earlier this month, Reagan overrode objections from the Defense Department and embraced the "build down" concept for nuclear arms reductions suggested by two key Senators. He also injected new flexibility into his initially tough proposals for strategic arms reductions.

At this writing, the leading candidate for the post of national security adviser is reported to be Robert C. McFarlane, who is currently serving as deputy assistant to the president for national security and as special envoy to the Middle East. Mr. McFarlane is a low-key professional with long experience in the White House. The

former Marine colonel is so self-effacing that until he was appointed to his roving Middle East job a few months ago, few photographs were publicly available.

McFarlane is regarded by many of the Congressmen who have dealt with him as moderate, pragmatic, nonideological and well-informed. A similar view prevails at the State Department. Officials there, who have engaged in many a battle with national security advisers, including Judge Clark, say that they would be happy with the choice of McFarlane for the job.

But objections to McFarlane's selection as national security adviser have come from a number of conservative supporters of President Reagan outside the administration who would like to see United Nations Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick get the job. Inside the administration, opposition is reported to have come from Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and CIA Director William J. Casey, who are said to fear that McFarlane will not be forceful enough in presenting their views to the President. A close friend of Reagan's, Clark had easy access to the President. He also shared some of the hardline views for which Weinberger and Casey are noted.

The president's national security adviser is supposed to be an honest broker, presenting the president with all of the foreign policy options proposed by the

Entreating Reagan

William Clark's Shoes Will Be Difficult to Fill If Politics Is the Test

Conservatives Are Distressed That Foreign Policy Job May Go to a 'Pragmatist'

Robert McFarlane's Chances

By GERALD F. SEIB

AND ROBERT S. GREENBERGER

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The unexpected departure of National Security Adviser William P. Clark has rekindled the old bitterness between conservatives and pragmatists in Ronald Reagan's foreign-policy apparatus.

When Mr. Clark called President Reagan at Camp David two Saturdays ago and first expressed willingness to become Interior Secretary, he wasn't acting because of national-security developments. Mr. Clark was simply weary of his grueling job and tired of the backbiting battles he had been involved in with others in the administration.

But events in the four days since Mr. Clark's move to Interior was announced show that the change may have far-reaching foreign-policy implications. It has unsettled the administration's most conservative officials—including Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Central Intelligence Director William Casey—who fear they have lost their best friend in the top levels of the foreign-policy structure. As a result, they are bracing to wage anew old battles over Central America, arms control and the defense budget—issues that were likely to be marked by contention anyway in the coming election year. The power vacuum created by Mr. Clark's departure could well increase the tensions. (For a report on how Mr. Clark's departure from the White House affects the power balance among presidential aides, see story on page 8. Mr. Clark's environmental record is the subject of a story on page 10.)

"The Reaganauts are gone or going," frets one Reagan appointee in a mid-level foreign-policy job. "This significantly increases the president's trouble with the right."

Prevailing Pragmatists

Such worries have led conservatives to carry out an internal struggle to replace Mr. Clark with Jeane Kirkpatrick, the hard-line

United Nations ambassador. But a White House official says that President Reagan yesterday told his advisers that his choice for national security adviser is Robert McFarlane, Mr. Clark's deputy. The taciturn Mr. McFarlane is far more acceptable than Mrs. Kirkpatrick would be to such pragmatists as Secretary of State George Shultz.

Administration aides say that, to console her, Mrs. Kirkpatrick may be considered for some other foreign-policy position. She is said to have grown weary of her UN duties, and friends of hers suggest she will be tempted to leave the administration if she isn't moved into another job.

Conservatives aren't uncomfortable with Mr. McFarlane for strictly ideological reasons. "It isn't like he's a dove," notes one White House aide. Even Mr. Clark has strongly endorsed Mr. McFarlane as his successor, arguing that his deputy is the most knowledgeable candidate. Mr. McFarlane is a retired Marine and served as a national security aide in both the Nixon and Ford administrations.

But Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Casey worry that Mr. McFarlane simply won't have the same easy, and influential, access to the Oval Office that allowed Mr. Clark, a longtime associate of the president's to carry the conservatives' arguments. While Mr. Reagan has promised that Mr. Clark's successor will have the same access, conservatives worry that more-moderate forces led by Mr. Shultz are in the ascendant.

Without Mr. Clark or such a forceful person as Mrs. Kirkpatrick in the national security adviser's job, conservatives are convinced that their fortunes will suffer. "This is the ball game," says Edwin J. Feulner Jr., the president of the Heritage Foundation.

The absence of Mr. Clark also could open the door to more direct clashes between the State Department and Messrs. Weinberger and Casey. For example, Mr. Clark sided with the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency on Central American strategy earlier this year, tipping the balance in favor of a more militaristic approach. Mr. Shultz and others in the State Department favor stressing economic and social reforms in the region while giving Central America less stress on Capitol Hill.

On the Middle East, the departure of Mr. Clark could lead to a change in the U.S. approach to Syria. Mr. Clark has been more inclined in recent weeks to try to strike a compromise with Syria as it flexed its muscles in Lebanon, officials say. At the same time, the State Department has moved toward a strategy of bypassing Syria and tightening ties with Israel to offset growing Syrian strength. Mr. McFarlane, who also currently is Mr. Reagan's special Middle East envoy, has leaned toward the State Department's approach, officials say. This

week administration officials, including Mr. McFarlane, will be reviewing Middle East policy.

Defense Implications

Conservatives also are worried about how the absence of Mr. Clark will affect decisions on the defense budget and arms control. Mr. Clark has reinforced Mr. Weinberger's arguments for big defense-spending boosts and has supported his strategy of refusing to give ground to Congress on the issue. Moderates in the White House, like chief of staff James Baker, now stand a better chance of prevailing in their argument that the administration should strike accords with Congress rather than confront it on the defense issues.

Similarly, Mr. Clark has carried the Pentagon's view on arms control into the Oval Office. Under Mr. Weinberger's guidance, the Pentagon has pushed a tough, take-it-or-leave-it line that challenges the Soviet Union to make significant changes in its arms policies.

The State Department, on the other hand, has argued consistently for more "realistic" and flexible approaches that stand a chance of producing accords with Moscow. Mr. McFarlane has acted for the administration in fashioning bipartisan compromises with Congress on arms issues. He was the "father" of the administration's Scowcroft commission, which reached such a compromise on the MX missile. He also was a force behind recent negotiations with Congress that led the administration to adopt a new strategic-arms strategy incorporating the concept of a "build down," in which the superpowers would eliminate more old warheads than they install new ones.

These issues are likely to be prickly ones anyway because of the 1984 presidential election campaign. The administration's moderates, and its political advisers, will be more inclined to seek an arms-control treaty accompanied by an election-year summit meeting with Soviet leader Yuri Andropov. Conservatives would be quick to suspect that such moves represent only election-year sellouts to the Soviets.

Without a person of Mr. Clark's views in the national security adviser's job, conservatives will jump more readily to the conclusion that Mr. Reagan is being led away from his true beliefs for the sake of political expediency.

Mr. Clark, despite his lack of foreign-policy experience, had the clout to resolve such disputes and thereby to squelch bickering between the conservative and pragmatist camps.

CONTINUED

M'FARLANE CALLED CHOICE OF REAGAN FOR SECURITY POST

NO WHITE HOUSE COMMENT

Mrs. Kirkpatrick Is Reported Angered by Move and Set to Shun New Position

By STEVEN R. WEISMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 — President Reagan has chosen Robert C. McFarlane as his national security adviser, a White House official said today. The selection was reported to have angered Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, the chief United States representative at the United Nations, and to have persuaded her to reject any offer of another post in the Administration when she leaves the United Nations position this year.

Cabinet Aides Given Assurances

A White House official said Mr. Reagan had selected Mr. McFarlane, currently the deputy national security adviser and special Middle East envoy, for the national security post after assuring Cabinet members that Mr. McFarlane would have access and authority equal to other top White House aides.

Presidential aides said further that Mr. Reagan was hoping to offer Mrs. Kirkpatrick a post as a senior foreign policy adviser in Washington, where she lives. Mrs. Kirkpatrick had been the choice of conservatives within the Administration for the national security post.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick was pictured as being angered at the reports that she would be offered another job and as planning to reject it. She was understood to have felt "blocked" by Secretary of State George P. Shultz and others for the national security post.

Position Still Undefined

Earlier today a foreign policy official close to Mrs. Kirkpatrick said that she would be "silly" to take an undefined advisory position in Washington.

"What position could they give her?" he said. "She's in the Cabinet, she's in the National Security Council. There's no way institutionally that she could be guaranteed access."

There were no public announcements of any changes in position in the Administration today. Mr. Reagan declined to discuss any personnel or other matters when he walked past reporters after returning to the White House by helicopter from a weekend at Camp David, Md.

The reported decision to name Mr. McFarlane to the national security post was precipitated by Mr. Reagan's decision, announced last Thursday, to name William P. Clark, a longtime associate and champion for conservatives, as Secretary of the Interior. The selection stunned members of the Administration and touched off a competition for the national security job.

White House aides let it be known today that Mr. McFarlane's selection was imminent. They said Mr. Reagan decided the issue after spending part of the weekend assuring conservatives that their views would be heard. Mrs. Kirkpatrick was reportedly informed of the choice of Mr. McFarlane on Saturday.

There were reports that James A. Baker III, the White House chief of staff, was being considered by Mr. Reagan to succeed Mrs. Kirkpatrick at the United Nations. But Larry Speakes, the White House spokesman, said tonight that he had spoken to Mr. Baker and that Mr. Baker regarded the reports as being "without foundation."

Mr. Reagan also reportedly assured both Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and William J. Casey, director of Central Intelligence, that Mr. McFarlane would have the necessary access and clout to keep foreign policy matters at the top of Mr. Reagan's agenda.

Nevertheless, the appointment of Mr. McFarlane, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel who served on the national security staffs of Presidents Nixon and Ford, was seen by many in the Administration as a significant loss for the conservative wing.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick was pictured as having been angered by reports that Mr. Reagan wanted to offer her another foreign policy post in Washington. She was reported to regard these reports as "devious" and an attempt to mollify conservatives after she was passed over for the national security post.

New Position Suggested

White House officials said early today that Mr. Reagan had not yet decided what sort of post Mrs. Kirkpatrick might be offered, and that he might create a new position in the White House or the State Department.

However, it was learned later that Mrs. Kirkpatrick considered that any newly created advisory post would be meaningless because her being passed over for the national security job meant that she could be shut out of the foreign policy process by Secretary Shultz and others.

Administration officials had reported this weekend that Mrs. Kirkpatrick had already informed the White House of her intention to resign from the United Nations post after this year's session of the General Assembly. The session is due to end in mid-December.

However, the Administration aides considered it possible that she would stay in some other capacity. Much of Mrs. Kirkpatrick's disenchantment with her job was said to stem from her dislike of having to commute from Washington, where she lives, to New York.

Former Professor in Capitol

Before taking the United Nations job, Mrs. Kirkpatrick was a political science professor at the Center for International and Strategic Studies at Georgetown University here.

White House officials said today that Mr. Reagan had wanted to appoint Mr. McFarlane national security adviser all along, but that he had wavered because of the last-minute drive by conservatives on Mrs. Kirkpatrick's behalf, and because of worries by William J. Casey, the current national security and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger.

The departure of Mr. Clark sparked a strong outcry by conservatives over the weekend. An Administration official reported that various conservative groups had begun organizing a campaign on behalf of Mrs. Kirkpatrick.

Some conservatives favored such other choices as Mr. Weinberger himself, John Lehman, the Secretary of the Navy, or Fred C. Iklé, an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

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WASHINGTON POST
17 October 1983

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The High Cost of Shifting Clark

Soon after national security adviser William P. Clark telephoned President Reagan at Camp David Oct. 8 for a Saturday morning briefing on troubled Lebanon, Reagan turned the talk to his burning concern about James Watt and the Interior Department—a change of subject that was shortly to cause alarm for the president's foreign allies and domestic supporters.

"Almost as one," an insider told us, Reagan and his closest friend came to an answer. Nailed down six days later in an Oval Office chat, Clark replaced the fallen Watt, but at high cost. The second turnover of national security advisers in 21 months exhibits presidential disregard not only for the role Clark filled so well but for foreign policy in general.

Reagan's private advice to Clark to "start wearing your Stetson again, Bill" resulted from no conspiratorial power play by Secretary of State George Shultz in his struggle with Clark, though Shultz surely was pleased. Nor did it climax quietly acrimonious relations between Clark and White House Chief of Staff James Baker III, who actually opposed the move as a bad idea.

Instead, it revealed a presidential mindset that bewilders and worries U.S. allies. Their emissaries here were astonished that the point man of Reagan's national security policy could so quickly be sent to a post that, by contrast, is inconsequential.

But the alarm of America's allies was nothing compared to the consternation of Reagan's conservative friends, particularly in the Senate. Still in agony over the Watt affair, such conservatives now perceive a new supremacy for Shultz's State Department, working in league with Baker's West Wingers on arms control and other efforts to soften East-West tensions before the 1984 election.

They are not alone. From the United Nations, U.S. Ambassador Jeané Kirkpatrick quietly passed along concerns that without Clark at the NSC helm, Reagan's tough positions on arms control, Soviet relations and Central America will be submerged under a resurgent Foggy Bottom. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey both registered similar fears with the White House.

Kirkpatrick's concern is ironic. She sent a note to Clark several weeks ago containing an eyebrow-raising suggestion: with Robert McFarlane, Clark's deputy on an open-ended assignment in the Middle East, she might serve the administration better if she left the U.N. and became Clark's deputy. Kirkpatrick's move was quietly in the works when the Watt affair triggered its national security chain reaction.

Republican conservatives mounted an eleventh-hour campaign for Kirkpatrick as Clark's replacement. Clark's sponsorship could have installed Kirkpatrick in the White House, but he decided not to choose between two of his closest associates these past two years.

Kirkpatrick's feisty idiom and trenchant policy positions, though admired enough by Clark for him to want her as his deputy if not successor, are a source of fear in the State Department and West Wing. Shultz, Baker and White House deputy chief of staff Michael Deaver were determined to follow the regular order with McFarlane's succession. They want no part of another strong figure at the NSC who would guarantee more of the disorder that has dogged the administration national security apparatus from the start.

All this could mean faster unraveling

of Reagan's once rock-like foreign policy following Clark's departure from the White House basement. A special presidential directive keeps Clark in the national security loop, but that can never substitute for the lack of his physical presence. As Shultz once remarked privately, "When the president and Bill are in the same room, it's not necessary for them to say many words."

To fix a problem at Interior, Reagan has given up more than he knows. Quiet-spoken Bill Clark is telling his friends that "I've gone wherever he's pointed me ever since '66." But despite his own fatigue and frustration, his trip to Interior is one time he should have flashed a caution light to his chief.

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WASHINGTON TALK

Briefing

Litmus Test Movie

President Reagan really loved it. William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, loved it. Alexander M. Haig Jr., the former Secretary of State, has seen it three times and loved it because the good guys win. The object of this affection is a newly released English motion picture, "The Final Option"; the accounts of high-level enthusiasm come from the conservative writer Victor Lasky, who held private previews of the film here and in California as a favor to the producer, Euan Lloyd.

The film is a thriller in which British commandos recapture the American Embassy in London from terrorists who manipulate an antinuclear peace group that is covertly financed by the Soviet Union. The peace advocates infiltrate the embassy disguised as a dance band and take hostages at a diplomatic dinner, including the Secretary of State and the British Foreign Minister. Almost without exception, the hostages survive and the terrorists are exterminated.

On the other hand, The Washington Post called the film "ill-timed, ill-titled and more than a little ill-conceived," which is probably just about what Mr. Lasky and General Haig would have predicted.

James F. Clarity
Warren Weaver Jr.

NEWSWEEK
17 October 1983ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4

LETTERS

CIA: Casey Responds

I am pleased with the way the article "The Secret Warriors" (NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Oct. 10) conveys the dedication and quality of the people here at the CIA. However, I cannot let stand statements and impressions which are simply not true and which can damage American interests and relationships around the world.

As you know, it is established policy not to comment on intelligence matters so I cannot go into detail. I can only state that I have been provided with a list of some 30 inaccuracies and things that never happened that appeared in your article. One which I can specifically deny because it would be illegal, and CIA does not violate the law, is the allegation that CIA is providing covert aid to the insurgents in Angola.

In a lesser vein, the degree of inaccuracy is illustrated in the statement that I am "traveling at least 50 percent of the time." This is a 700 percent distortion of the truth.

On a personal note, I would have hoped in associating my name with Robert Vesco that you would have acknowledged that it was I, as chairman of the SEC, who acted to stop Vesco's worldwide looting of stockholders' moneys and took unprecedented and successful initiatives to protect the in-

vestors he defrauded. In my confirmation by the Senate Intelligence Committee, Stanley Sporkin, SEC enforcement chief at the time the Vesco case was broken, spelled this out. He stated that I "directly involved [my]self in aggressively pursuing the investigation . . . pressed the staff to complete the investigation and to proceed with the appropriate enforcement action as soon as possible . . . had the foresight to seek the cooperation of other affected governments." He concluded that the Vesco action is "one of the most impressive and important enforcement cases in which the SEC has ever been involved" in which "over 400 million dollars have been recaptured for investors throughout the world."

WILLIAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON TIMES
17 October 1983

McFarlane chosen as security adviser

By Jeremiah O'Leary
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

President Reagan has chosen Robert C. McFarlane to succeed William P. Clark as his new national security adviser and is expected to make the formal announcement soon, probably today.

At the same time, informed administration sources said the

president also has decided to bring U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick to Washington as head of one of the semi-independent national security-oriented agencies. Kirkpatrick has been anxious to leave the United Nations to return to Washington and Reagan has wanted her closer than New York because of his high regard for her advice and counsel. "The president wants her to be his adviser in Washington as she has been in New York," said a senior official last night.

Reagan now is trying to decide where to place her so that she has a

power base instead of being a supernumerary of high rank. She is expected to retain her place in Reagan's Cabinet. Reagan made these decisions over the weekend at Camp David and made them known

yesterday to Clark and a few others.

Administration sources said Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and CIA Director Wil-

liam J. Casey were among those at White House meetings Friday and Saturday arguing that McFarlane, now Clark's deputy at the NSC, should have the same access to the Oval Office that Clark has enjoyed. At a National Security Policy Group meeting Friday, which was attended only by principals, Weinberger and Casey reportedly made it clear they had no ideological objection to McFarlane

But they, and Clark, wanted to be sure that McFarlane did not fall under control of any other White House official in the reorganization. Chief of Staff James A. Baker III also was reliably reported to have favored appointment of the 46-year-old former Marine officer and State Department counsel.

Weighing heavily in favor of McFarlane was the full backing of Clark whose advice Reagan prizes above all others on critical decisions. McFarlane was handpicked by Clark to be his deputy at the National Security Council but is detached to be the president's special peace envoy to the Middle East.

Meanwhile, The Washington Times has learned that Clark last week promoted his military assistant, Rear Adm. John Poindexter, to fill McFarlane's job as deputy national security adviser. This cleared the way for McFarlane to take either the new position or remain on the gruelling Mideast assignment.

Reagan now will have to find another troubleshooter for the Middle East crisis as well as a new ambassador to the U.N. Officials said Reagan has not yet gotten around to considering possible candidates for the U.N. ambassadorship and there is no clue as to who may be considered. It is expected that McFarlane's assistant, Richard Fairbanks, former assistant secretary of state for congressional affairs, will likely take over the shuttle diplomacy task.

The national security adviser is not subject to Senate confirmation but Clark, the president's nominee to replace James G. Watt as secretary of the interior, is expected to face rugged questioning on environmental issues when he appears at Senate hearings on his nomination. The White House is not expected to send Clark to Capitol

Hill until Congress adjourns in November to give Clark more time to prepare for what are expected to be contentious hearings for which he is hardly prepared at this juncture.

The same forces who unceasingly sought the scalp of Watt because of his policies and his unfortunate phrase-making are expected to zero in on Clark, a conservative of the same beliefs as Reagan and Watt.

Some officials anticipate a delay in the hearings until January so that Clark can prepare himself for a heavy quizzing from anti-administration senators.

White House insiders say it was sheer coincidence that McFarlane was in Washington for consultations when the Watt resignation was followed by the bombshell Clark nomination. But McFarlane is well known to the president and thoroughly trusted by Clark and that was enough for Reagan. In addition, the State Department and Secretary George P. Shultz supported McFarlane because they were not anxious to see the strong-willed Kirkpatrick move into the powerful NSC position.

The only argument against McFarlane was that while he was a Marine major, he served in the NSC under Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and then-Col. Alexander M. Haig Jr. But McFarlane is an expert on the nuclear arms negotiations now reaching a critical stage in Geneva and is more current than anyone else on the boiling crisis in the Mideast.

Poindexter, a Naval Academy graduate, is a capable administrator inherited by Clark from Richard V. Allen in the NSC. He is still on the active Navy list but does not have the rank for dealing with the

CONTINUED

Reagan Firm on Security Adviser

Wants McFarlane Despite Opposition, Aides Say

By DAVID WOOD
 and GEORGE SKELTON,
Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON—President Reagan is committed to the appointment of Robert C. McFarlane as his national security adviser despite the strong opposition of conservatives outside the government and some doubts by high-ranking Administration officials, White House officials said Saturday.

McFarlane, a key national security assistant and Reagan's chief Middle East negotiator, was widely predicted to succeed William P. Clark as national security adviser after Reagan announced last week his intention to nominate Clark to succeed James G. Watt as secretary of the Interior.

But, in the wake of that announcement Thursday, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and CIA Director William J. Casey were said to have raised some questions about McFarlane's suitability. By Saturday, conservative organizations in Washington were mounting telephone and telegram campaigns urging the White House to reject McFarlane and appoint instead U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, a conservative favorite.

Reagan, one Administration official said, "really wants McFarlane" but does not underestimate the importance of listening to everyone's views on the subject. He suggested that, without such a strong stand by Reagan, the President could perhaps be persuaded to change his mind but that, as a result of Reagan's firmness, the White House staff Saturday was "shaping a consensus that agrees with the President."

The officials, who spoke on the condition that they not be identified, said that although the issue was not

completely settled late Saturday, a formal announcement of the appointment could be expected soon.

The officials said the White House is not seeking recommendations from Congress on the appointment because Reagan considers it an internal Administration issue. Appointment of a national security adviser does not require congressional confirmation.

But conservative spokesmen, declaring that the appointment of McFarlane would be the "final straw" in what they described as their declining support for the Administration, mounted a vigorous effort to steer the White House away from choosing him.

They said their hopes for derailing the appointment were buoyed when Weinberger and Casey—two of the Administration's most outspoken conservatives—raised concerns about McFarlane on Friday. And the conservatives cited Clark's decision to cancel a scheduled appearance Saturday at a Navy submarine christening in Groton, Conn., to coordinate White House work on the succession, as evidence of White House uncertainty over the McFarlane appointment.

"This is one of the most critical decisions Reagan will ever make," Howard Phillips, national director of the Conservative Caucus, said. "A McFarlane appointment would freeze conservatives out of all foreign policy-making and would result in terminal despondency for conservatives," raising questions about whether conservatives would participate in efforts to reelect Reagan, Phillips said.

McFarlane, a 46-year-old former Marine lieutenant colonel who has served as a national security assistant to three Presidents as well as having been a staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, is disliked intensely by many conservatives who charge that he has not pursued military superiority over the Soviet Union vigorously enough, has sought to build the MX missile only as an arms control "bargaining chip" and has failed to spotlight alleged Soviet violations of existing arms control treaties, Phillips said.

But Administration officials discounted the effect of a conservative pressure campaign, given what they described as Reagan's strong feeling for McFarlane and the fact that Clark, one of Reagan's closest friends, had strongly recommended him. The officials said Clark was

focusing his attention Saturday on lobbying for McFarlane within the Administration rather than polling outside opinion.

The officials also said the questions raised by Casey and Weinberger about McFarlane were less ideological than practical, reflecting concerns "that the guy would be more of a bureaucrat than a strong figure like Clark has been."

In a White House meeting Friday, in which McFarlane briefed top national security officials on the situation in Lebanon, those concerns appeared to have been eased. McFarlane gave what one of his supporters described as a "brilliant" presentation. "He really impressed everybody," the official said.

Weinberger was said Saturday to be arguing for a delay in the appointment, and Casey was said to be lobbying for Kirkpatrick. But, partly because of McFarlane's presentation, both men were reportedly willing to accept Reagan's final decision. Both men were said to be seeking assurances Saturday that McFarlane would be able to operate as national security adviser with the same degree of authority and access to Reagan as enjoyed by Clark. A White House official said that these concerns had been alleviated in "extremely high-level" discussions.

Other Administration officials said Saturday that, although both McFarlane and Kirkpatrick are viewed as knowledgeable and able, the U.N. ambassador is known as a forceful advocate of her positions while McFarlane is "a known quantity" and more of a "team player."

Reagan was described by aides as seeking as his national security adviser someone who would be "compatible" with all the Administration's national security officials,

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16 October 1983

REAGAN DELAYING ON SECURITY AIDE

Pressure by Conservatives Is
Said to Slow Final Decision
on Successor to Clark

By STEVEN R. WEISMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 15 — President Reagan and his advisers were described today as unable to make a final selection of a new national security adviser as conservatives in the Administration sought assurances that the President would continue to listen to their views.

An Administration official said this afternoon that Robert C. McFarlane, the deputy national security adviser and special Middle East envoy, would "in all probability" be chosen. But he said the selection of Mr. McFarlane would come only if Mr. Reagan succeeded in assuaging those who felt that he would not be strong enough on the job.

Earlier today, the official said there were signs that Mr. Reagan was "veering off course" from his original intention to choose Mr. McFarlane to succeed William P. Clark in the national security post. The vacancy occurred when Mr. Reagan, surprising his aides, selected Mr. Clark Thursday to be Secretary of the Interior.

The snag in the selection of Mr. McFarlane was said to come from Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and William J. Casey, director of Central Intelligence. Both were reported to have objected to him, not on ideological grounds but because they were concerned that Mr. McFarlane, a taciturn former Marine colonel and veteran of three Republican Administrations, did not have a strong enough personality to force foreign policy issues to the top of Mr. Reagan's agenda.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick Backed

A White House official said that as Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Casey expressed their misgivings, a major lobbying effort by conservatives had started and that their leading candidate was Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, the chief United States representative at the United Nations. Another official said Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Casey had let it be known they would be more comfortable with Mrs. Kirkpatrick than Mr. McFarlane.

Mr. Reagan's selection of Mr. Clark for the Interior post stunned members of his Administration and dismayed conservatives, who had come to look on the former California Supreme Court justice as a champion of their views in the White House.

Mr. Clark was chosen as national security adviser in January 1982 after the departure of Richard V. Allen, who had been unable to report to Mr. Reagan directly and had to go through intermediaries.

White House officials noted that Mr. Weinberger's and Mr. Casey's concerns had been a feature of the Reagan Administration since its inception. One official said Mr. Clark's difficulties in putting foreign policy matters onto Mr. Reagan's schedules had contributed to his willingness to take the Interior job.

Dispute Over Manila Trip

For example, Mr. Clark recently lost a dispute with Michael K. Deaver, the deputy White House chief of staff, over whether the President should visit the Philippines during an Asian trip scheduled for next month. At the urging of Mr. Deaver, who was reportedly concerned about security problems, Mr. Reagan canceled visits to the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand.

In addition, a senior adviser to Mr. Reagan noted that Mr. Clark had had to overcome the opposition of both Mr. Deaver and James A. Baker 3d, the White House chief of staff, in persuading Mr. Reagan to make speeches last spring on behalf of his defense budget and his aid package for El Salvador.

The adviser said there was lingering and widespread fear that Mr. McFarlane, even if he took a similar approach, could not duplicate Mr. Clark's clout in the President's office.

This afternoon, a White House official said he understood that Mr. Reagan had been able "to reassure" both Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Casey on this score. It was unclear whether the reassurance came in the form of guarantees of access to the Oval Office or of participation in meetings by Mr. McFarlane.

WASHINGTON POST
16 October 1983

STAT

McFarlane's Influence Is Questioned

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

Robert C. McFarlane remains the leading White House candidate to succeed William P. Clark as national security affairs adviser, but Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and CIA Director William J. Casey have expressed concern about McFarlane's ability to represent their views, administration sources said yesterday.

Officials said President Reagan has attempted to reassure Weinberger and Clark that he would give McFarlane access to the Oval Office and a role equivalent to that enjoyed by Clark.

Officials said that Reagan had not yet decided on Clark's successor and that U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick is being pushed by conservatives for the powerful post as top White House adviser on foreign policy and national security.

But one informed administration official said the selection is "coalescing toward McFarlane."

McFarlane is now deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs and has been serving since July as the president's special Middle East envoy.

A White House official said the timing of Reagan's decision remains "unpredictable."

The objections of Weinberger and Casey are said to center on concern that McFarlane could not command the access and influence of Clark, a conservative who enjoyed Reagan's

confidence and almost unrestricted access to the Oval Office.

Both the defense secretary and the CIA director are said by officials to want a successor to Clark who would be a strong advocate of their views on increasing the defense budget and taking a hard line against the Soviets.

Their doubts are not about McFarlane's competence, officials stressed, but about his ability to represent their views in hard-fought competition with others at the White House.

"Weinberger and Casey want to be sure they have an agent who has the muscle to get it done," said one administration official. "They want to have a strong person like Clark."

A White House official said last night that both Weinberger and Casey "have been reassured" that McFarlane, if selected, would be given access to the Oval Office and a role equivalent to Clark's.

The official said the process of picking Clark's successor had become one of "trying to round people up" and build a "consensus" for McFarlane.

Despite the concerns of Weinberger and Casey, other officials said it was likely that neither McFarlane, 45, a former Marine lieutenant colonel, nor Kirkpatrick, 56, a favorite of conservative activists outside the administration, would be able to match Clark's influence with the president.

Both Clark and White House chief of staff James A. Baker III, who have often been at odds in the past, favor McFarlane. Secretary of State George P. Shultz also reportedly wants McFarlane.

But Kirkpatrick, a former professor at Georgetown University, has made it known that she would like to return to Washington after nearly three years in New York, and some conservative activists and congressmen, among others, were

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WASHINGTON POST
15 October 1983

Sub Only

Overtaxed, Clark Sought Interior Post

By Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writer

William P. Clark asked President Reagan to consider him for the position of secretary of the interior after deciding to leave his job as national security affairs adviser because of its mounting strains and persistent, bitter White House staff infighting, senior administration officials said yesterday.

"The president wanted to accommodate Bill, and he was also well aware that there had been plenty of tension," one of these officials said.

Clark had "a bellyfull" of White House staff disputes, another said, and was tired of "the 18-hour days, the pressure, the bickering and the

cables in the middle of the night." The officials said relations were particularly strained between Clark and White House deputy chief of staff Michael K. Deaver, both of whom have been associated with Reagan since he began his first term as governor of California in 1967.

Deaver and Clark sometimes became so angry that they did not

return each other's telephone calls, officials said. Clark and his supporters also suspected that Deaver enlisted Nancy Reagan in what they saw as a campaign to force Clark off the White House staff.

The seeds of Clark's move from the White House to his nomination as secretary of the interior were sown last December when Clark, 51, depressed over his job and worried about the management of his 888-acre California ranch, suggested to Reagan that he leave the administration and return home.

"Bill, this is the first time I've ever rejected a resignation," Reagan reportedly replied. "In time there may be something else." Clark was said to have told the president that he was not interested in returning to the judiciary at any level.

Clark was serving as a Reagan appointee on the California Supreme Court when the president asked him to come to Washington in 1981 and serve as deputy secretary of state to Alexander M. Haig Jr.

As White House tensions mounted in the months following Clark's December discussion with Reagan, Clark sometimes talked to friends about his desire to leave the White House staff and his hope of returning to the ranch. But he always told them he would stay as long as Reagan wanted him.

Sometimes, these friends said, Clark left the White House late at night with severe headaches, only to be back at work early in the morning.

Even his adversaries in the White House praised his capacity for hard work, but he seemed to some of them to be moody and unhappy.

White House rivals, including Deaver and chief of staff James A. Baker III, resented Clark's easy access to Reagan, who for 16 years has turned to Clark in times of political trouble.

Conservatives, both in and out of the administration, increasingly saw Clark as a lone, embattled figure who carried the banner of Reaganism in the White House against staff aides whose first loyalties had been to other Republicans.

They were concerned that Clark would be forced out of the White House and were, in many cases, unaware that he wanted to leave.

The opportunity arose after Interior Secretary James G. Watt was forced to resign Sunday under growing pressure from Republican senators because of his Sept. 21 description of a coal advisory panel as "a black . . . , a woman, two Jews and a cripple."

Sen. Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.), general chairman of the Republican Party and a close friend of Reagan, had "an understanding" with the president that he would be able to recommend a replacement for Watt, according to officials. Laxalt favored former senator Clifford P. Hansen (R-Wyo.), who had been his first choice for interior secretary in 1981.

A few days after Laxalt had suggested that Hansen replace Watt if he resigned, Clark telephoned Reagan at Camp David last Saturday, Oct. 8. This was the day before Watt announced his resignation, but it was expected by the president and his top advisers.

Clark reportedly suggested himself to Reagan as a candidate to succeed Watt and also talked about his desire to return to California. The two men reportedly joked about the idea, and Reagan said to Clark, "You could wear a hat again."

Reagan reportedly also told Clark that Hansen was being sounded out for the Interior Department job and said he didn't know if the former senator was available to take it.

On Wednesday, Hansen telephoned both Laxalt and James Baker to say he was turning down the job for health reasons. Baker began promoting two congressmen, Reps. Dick Cheney (R-Wyo.) and Manuel Lujan Jr. (R-N.M.), as potential replacements for Watt.

White House personnel director John Herrington was preparing a 28-name backup list. However, the man who really was being considered

by Reagan was not even on it. Herrington asked Clark if he wanted to be on the list, but Clark said he didn't want to "put his name in the system" and would leave the decision to the president.

Until Wednesday, Clark's discussion with Reagan had been kept secret even from chief of staff Baker. But Herrington informed Baker of his own conversation with Clark, even though he did not add Clark's name to the formal list.

The next day, Thursday, Reagan decided on Clark, catching by sur-

prise most senior administration officials, including Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

On the weekend before Watt's resignation, Clark had irritated Shultz by flying unannounced to Rome to meet with Reagan's special Middle East envoy, Robert C. McFarlane, and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, a longtime ally of Clark.

Though the three men did not discuss the idea of Clark becoming secretary of interior, according to officials, they did talk about future prospects for McFarlane, who also has been Clark's deputy.

White House officials said yesterday that they expect Reagan soon to name McFarlane to replace Clark as national security adviser, but one senior official said "the decision is not sealed in concrete."

Some conservatives reportedly were pushing U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick as an alternative to McFarlane but this idea reportedly found little favor with Baker and his allies or with Shultz, who had sometimes complained that Clark was preempting too many foreign policy decisions.

While the president's decision to move Clark from the White House to the Interior Department shocked officials in Washington on Thursday, it was characteristic of the past behavior of both Reagan and Clark.

Reagan often has considered his close associates to be interchangeable parts in managing a government enterprise he has likened to a corporate board of directors. He named Weinberger—with federal government experience as budget manager and finance director—as secretary of defense. He named his personal attorney, William French Smith—with

little background in criminal law—as his attorney general. These two men and Clark will now hold three of the top Cabinet posts in the administration.

Clark's move to the Interior Department, if the Senate confirms him, also parallels his earlier public career in California, where he took over as Gov. Reagan's chief of staff during a period of turmoil and then left for a relatively minor judgeship before Reagan later appointed him to the state Supreme Court.

No matter what Clark's status, in or out of government, Reagan always

has consulted him. Officials said yesterday that they expect this to continue and noted that both Weinberger and Smith have played influential roles in important administration decisions from their Cabinet posts.

During the 1980 campaign, when Clark was on the California court and prohibited from direct political involvement, Nancy Reagan invited him to the Reagan ranch to discuss problems about campaign manager John P. Sears.

It was Clark who placed the call to New York that awakened attorney William J. Casey, who was asked to serve in the Reagan campaign. Casey subsequently replaced Sears as campaign manager and then became director of the CIA, where he has been a Clark ally on most issues.

One of the central issues leading to the Sears dismissal was the tension between the campaign manager and longtime Reaganites, particularly Edwin Meese III, who is now the White House counselor. Reagan has always preferred a calm, harmonious working atmosphere among his close associates and dislikes arguments and staff bickering.

It was the disharmony between Secretary of State Haig and White House officials, led by Baker and Deaver and abetted by Clark, that led to Haig's departure from the administration. And it was what one official called "the persistent grinding friction" between Clark and other officials, especially Deaver, that prompted Reagan to accommodate Clark's desire to leave, officials said yesterday.

For Clark, given the history of his relationship with Reagan, it would appear to be far from the end of the line.

"Bill is a very sensitive person and he doesn't care for the rough-and-tumble of political infighting and give-and-take decisions," said one Californian who knows him well. "He likes the out-of-doors, and Interior appeals to him."

Another official said that "it wasn't a case of leaping or pushing, it was just a time for a change. Clark was burnt out, and Reagan wanted to keep him in his administration. This was the way to do it."

Staff writers Michael Getler and Don Oberdorfer contributed to this report.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, October 14, 1983

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14 October 1983

WASHINGTON
CHINESE

Chinese foreign minister Wu Xueqian had an unannounced meeting with William Casey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, during his three-day visit to Washington, information from Chinese official sources showed today.

Casey's name did not appear on the official schedule put out by the State Department or was the meeting mentioned to reporters in a summary briefing on the Wu visit by a senior State Department official Thursday.

But in a dispatch from Washington the Chinese news agency Xinhua said Wu met Casey Thursday before leaving for Chicago.

Wu also spent more than eight hours in meetings with Secretary of State George Shultz during his three days in Washington.

The Chinese news agency did not say what was discussed in the meeting between Wu and Casey, and neither the State Department nor the CIA have any immediate confirmation of the meeting. However, U.S. officials said Wu discussed the situation in Afghanistan and Cambodia with the Americans he met.

There have been recurring reports that China and the United States, as well as other countries, have been actively cooperating in supplying anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese forces with weapons and other aid in those two countries.

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WASHINGTON TIMES

13 October 1983

Officials deny report KAL attack an error

By Ted Agres
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

Senior administration officials are denying a published report that claimed U.S. intelligence analysts have concluded the Soviet Union did not know it was attacking a civilian airliner the night it shot down KAL Flight 007 over Soviet airspace.

The senior officials, who have routine access to the intelligence reports, added there has been no final assessment of the data and said that a conclusion having the effect of exonerating the Soviets was invalid.

The senior officials also charged that comments made Friday by the State Department on the report were "unauthorized" and that the department had not obtained "interagency approval," namely from the CIA or the White House, prior to making the statements.

The New York Times reported on Friday that a review of "all available evidence" had been concluded and that intelligence experts have "no indication that Soviet air defense personnel knew it was a commercial plane before the attack."

But the senior administration officials, who spoke on condition that they not be identified, characterized that report as either "a fabrication or a lie," and denied that "most intelligence analysts have reached that conclusion."

Based on a reading of the intelligence data thus far, one senior official said, "there is another assessment" of the overall picture, "and that is that the Soviets must have known they were shooting down a civilian airliner."

The official added that the evaluation of intelligence is continuing, and will do so until the aircraft's "black box," which contains recordings of the pilot's conversations and flight data, is accounted for.

The Washington Times also has learned that three weeks ago CIA Director William Casey, under presidential authority, circulated a detailed memorandum to officials at the State Department, Defense Department and White House

warning against any further public discussion of intelligence or assessments regarding the KAL incident.

Casey said that too much information on U.S. "sources and methods" of intelligence-gathering had already been revealed and that the time had come for it to cease.

Nevertheless, on Friday State Department spokesman Alan Romberg told reporters that U.S. analysts do "not know for sure" and "may never know" whether the Soviets knew they were shooting down a civilian airliner.

"We don't know for sure. How can we possibly know for sure? We have never said we did," Romberg said.

Romberg "had no business saying that," a senior administration official said. "(Secretary of State) George Shultz's people are not authorized to discuss details of intelligence assessments that are taken out of context and which contravene both administration and legal prohibitions against public discussion of intelligence sources and methods," the official charged, referring to the Casey memorandum.

"Taking such details out of context almost invariably leads to faulty analysis and incorrect intelligence assessments, especially when the broader context, which informs our overall assessment, indicates that the Soviets did know that they were shooting down a civilian airliner," the senior official charged.

Romberg yesterday declined to comment on any aspect of his statements, saying only, "I speak with the authorization I need to speak with."

White House officials, as well as some military analysts, suggest that there exists "political motivation" for putting out the story easing up on the Soviets. They maintain that certain factions within the State Department and within the intelligence community have been "pushing" the view from the beginning that the Soviets did not know the civilian nature of the aircraft.

They cite as one indication of this view a secret State Department cable sent to Seoul, South Korea, the day after the shootdown. The cable quotes the department's task force as being "convinced the Soviets were sure they were firing on an American military plane when they attacked the KAL aircraft." A copy of the document was obtained by The Washington Times.

The officials suggest that some State Department officials and others are overly concerned that the

Reagan administration's accusations against the Soviets may lead to a further "chilling of relations" and block already "limited chances" for a Reagan-Andropov summit.

"The State Department apparently believes the American public must be protected from getting angry over Soviet criminal behavior because it fears such 'popular anger' could lead to war," one senior official mused.

Gen. George Keegan, former head of Air Force intelligence, said he believed the statements exonerating the Soviets were put forward based on "a conscious, political decision made somewhere to tone down the rhetoric to free the Soviet leaders from the responsibility" of shooting down the aircraft.

"I can't imagine what evidence they would have to come up with such a judgment," Keegan added.

The New York Times article claims that "most American intelligence experts" reached the conclusion that the Soviet SU-15 jetfighter "was below, and not parallel to, the South Korean 747." The distinction is important because the 747 has a distinctive silhouette clearly visible from the side, but not necessarily from below.

But Keegan, whose view was echoed by the current officials, said that assessment is faulty. "The translation of the voice intercepts make it crystal clear that the pilot flew abreast, then past the nose of the aircraft, then he pulled back to make the rocket run," Keegan said.

A senior administration official simply said the report of flying below and not alongside "was wrong." He would not elaborate on that point.

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WASHINGTON POST
12 October 1983

file only

Turnovers Few in Reagan's Cabinet

By Myron Struck
Washington Post Staff Writer

Despite the resignation this week of Interior Secretary James G. Watt, President Reagan has more of his original Cabinet in place than Jimmy Carter or Richard M. Nixon had after three years in office.

Of the 13 department heads, eight have been on the job since Reagan started. In addition, five other members of the Reagan Cabinet—Budget Director David A. Stockman, White House Counselor Edwin Meese III, U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, CIA Director William J. Casey and Special Trade Representative William F. Brock—have stayed on.

Besides Watt, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., Health and Human Services Secretary Richard S. Schweiker, Energy Secretary James B. Edwards and Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis also stepped down.

Six of Nixon's 12 department heads stayed with him for the first three years, as did six of Carter's 11

department heads—although one changed jobs. (The Nixon Cabinet was the last to include the postmaster general, while the education and energy secretaries were added under Carter.)

Four of Nixon's original appointees were still with him at the end of his first term, but none lasted until the end of the administration on Aug. 10, 1974. The four were Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, Housing and Urban Development Secretary George W. Romney and Transportation Secretary John A. Volpe.

Four Carter appointees stayed in office through his full term: Interior Secretary Cecil D. Andrus, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland and Labor Secretary Ray Marshall.

In addition, Patricia Roberts Harris remained in the Cabinet, but switched from HUD to HHS, and Shirley Hufstedtler served a little more than a year as Carter's only education secretary.

Only two of the 11 Cabinet secretaries Gerald R. Ford inherited from Nixon—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Treasury Secretary William E. Simon—stayed until the end of Ford's term.

Earlier presidents often retained Cabinet members from the previous administration—even if it was the other party.

Thomas Jefferson, for example, retained three of the six members of John Adams' Cabinet for a while, then replaced them with his own selections midway through his first year.

President William McKinley's choice for agriculture secretary, James Wilson, stayed in office 16 years, through the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft.

Andrew W. Mellon, President Warren G. Harding's choice for treasury secretary, served more than 10 years, under Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover.

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ON PAGE 7

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'It was his task to guide the Archdiocese of New York during some years of tension, conflict and trials...He has been able to guide his church safely through these troubled times.' —From the funeral sermon by William Cardinal Baum



CIA chief William Casey, representing the White House; Mayor Koch, former President Nixon and Gov. Cuomo (l. to r.) next to Cardinal Cooke's coffin during funeral Mass yesterday at St. Patrick's Cathedral.

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ON PAGE 20

Liberty. Dec

VILLAGE VOICE
11 October 1983

PRESS CLIPS

By Alexander Cockburn

It Takes Two

Now that Ed Harris, the actor portraying John Glenn in *The Right Stuff*, has appeared on the cover of *Newsweek*, it is only a matter of time before he takes over from Glenn in the primaries. There are some divisions in the Glenn camp on precise strategy. Some argue that since the "real" John Glenn is such a dreadful speaker it might be better to put him on ice for the duration and substitute Harris, without telling anyone. Glenn would be the "back room boy", concentrating on fund-raising while Harris kisses babies and works the primary circuit. Others in Glenn HQ argue that this would be "deceitful" and contrary to the spirit of post-Watergate morality. They say Glenn should be upfront about the arrangement and that on the stump and in network and local tv shows the situation should be explained in the network news idiom for summer relief: "This is the John Glenn Campaign with Ed Harris Substituting for John Glenn".

Yet another faction among the Glenn advisers fears that, as one of them put it, "Harris might develop a mind of his own" and launch a divisive splinter candidacy. As a precedent, they cite the crisis, well-known to political insiders, which developed between the two Ronald Reagans in the 1980 campaign.

It seems that Governor Reagan was too rusty at the start of his campaign, and too elderly in appearance to belie charges that he was over the hill. Furthermore he refused to dye his hair. Nonetheless, he resisted the urging of close advisers that he make way for his understudy, a retired actor who had served as pinch-hitter for the governor in his Sacramento days. The crisis came in the hours before the famous tv debates between Republican candidates on the eve of the New Hampshire primary. Top advisers William Casey and Ed Meese concluded that Reagan was too exhausted to continue and that the understudy, who had traditionally handled debates, should step in. The governor, backed by John Sears, resisted. In a brief tussle minutes before the debate the governor was overpowered and flown in a private plane to the estate of Walter Annenberg. Nancy Reagan subscribed to the arrangement in the "long-term interests of her husband and the country."

The understudy carried the burden of the first primaries until a rested Reagan, reconciled to the arrangement—and to Grecian Formula—was able to return to the fray. It was in fact the understudy, charged after the election with handling most speaking engagements, who was the victim of John Hinckley's attack. This explains President Reagan's seemingly miraculous recovery. The crisis now raging in the White House pits the "real" Reagan who wishes to retire after one term, against the understudy, since recovered, who prefers to remain in Washington and who threatens to carry on alone.

Other politicians with full-time understudies include Kemp.

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
11 October 1983

NEW YORK

President sends condolences to Cooke's mourners

President Reagan's representative to the funeral of Cardinal Terence Cooke carried a letter of mourning that praised the prelate for his staunch pro-life stance, authorities said Tuesday.

CIA Director William Casey, Reagan's representative at Monday's funeral mass, delivered the letter, dated Oct. 6, to Bishop Joseph O'Keefe, the current administrator of the Archdiocese of New York, said archdiocesan spokesman Joseph Zwilling.

O'Keefe will govern until a new archbishop is chosen by Pope John Paul II for Cooke.

The burial mass for Cooke was held at St. Patrick's Cathedral and attended by notables including former President Richard Nixon, Gov. Mario Cuomo, Mayor Edward Koch, New York Sens. Patrick Moynihan and Alfonse D'Amato and about two dozen representatives of other religious denominations.

Cooke, who suffered from leukemia, died Thursday morning at the age of 62. He was interred Monday in a crypt beneath the main altar of the cathedral.

Reagan, who visited Cooke on his sickbed Sept. 26, wrote, "Nancy and I share in the grief of the people and the clergy of the New York Archdiocese at the passing of his Eminence Terence Cardinal Cooke and we extend to all of you our deepest sympathy."

"Cardinal Cooke will always be remembered for his tireless defense of the right to life," the letter said. "And he deeply believed it was God's will that all human life, even in the womb, deserved respect and protection."

Cooke, an anti-abortion activist for 10 years, served as chairman of the Pro-Life Committee of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. "We will always always cherish the memory of our last visit with him (Cooke) just a few days before his death," the letter said.

Pressure builds against Casey's Fulton speech

By PAUL ROBERTS
of the Tribune's staff

A member of the family whose endowment pays for Westminster College's most prestigious speaking event yesterday asked the school's president to rescind this year's John Findley Green Lecture invitation to CIA Director William Casey.

John Green II, grandson of the man for whom the lecture series is named, made the request to President Harvey Saunders during a meeting with Westminster's Board of Trustees, said sources familiar with the session.

In doing so, Green sided with a majority of faculty members who last week sent a resolution to Saunders asking that Casey's Oct. 26 lecture be canceled.

Professors alleged Casey has a history of disreputable business dealings, and—as political science professor John Langton charged—“would sully the reputation of the Green lecture.”

Sources familiar with yesterday's meeting, who asked not to be identified, said Green's request marked the first time the family has involved itself in selecting speakers for the 40-year-old lecture series.

Attempts to reach Green, a St. Louis lawyer, and Saunders were unsuccessful before the Tribune's deadline today.

Meanwhile, a spokesman at CIA headquarters near Washington, D.C., said this morning that news of the controversy had not reached Casey.

Dale Peterson, the Central Intelligence Agency's chief of media relations, then consulted with “those who are organizing” Casey's Fulton trip. Afterward, Peterson emphatically added: “He will be there.”

Point by point, Peterson denied charges leveled by Westminster professors. Peterson said “the allegation that Mr. Casey lied to a Senate Banking Committee in 1971 are absolutely not true.”

Peterson said Casey would deny the accuracy of transcripts recording his sworn testimony before the committee, which, according to press accounts, indicate Casey's statements contradicted both the records of

trial testimony and a federal judge.

Peterson said a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report in December 1981 rebutting allegations that Casey lied to senators and other allegations of Casey's questionable business practices. “All of those old allegations proved to be unfounded,” he said.

Westminster professor Dave Southern and several other professors noted the precarious position in which Saunders finds himself because of the faculty's resolution.

Saunders may be unable to diplomatically “disinvite” Casey, but Southern said the president's quandary will benefit the college in the long run because administrators may realize the speaker selection process must be changed.

The faculty's resolution suggested a committee of administrators, students, faculty and alumni choose future speakers. The college president has traditionally selected the Green speaker.

Southern and others, such as political science professors John Langton and Peter Leo, say several recent selections by the college administration have come from the “political right.”

The professors say they want more diversity in speakers.

America's Secret War

Under William Casey, the CIA is back in business with



In a string of Turkish cities and towns, agents of the Central Intelligence Agency have arranged covert support for Iranian exile groups seeking the overthrow of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Two thousand miles away, in the Pakistani cities of Peshawar and Islamabad, other undercover operatives are coordinating the flow of money and matériel vital to rebel tribesmen battling Soviet invasion troops across the border in Afghanistan. The agency also supplies secret aid to friendly forces in Chad, Ethiopia, Angola and the Sudan—and has launched the massive campaign of espionage, air strikes, propaganda and other support for a now notorious "secret war" against the leftist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Clearly, the cloaks and daggers have come out of cold storage at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. For better or worse, the Company is back in the business of covert action—with a global scope and an intensity of resources unmatched since its heyday 20 years ago.

Under the most unlikely director of central intelligence in the agency's history—a mumbling, often maddening tax lawyer and businessman named William J. Casey (page 40)—the CIA has found its ranks expanded, redirected and re-energized for covert confrontation with hostile forces around the world. Casey also has streamlined basic analysis and reporting functions, helped swaddle the agency in a cocoon of controversial new secrecy orders and moved it forcefully into two areas of stepped-up national concern: the fight to keep tons of deadly drugs from coming into the United States each year and the battle to keep scores of critical high-tech advances from being pirated out. Casey's ability to get things done stems in large part from his close and frequent contact with the president (at least two meetings each week, plus frequent phone conversations) and with fellow members of the cabinet (Casey is the first DCI with cabinet rank).

"Mushrooms": Still, the increase in covert action has raised old questions about the wisdom, propriety and effectiveness of American intelligence activities. Critics on and off Capitol Hill say Casey shows an old cold warrior's insensitivity to the potential embarrassment and diplomatic danger that secret missions always pose—and a high-handed disregard for the role of congressional oversight in this most sensitive area.

"We are like mushrooms," says California's Democratic Rep. Norman Mineta of the

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. "They keep us in the dark and feed us a lot of manure."

The most dramatic showdown so far came this past summer when the House Intelligence Committee voted to cut off all funds for further covert support of the anti-Sandinist contra rebels in Nicaragua—a largely symbolic act, since the Senate never



Wally McNamara—NEWSWEEK

THE DCI AT LANGLEY: A covert clientele

concurred. The national debate will flare again in the next few weeks as Congress begins to consider the nation's 1984 intelligence budget, which is reported to have grown at a rate of 17 percent annually for the past three years, faster even than Pentagon spending, to regain the level it held before big cutbacks began back in 1973. The prospects for making any substantial cuts in the face of new Soviet aggressiveness—both the shootdown of a Korean Air Lines jetliner and Moscow's hostile rejection of the latest U.S. arms-control proposals (page 26)—"are not promising," concedes committee chairman Edward Boland of Massachusetts. Dubious, too, are prospects for a

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NICARAGUA: Anti-Sandinista contras

events vital to our national security interests, a capability which only the United States among major powers has denied itself," it proclaimed, in pointed reference to the decimation of CIA undercover ranks under President Jimmy Carter and CIA Director Stansfield Turner (operatives were pared down to perhaps 300 from a high point of thousands in the early 1960s).

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NEWSWEEK
10 October 1983



Photos by Wally McNamere—NEWSWEEK

With wife, Sophia, at Long Island home: A long love affair with intelligence

A Most Unlikely Superspook

Except for the pistols tucked beneath their jackets, the two fresh-faced young men sitting in the front seat of the black Chrysler might have been mistaken for trainees at a good brokerage house. Behind them, his jowls quivering with the car's vibration, his head cocked in a characteristic expression of quizzical attention, sat William J. Casey, 70, multimillionaire, lawyer, investor, politician, tax expert, amateur historian—and director of central intelligence (DCI). "Mr. Casey," one of the agents said, "they've got a call on the secure phone. Do you want to go back?" Casey grunted yes and the car turned toward the antebellum mansion on Long Island that he has owned for 35 years. Lunch would have to wait. This call from his deputy wasn't about Thailand or Chad or any of the thousands of men at his command around the world. It was about how to handle congressional testimony—an overt operation of extreme sensitivity.

While Casey and Ronald Reagan are close—perhaps closer than any DCI and president since the agency's founding—the CIA director's relations with Congress need constant patching. Many members of the intelligence committees remain disturbed by what they view as his cavalier approach to keeping Congress informed. In August 1981, after his poorly qualified chief of clandestine operations, Max Hugel, was forced to resign, Casey found his own job threatened. After a brief investiga-

tion, the most enthusiastic endorsement Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Barry Goldwater could muster was that Casey was not "unfit to serve." Last June came "Debategate." Casey denied White House chief of staff James A. Baker III's assertion that he had received purloined debate-briefing papers from Jimmy Carter's 1980 campaign (NEWSWEEK, July 18).

Bullfrog: Part of Casey's problem is his chronic inarticulateness, particularly unnerving given his sharp mind. In his bullfrog, often inaudible mumbling, "Nicaragua" comes out "Nicowawa," prompting a group of Democrats to say they won't approve plans to "overthrow the government of any country Casey couldn't pronounce." Even the president jokes about it, telling one GOP senator that Casey "will be the first DCI who didn't need a scrambler phone." But deeper unease about Casey grows out of his heedless nature. His affinity for action and risk, healthy for money-making, can be worrisome in other realms. As DCI he is always in motion, traveling at least 50 percent of the time, occasionally on commercial flights under an assumed name, a practice one agency source calls "extremely risky." With Casey, the question is what happens when the to-hell-with-the-niceties approach that has served him so well in business is applied to the CIA.

Casey won the CIA job after managing Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign, but

his interest in the post had its origin in a longtime love affair with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the World War II precursor to the CIA. While Casey's bad eyesight kept him out of direct espionage, a contact in OSS chief William Donovan's New York law firm landed him a job in the OSS Washington office. In the last months of the war, as London station chief, he organized a large-scale operation that dropped some 150 agents behind German lines to disrupt Nazi forces and assist the Allied advance. Some recent scholarship suggests that the mission produced few concrete results. But over the years there has been a tendency on the part of the fraternity of OSS veterans, including Casey, to transfer their glowing wartime memories to current operations.

Preparation: When Casey first took over the CIA he was widely criticized for his lack of relevant experience in the 35 years since the end of the war. But for the bulk of the agency's activity—the collection and analysis of intelligence—Casey's business career was solid preparation. In 1937, after waiting on tables to help pay his way through Fordham and St. John's Law School, Casey went to work for a newsletter that advised companies on the tangled new legislation coming out of Washington. The exercise—presenting complex information in a clear way—was not so different from intelligence work, except that there was money in it. From 1954 to 1971, Casey's own firm, the Institute for Business Planning, helped produce dozens of how-to books on subjects like estate planning and mutual funds. They still circulate widely. "I have one on my desk right now," chuckles former CIA Director William Colby from his Washington law office.

Casey's appetite for digesting information—and now intelligence—is prodigious. Many public figures feel obliged to affect a taste for books; Casey's is real. Except for golf with friends like William

Simon and George Shultz, he does little in his spare time but read. Author of one nontechnical book, a guide to the American Revolution, he has completed a second on the OSS, which he won't publish until he leaves his present job.

This scholarly inclination stands in sharp contrast to Casey's freewheeling financial style. Instead of coasting with a cushy corporate life, Casey relished risks. He helped found many high-technology firms—often receiving stock in exchange for his legal work. The gambles paid off, helping Casey amass a fortune of \$8 million to \$12 million. Several shareholder

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10 October 1983

TOP OF THE WEEK

Newsweek



America's Secret Warriors: The CIA Reborn

The cloaks and daggers have been brought out of cold storage at Ronald Reagan's Central Intelligence Agency. After a sharp decline in clandestine work during the 1970s, there are now more than 1,000 CIA undercover specialists—and more CIA-backed covert operations under way than at any time since the 1960s. With gruff, controversial William J. Casey (left) at the helm, the agency has sponsored large-scale "special activities" in Iran, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Thailand and Nicaragua (right). But Congress is disturbed. As Casey goes about the task of strengthening the CIA and plugging its leaks, serious doubts remain about the propriety and effectiveness of clandestine operations. *Page 38*



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ON PAGE A-5

WASHINGTON POST
9 October 1983

Scholars Resume Writing History of CIA

By Ian Black
Washington Post Staff Writer

Somewhere inside the sprawling headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley, a small group of professional scholars is producing volume after volume of secret history books that will never be found on the shelves of the nation's public libraries.

The CIA's historical office—little known even inside the agency—is a unique organization with unique problems.

"There are," said one person familiar with its work, "a lot of people out there who simply don't want things written down."

Under Director William J. Casey, an avid reader and amateur historian, the office has been reborn, after internal arguments and a depletion in resources killed it off three years ago.

"Casey is very favorable towards history," one former CIA official said.

"He seems to think that the work of the historical staff is important and has given some attention to it," according to another source.

"At the moment," said a government historian in another agency, "the office is undergoing a mild revival. How far it will get I couldn't predict. It just depends on who is and who isn't interested in having histories written. It's certainly not the sort of job I'd want to have. The difficulties are just too great."

The scholar who occupies the CIA's chair of secret history apparently had his doubts as well. Before taking up the post in August, 1981, according to a former colleague, Prof. Kenneth McDonald kept open his 20-year tenure at George Washington University for a further 12 months until he felt secure in the new job.

The CIA is proud of him—to judge by the relatively large amount of information the agency divulges about a career that includes four years in the Marines, a B.A. from Yale, a doctorate from Oxford and a professorship of strategy at the Naval War College.

But the agency will reveal nothing about the type or quantity of work now done by McDonald and three assistants.

"They write histories, internal CIA histories based on classified information," said spokesman Dale Petersen. "These remain classified."

Former CIA officials and scholars say the office concentrates more on the structure and organization of the agency than on the history of individual operations, explaining why, for example, one section was merged with another at a certain time.

"Post-mortems" on operations, these sources say, may be found in the records of other CIA offices. One retired counterintelligence official returned to Langley on a contract to write a "narrative history that tied various incidents together."

The output of McDonald's office, according to people familiar with it, is "considerable" but uneven in quality. One official described it as varying "from quite good to extremely bad or even hopeless."

One reason for this, says one person who has seen the secret volumes, is that they are often written by officials approaching retirement or between assignments and who have only a peripheral knowledge of the subject and no historical skills.

The only publicly available information about the history program is buried in a footnote in a volume summarizing almost three decades of the CIA's existence prepared for the 1975 Church Commission study on U.S. intelligence activities.

Its author, committee staffer Anne Karalekas, included among her sources "approximately 75 volumes from the series of internal CIA histories, a rich if uneven collection of studies which deal with individual agency components, the administrations of the directors of Central Intelligence and specialized areas of intelligence analysis."

She described the material as constituting a "unique institutional memory."

Karalekas, according to a former official, "got to look at a lot of things that people normally wouldn't see."

The historical staff was established under the directorship of Gen. Walter Bedell Smith in 1951, shortly after the CIA evolved from the World War II Office of Strategic Services.

"It has had a checkered history," says one scholar, "flourishing and receding depending on the circumstances."

CONTINUED

Westminster faculty members seek to block CIA chief's speech

By PAUL ROBERTS
of the Tribune's staff

A group of faculty members at Westminster College in Fulton has asked that plans be scuttled for CIA Director William Casey to address the college Oct. 29 at its most prestigious annual speaking event.

The group decided Casey is unworthy of giving the 40th John Findley Green Lecture after hearing reports from some professors about Casey's former business practices, which as late as two years ago put his job on the line during intense congressional scrutiny.

After a vote Tuesday, the faculty members requested that Westminster President Harvey Saunders rescind the invitation already accepted by Casey, a longtime Republican administrator and once-prominent Wall Street investor.

"Mr. Casey is a very unsavory character who would sully the reputation of the Green lecture," political science professor John Langton said yesterday. "He has been operating on the margin of business law for years, and he has even been caught."

Attempts by the Tribune to reach Westminster's president were unsuccessful, but Fulton's Kingdom Daily Sun-Gazette reported yesterday that Saunders declined comment on whether he will withdraw the offer.

The college's scholars take the Green lecture series very seriously. Named for a 19th-century Westminster graduate, speakers since 1936 have included Winston Churchill, Harry Truman and Hubert Humphrey.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger spoke last year. Former British prime minister Edward Heath, a conservative, delivered the address two years ago.

The offer to Casey, the faculty's resolution contended, marks a trend by the college's administration to invite dignitaries on the right of the political spectrum. The college president traditionally makes the selection.

Langton said about three-fourths of the 55-member faculty was present Tuesday, and about 60 percent of those who attended were in favor of withdrawing Casey's invitation.

They also asked Saunders to form an advisory committee of students, faculty and alumni to make future recommendations to the administration for selecting speakers.

"I don't have any problems with speakers of the right," Langton said, "but I'd like to see more diversity in the speakers we do have."

Asked about his own political preferences, Langton replied: "The political persuasion of anyone involved in this resolution is not at issue. The fact is a liberal arts college should be a free market of ideas."

In 1981, a New York federal judge ruled Casey and other directors of a New Orleans agricultural firm had circulated false information to investors who later filed a lawsuit against the now-bankrupt corporation.

Allegations of dishonest stock sales were included in the 1974 lawsuit, three years after former President Richard Nixon appointed Casey chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, a key corporate oversight agency.

At confirmation hearings for that post in 1971, Casey told a congressional banking committee about a lawsuit in which the tax publication that Casey once edited was sued for plagiarism.

A jury had ruled against Casey's publication in 1962. The plaintiff was awarded about \$42,000, but the case was later settled out of court.

After the first round of hearings on Casey's appointment, senators saw court documents and contacted the trial judge who heard the civil suit.

According to excerpts published in The Nation magazine on Aug. 8, 1981, both the trial transcript and the judge's statements contradicted key sections of Casey's sworn testimony before the senators.

Casey won the appointment and served as SEC chairman until 1973.

In recent years, he has been an undersecretary of state for economic affairs and president of the U.S. Export-Import Bank.

After working for Reagan's presidential campaign, he was appointed CIA director in 1981.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8WASHINGTON POST
8 October 1983

Casey's Stock Trust Is Cleared

Associated Press

CIA Director William J. Casey announced yesterday that he has obtained the approval of two government agencies to set up a blind trust for his investments, a move designed to quell the criticism over his multimillion-dollar stock portfolio.

The arrangement was approved by the Justice Department and the Office of Government Ethics, said David Martin, director of the office.

A CIA statement said the move "should resolve questions raised concerning the management of his holdings."

As CIA director, Casey has access to the government's most secret economic data. In 1982, while he was at the agency's helm, Casey bought stock and other securities worth between \$1.9 million and \$4.5 million, according to a financial disclosure form released last summer.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

41 EAST 42nd STREET, NEW YORK

FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PROGRAM NEWS

STATION CNN-TV AND THE
CABLE NEWS NETWORK

DATE OCTOBER 8, 1983 8 PM CITY NEW YORK

-BROADCAST EXCERPT

NEWSCASTER: The C.I.A. deals in secrecy. That's its business. Reporters, it follows, have a tough time finding out what's going on inside C.I.A. headquarters. But intelligence expert David Wise has learned of some personnel moves not widely publicized elsewhere. In his commentary tonight, Wise suggests what implications those moves could have.

DAVID WISE: Covering a secret intelligence agency is a little like covering the Kremlin. They don't talk much about what happens inside the walls. So, reporters have to draw conclusions from little things, like who shows up at public appearances, or what shifts in personnel really mean.

In the same spirit, it's valuable to explore some quiet shakeups that have occurred inside the C.I.A. Little or nothing has been said publicly about these changes, but word has a way of seeping out to those who watch the walls.

In the first change, C.I.A. Director William Casey has tapped two former clandestine operatives to handle the agency's dealings with Congress and the press. J. William Doswell, a former Richmond public relations man who headed Casey's Congressional and press relations, has left C.I.A. Casey split the job in two. He named Clark George, until now the second-highest clandestine operator in the agency, to handle Congress. He put George Lauder, another former spook, in charge of public affairs.

C.I.A. hands deny that the agency's desire to shore up Congressional and public support for its covert operation in Nicaragua was behind these moves.

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ON PAGE A-16

MIAMI HERALD
8 October 1983

CIA Director Casey to set up blind trust

file only

CIA Director William Casey, a self-made multimillionaire, announced Friday that he is putting his investments in a trust to resolve controversy about his financial dealings. The 70-year-old intelligence chief said in a statement that the trust "should resolve questions raised concerning the management of his holdings."

Since his appointment in January 1981, Casey had declined to place his holdings in a blind trust as other senior government officials had done. A financial disclosure statement made public last May showed Casey had made as much as \$7 million in stock and security transactions as the stock market began to improve in late 1982.

As CIA director, Casey had access to classified economic information. Nevertheless, the Office of Government Ethics said it could not find any conflict of interest or any

evidence that Casey may have benefited from advance information.

Associated Press
7 October 1983

WASHINGTON

CASEY WILL HEAD DELEGATION TO FUNERAL
COOKE DELEGATION

CIA Director William J. Casey will be President Reagan's personal representative to the funeral Monday of Roman Catholic Cardinal Terence Cooke, the head of the archdiocese of New York who died of cancer Thursday.

Other members of the delegation will include Labor Secretary Raymond J. Donovan; Health and Human Services Secretary Margaret Heckler; White House deputy chief of staff Michael K. Deaver; national security adviser William P. Clark; presidential assistant Edward J. Hickey; Adm. J.D. Watkins, chief of naval operations; William Wilson, the president's special representative to the Vatican, and Clare Booth Luce, a member of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

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7 October 1983

Casey Awarded CIA's Highest Medal For His 'Outstanding Leadership'

United Press International

CIA Director William J. Casey was awarded the agency's highest medal "for outstanding leadership" yesterday during a surprise ceremony at the agency's Langley headquarters.

A citation read by Deputy Director John McMahon said

Casey was awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal for restoring the credibility of the CIA and bringing "imagination to our operation."

Casey took charge of the CIA in 1981 with a mandate to strengthen covert operations and defend U.S. world interests.

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ON PAGE A-11

NEW YORK TIMES
October 1983

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400060003-8

STAT

Casey Awarded C.I.A. Medal

WASHINGTON, Oct. 6 — (UPI) — William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, was awarded the Central Intelligence Agency's highest intelligence medal today "for outstanding leadership." In a surprise ceremony at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va., Mr. Casey was awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal for restoring the credibility of the C.I.A.

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

6 October 1983

Mr. William Broyles, Editor
NEWSWEEK
444 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Mr. Broyles,


I am pleased with the way-the article "The Secret Warriors" conveys the dedication and quality of the people here at the CIA. However, I cannot let stand statements and impressions which are simply not true and which can damage American interests and relationships around the world.

As you know, it is established policy not to comment on intelligence matters so I cannot go into detail. I can only state that I have been provided with a list of some 30 inaccuracies and things that never happened that appeared in your article. One which I can specifically deny because it would be illegal, and CIA does not violate the law, is the allegation that CIA is providing covert aid to the insurgents in Angola.

In a lesser vein, the degree of inaccuracy is illustrated in the statement that I am "travelling at least 50 percent of the time." This is at least a 700 percent distortion of the truth.

On a personal note, I would have hoped in associating my name with Robert Vesco that you would have acknowledged that it was I, as Chairman of the SEC, who acted to stop Vesco's worldwide looting of stockholders' moneys and took unprecedented and successful initiatives to protect the investors he defrauded. In my confirmation by the Senate Intelligence Committee, Stanley Sporkin, SEC Enforcement Chief at the time the Vesco case was broken, spelled this out. He stated that I "directly involved himself in aggressively pursuing the investigation"***"pressed the staff to complete the investigation and to proceed with the appropriate enforcement action as soon as possible"*** "had the foresight to seek the cooperation of other affected governments." He concluded that the Vesco action is "one of the most impressive and important enforcement cases in which the SEC has ever been involved" in which "over 400 million dollars have been recaptured for investors throughout the world."

Sincerely,



William J. Casey

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6 October 1983

WASHINGTON
CASEY GIVEN INTELLIGENCE AWARD

CIA Director William J. Casey on Thursday was awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal, the highest award given to a U.S. intelligence official.

Deputy director John McMahon bestowed the award on Casey at a "surprise" ceremony at Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in suburban Langley, Va., according to CIA spokesman Dale Peterson.

"Under his guidance and direction, the agency has been strengthened and its health restored," McMahon said in presenting Casey the award. "His unique insight into the needs of our policymakers has brought imagination to our operations and relevance to our analysis."

Since Casey took over the CIA in January 1981, the agency has sharply increased its budget and activities, according to officials familiar with its secret operations. Casey has also overseen major covert actions, including the now widely known CIA support for Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries.

Peterson said the award is presented infrequently, but he did not know how many other times the gold medal has been given. Peterson said McMahon has the authority to grant the award.

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WASHINGTON
CASEY CITED FOR REVIVING CIA
BY DANIEL F. GILMORE

William J. Casey, the CIA's controversial director, was awarded the agency's highest medal "for outstanding leadership" Thursday during a surprise ceremony at Langley, Va., headquarters.

A citation read by Deputy Director John McMahon said Casey was awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal for restoring the credibility of the CIA and bringing "imagination to our operation."

A self-made multimillionaire and manager of Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign, Casey has served as the nation's top spy since 1981 and has been involved in a number of controversies -- the latest being disclosure that the Republican campaign obtained a copy of President Carter's briefing book before a crucial 1979 television debate with Reagan. Casey denied involvement in the affair.

"(Casey's) unique insight into the needs of our policy makers has brought imagination to our operation and relevance to our analysis," the citation said in part. "His experience and deep appreciation of world affairs add immeasurably to the credibility of our product and fulfillment of our mission. Mr. Casey's performance is in the highest tradition of federal service."

Casey took charge of the CIA with a White House mandate to strengthen covert operations and defend U.S. interests around the globe.

Casey was no stranger to cloak and dagger affairs. He served as chief of secret intelligence in Europe for the Office of Strategic Services, the CIA's predecessor, during World War II.

Still there were congressional doubts about Casey's long absence from intelligence matters and he soon came under scrutiny on a number of matters, including his financial affairs.

CIA veterans, however, have stoutly backed his leadership.

Casey made his fortune in Wall Street as a high-priced corporate lawyer. He also served in Washington as head of the Securities and Exchange Commission, assistant secretary of state for economic affairs and president of the Export-Import Bank in the Nixon and Ford administrations.

His Reagan campaign activities in 1979 were challenged this summer when, in answer to congressional queries, a White House official said he believed Casey supplied the Carter briefing book. Casey denied involvement.

He told The New York Times in July it would have been "totally uncharacteristic and quite incredible" for him to have obtained such material. "I wouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole," he said.

United States Senate

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October 4, 1983

The Editor
Newsweek
444 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022 -

Dear Sir:

Your article titled "The Secret Warriors" (Newsweek, October 10, 1983) is a terrible example of "shoot from the lip" journalism.

In your diatribe on covert action you state that the CIA is providing "training, arms and financial assistance" to military forces in Angola. If so, this action would violate a 1976 law prohibiting such assistance. Now, this charge by Newsweek is an absolute lie. In response to this charge, CIA spokesman, Dale Peterson, has stated "We obey the law, we do not violate the law."

Why didn't the Newsweek reporters ask the CIA ahead of time about this? Why didn't they ask somebody on our Committee about this? The answer is, if Newsweek had asked these people ahead of time, they would have refuted the charge and there would have been no story. It seems that Newsweek follows the old line that you never let the truth get in the way of a good story. Serious factual errors like this are scattered throughout this article. They call into question everything you write.

During the early 1970's, it appeared that Congress was going to hamstring the American intelligence with its public investigations of alleged abuses within the Intelligence Community. Today, seven years after the formation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and its counterpart on the House side, I believe it is possible to say that the Intelligence Community is recovering very well. Bill Casey has played an important role in this recovery, and he should be commended for his efforts rather than criticized by a bunch of reporters who don't know what they're talking about.

Yes, it is true that the CIA is now "fighting to keep tons of deadly drugs from coming into the United States each year," and the CIA is battling "to keep scores of critical high-tech advances from

4 October 1983

WASHINGTON
CIA
BY PATRICIA KOZA

In a rare public session, the Senate Intelligence Committee approved a bill Tuesday that would streamline the process by which the CIA makes available information under the Freedom of Information Act.

In a related action, the committee released an exchange of letters between Sen. Dave Durenberger, R-Minn., and CIA Director William Casey, in which Casey promised to set up a major new program to declassify documents considered of historical interest.

It was the first time since Reagan abolished compulsory declassification last year that the CIA has indicated a willingness to release at least some documents without a court order.

The legislation was the result of a compromise worked out between the CIA and the committee to improve the security of sensitive CIA files and cut down a tremendous backlog of Freedom of Information Act requests, while still maintaining public access to virtually all material now released by the agency.

Supporters said the bill will only restrict the type of information the CIA would have to search in response to the legal requests. Much of it is classified and the agency will not release it in any case.

A similar bill has been introduced in the House by Rep. Romano Mazzoli, D-Ky.

The CIA sought an exemption from the search procedures because it was creating an enormous administrative burden, with some requests taking as long as three years to fulfill when the time limit for compliance is 10 days.

As part of the compromise, the CIA agreed to retain financing of its information office at the current level to attack the backlog.

The legislation, sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., would exempt from public access all "operational" files -- the CIA's most sensitive files.

Operational files deal with actual CIA activities such as foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and counter-terrorism; operations and investigation of potential sources in those areas, and relationships with foreign governments and intelligence services.

Historians and journalists claim the exemption is large enough to allow the CIA to withhold information indefinitely.

In Casey's letter, he agreed to set up a major new program to declassify historical documents.

"If Congress is willing to provide the resources," Casey's letter said, "I am prepared to institute a new program of selective declassification review of

CONTINUED

WASHINGTON

SENATE PANEL VOTES TO BAR ACCESS TO SOME CIA FILES

BY MIKE SHANAHAN

The Senate Intelligence Committee voted unanimously Tuesday to bar access by journalists, authors and historians to some secret CIA files under the Freedom of Information Act.

"This will satisfy both the CIA's interests and the public's right to know as much as possible about their government," said one committee member, Sen. Walter Huddleston, D-Ky.

The legislation was approved only after CIA Director William Casey agreed to accept changes intended to prevent agency officials from using it to cover up intelligence abuses or to keep secret information of legitimate historical interest.

Casey once called for doing away completely with the Freedom of Information Act, which provides a mechanism for U.S. citizens to obtain information about the operations of all federal agencies.

The CIA had sought exemptions from the eight-year-old law on the grounds that the statute's requirements were burdensome and expensive and could lead to the inadvertent exposure of sensitive information about CIA covert operations.

As approved by the committee, the proposal would allow CIA officials to set aside some operational files now subject to Freedom of Information Act requirements. Such requirements are "imposing unique and serious burdens on this agency," according to the legislation.

The committee chairman, Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., said, "An experienced person must go through stacks and stacks of these papers - sometimes many feet tall - to justify why almost every single sentence should not be released."

The law requires the CIA to review any files sought by a taxpayer and provide an explanation why they cannot be released, even though many of the requested documents concern intelligence methods and operations which are legally out of bounds.

The committee measure would allow operational files to be exempted, but permit persons seeking information to protest to a federal judge if they believe the CIA is using the exemptions improperly.

In addition, investigators of alleged CIA abuses would be granted access to CIA operational files, even if they are exempt under the new proposals.

Eventually, files on CIA operations would become available to historians, but only after there was no risk of exposing CIA agents or methods of operation.

Morton Halperin of the American Civil Liberties Union said the new version of the proposal was a big improvement, although the ACLU will seek further safeguards against CIA cover-ups.

Goldwater said it was unlikely the legislation would reach the Senate floor until after Congress returns from a Columbus Day recess in mid-October.

WASHINGTON
DOCUMENTS

The CIA, under prodding from Congress, today agreed to establish a new program to declassify historical documents.

Meanwhile, the Senate Intelligence Committee approved unanimously and sent to the full Senate a bill designed to ease the burden on the CIA of public requests for access to intelligence papers and data.

The simultaneous actions represent related attempts to respond to CIA complaints that public requests for documents under the Freedom of Information Act were overwhelming and to congressional concerns that public access to important CIA papers not be unduly restricted.

A spokesman for the American Civil Liberties Union welcomed the new CIA declassification program for historical papers and expressed qualified support for the committee-approved bill.

The organization, which lobbies on civil rights and free speech issues, still had problems with the legislation but believed it reflected substantial progress over earlier versions, an ACLU spokesman said.

CIA Director William Casey agreed to establish the new declassification program at the urging of Minnesota Republican David Durenberger, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

"It would demonstrate your commitment to openness in the things that matter while continuing to safeguard that which must remain secret," Durenberger told Casey.

Casey said the program would focus on 20-30 year old files.

Of the Senate bill, Kentucky Democrat Walter Huddleston said: "I am satisfied it will serve both the CIA's operational interests and the public's right to have as much information as possible about their government."

The ACLU was particularly pleased by an amendment to the bill ensuring that people with evidence of the CIA's improperly classifying files could ask a court to review the matter, a spokesman said.

Ex-Kennedy Consultant Linked to Carter

By ROBERT L. JACKSON, *Times Staff Writer*

Debate Papers

WASHINGTON—A Republican congressional aide has told FBI agents that Paul Corbin, a former political consultant to the Kennedy family, boasted last April that he had obtained former President Jimmy Carter's debate briefing papers and had furnished them to President Reagan's election campaign three years ago, according to sources familiar with the case.

But Corbin, under FBI questioning, has flatly denied these assertions by Tim Wyngaard, the GOP aide, the sources said. Thus, the conflict has presented federal investigators with yet another impasse in their long-running political espionage probe.

"It's a case of one person remembering this and another person remembering that," said one official who refused to be named. The Corbin-Wyngaard conflict is "a standoff," he said.

However difficult it may be to prove, Wyngaard's account to the FBI is noteworthy because he quotes Corbin as saying that he delivered the Carter documents to William J. Casey, then Reagan's campaign manager and now direc-

tor of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Casey was named early last summer as the source of such material by White House Chief of Staff James A. Baker III, who was in charge of preparing Reagan for his Oct. 28, 1980, debate with Carter. But Casey has repeatedly denied seeing, handling or even knowing about the pilfered documents, insisting that he would not have touched such papers "with a 10-foot pole."

In Corbin's FBI interview, he contends that he never told Wyngaard, executive director of the House Republican Policy Committee, that he delivered pilfered material to Casey, the investigative sources said. Corbin's account is that he only furnished a six-page memo from a New York attorney suggesting points that Reagan might raise against Carter in the debate.

Corbin, who could not be reached for comment, reportedly told the FBI he became familiar with the anti-Carter strategy document while working as a volunteer in the unsuccessful bid of Sen. Edward M.

Kennedy (D-Mass.) for the Democratic presidential nomination in early 1980. Corbin's attorney, Herbert J. Miller, said neither he nor Corbin would make any public statements about the investigation.

The Washington Post, which disclosed Corbin's role Friday, quoted Casey as saying that the two men are friends and that the Reagan organization had paid Corbin \$2,860 for expenses for campaign work he performed in Florida.

Wyngaard said in a statement that he had "cooperated fully with the proper authorities" but would not discuss the matter publicly. Rep. Dick Cheney (R-Wyo.), GOP policy committee chairman, first relayed word of Wyngaard's account to the White House earlier this year and later was interviewed by the FBI.

The FBI is expected to conclude its field investigation by late October, about the same time that the House Post Office and Civil Service subcommittee on human resources opens hearings on the case.

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WASHINGTON
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POST WATCH

La Casey aux Folles: The long Style-section article on CIA Director William Casey that appeared in early September lacked any snazzy artwork to enliven the piece. Our suggestion: the picture in Ben Bradlee's office of Casey at the exclusive California retreat Bohemian Grove. Casey is wearing a clown suit.

Salaries People Make



Is Paul Volcker, at \$60,663 a Year, the City's Most Underpaid Executive? Is Herbert Haft, at \$1,727,670 a Year, the Most Overpaid? See How You Compare in This Washingtonian Guide to Who Makes How Much Money.

By Hope Lampert with Peter Darling

Government Work

Ronald Reagan's salary as President of the United States is \$200,000. That is slightly less than the \$225,000 that the Teamsters pay their general president, Jackie Presser, and a little more than half the \$350,000 that the Bullets pay second-string guard Kevin Grevey. Reagan makes exactly what Richard Nixon made fourteen years ago.

High government officials are among the most underpaid people in Washington. The only Cabinet member who didn't take a pay cut to take the job was Elizabeth Dole—and that's because she was already in the administration. Bill Casey was making more than \$1 million a year as a New York lawyer when he was named CIA director at \$69,800 a year.

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Guest Commentary

The Threat and the Need for Intelligence



William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

IN A BUSINESS and a world of few absolutes, one thing is certain: our need as a nation for superior intelligence continues to grow. Throughout the world, our country faces serious threats to its security and national interests. These threats include social, economic and political instability, as well as outright military aggression.

Today, we need to be concerned about a greater variety of intelligence problems. In addition to the traditional military and political analysis of different countries, we are beginning to focus more attention on global issues—terrorism, political insurgency, nuclear proliferation and the pilfering of our technology—that cut across national boundaries.

The Soviet Union is still our number one intelligence problem. Its military build-up continues relentlessly; yet the threat from the Kremlin is much broader than just

direct military aggression. Enhanced Soviet military power will be used as a political weapon giving additional force and thrust to diplomatic and propaganda initiatives. With a skillful array of associates, Moscow is using a variety of tactics—political, diplomatic, subversive and insurgent—to expand Soviet influence and destabilize governments. Right now, in concert with Cuba, we see them attempting to bring the struggle to our own backyard in Central America.

As the demands for more information grow, so do the demands on our intelligence collection systems increase. We need a sufficient variety of modern collection methods, both human and technical. We cannot emphasize one method above the other since they only act well in concert. Each collection method answers its own special questions. None can stand alone. The validity of intelligence assessments de-

pends upon multiple sources of information.

New systems must have two major characteristics: flexibility and timeliness. It is not enough that we give our national leaders the right information; we must give it to them at the right moment. It is not enough that we know all there is to know about today's problems; we must be able to anticipate tomorrow's crises and be able to shift our resources appropriately.

We have been hard at work rebuilding our nation's intelligence service since the draw down of the 1970s. We will continue doing our best to keep our country's leaders apprised of the dangers and opportunities, to help them bring timely and effective initiatives to bear. In today's complex world we cannot afford to have an intelligence service that is anything but the best.

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BOOKNOTES

Upcoming and Recommended:
The Halloween Massacre of six years ago—when some 800 "old boys" were fired from the ranks of the top clandestine operators of the CIA—triggered the vivid imagination of Washington writer David Wise. The result: *The Children's Game* (St. Martin's/Marek, \$14.95), in which some of the old boys try to sabotage the agency and take it over again. Given the current controversy over William Casey and possible dirty tricks involving Debategate, the novel, published this month, takes on some immediacy. . . . More than merely a curiosity is the newly reprinted *WPA Guide to Washington, DC* (Pantheon Books, \$8.95), an exhaustive collection of information first compiled by the Federal Writers' Project in the 1930s. Some of the material is dated, of course (taxi zone rates are no longer 20 cents), but much is timeless—and fascinating.